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ABSTRACT 
ON BABEL\ BABEL ON: 
LITERATURE OF THE INSANE 
Since the publication of Michel Foucault's Madness and 
Civilisation the subject of madness has come under much 
academic review. The object of my study is to explore the 
possibilities offered by Foucault's work, to examine and 
extend some of his ideas into the field of literature. By way 
of introduction I concentrate on two paintings of Babel by 
Pieter Bruegel the elder. These paintings offer two opposed 
ways in which madness can be read: the Rotterdam version 
depicts madness as threat, as something alien, whereas the 
Vienna canvas perceives madness in more accessible terms, as 
something intrinsic to the human condition. These two 
versions of madness provide a metaphor both for the 
experience and the reading of madness. The edifice of Babel 
designates the site where madness breaks from the horizontal 
plane (the plane of sanity) to assert its particular 
verticality. I describe the verticality achieved by the 
madman according to three inter-related aspects: a changing 
perception of time, of space and finally the creation of a 
unique language guided by a unique reasoning. These notions 
also allow my study to move from considering the mad writer 
to the mad protagonist and finally to the perception of a 
world imbalanced. By way of concretising these ideas I 
examine Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra and focus on the 
way in which Zarathustra's search for madness was finally 
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consummated in Nietzsche's insanity. In Chapter Two the same 
co-ordinates are applied to William Cowper where I argue that, 
in madness, Cowper is locked outside our time and space and 
trapped in a poetry that manifests and exacerbates his 
madness. His contemporary, Christopher Smart is the subject 
of Chapter Three and presents an opposing experiencing of 
insanity. Confined to an asylum, Smart uses Jubilate Agna as 
a way of escaping the asylum and entering into a timeless and 
spaceless zone. He generates a language of praise, of such 
abandon that he creates for himself a space, a poem big 
enough to accommodate the poet. Following Foucault's scheme 
I move from the classical period to the modern and, in so 
doing, focus my investigation on the contemporary writer 
Samuel Beckett. Chapters Four and Five are thus concerned 
with two of his early novels, Murphy and Watt. For each of 
these protagonists a change occurs, a change that ruptures, 
and renders distant, the old familiar world. For Beckett, 
however, madness does not end here, it continues insinuating 
itself 1rough the mechanisms of reason and language. This 
contamination (which includes space and time) infects the 
narrative to such an extent that it questions the sanity of 
reason, the sanity of language itself. In the conclusion I 
suggest that it is the marginalised status of madness that 
allows it an insidious power, an ability to subvert language. 
The verticality of madness refuses language the certainty and 
the reasoned clarity it most desires. Madness is the doubt 
that makes language unsure of itself, that forces it to 
continue. 
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The Tower of Babel [flotterdam) 

CHAPTER ONE 
I Clovio's Ivory Tower 
There exist a few tales, a few moments in the history of 
story telling that are not domesticated by the passing of 
time. These stories are not merely part of a cultural legacy, 
they are narratives which continually break, unresolved, onto 
the surface. They recur simply because they have not yet been 
solved, explained away. The tower of Babel is one of these -
a tale that sets out to explain the diversity of languages 
and yet contains, upon its surface, a disproportion that 
engenders further confusion. In its telling it produces, as 
if by mistake, a series of breaks that disarm any implied 
moral. In part its impact can be ascribed to its brevity: its 
nine short verses (Genesis 11: 1-9) belie the magnitude of 
the demands made on the reader. But by far the greater part 
of the enigma lies in the implied absence of the tower, "this 
tower with its top reaching heaven" (4). Although it is 
obviously in the process of being built, it is never 
described and is seen only through the angry eyes of Yahweh. 
God's concern is initially, and primarily, linguistic. His 
response is somewhat like the jealous magician's whose 
wizardry has been mastered by expelled apprentices: 
'So they are all a single people with a single 
language!' said Yahweh. 'This is but the start of 
their undertakings! There will be nothing too hard 
for them to do. Come let us go down and confuse 
their language on the spot so that they can no 
longer understand one another.' (6-7) 
This tower, squeezed between two exhaustive genealogies, 
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recedes from attempts to imagine it because it is not there 
in itself but as an alibi for Yahweh's wrath and as a symbol 
of the people's desire. The first stirrings of confusion are 
given a certain credence by the etymology of Babel which is, 
at once, derived from the Hebrew verb 'to confuse' and, in a 
complicitous fashion, designates the 'gates of the gods'. 
Because of the lack of substance to the tower, various 
constellations of signification settle on the place where it 
should be. These are readings which attempt to flesh out the 
skeleton of this unsayable architecture. The obvious version 
(and one achieved precisely by not reading between the lines) 
is that 'God's confusion' was visited upon Noah's sons 
because they did not heed the covenant (9: 11). Theirs was an 
attempt to equal Yahweh, to build a tower of presumption into 
the heights. Their downfalling was their vanity. The second 
reading has Noah's children motivated by paranoia (and if 
God's reasoning in this section is anything to go by, an 
extremely sound paranoia) and the tower a progressive thrust 
towards knowledge based on past experience. The tower built 
on knowledge is an iconic representation of the organic 
counterpart in Eden - in itself a movement towards wisdom and 
the 'gate of the gods'. There are thus two Falls. 
Both involve a transgression of limits established by 
the ambiguity of Gods providence. Both involve a distancing 
from the Logos, the divine and creative word. And finally, 
both imply a need on the part of human ingenuity to bridge 
the gap imposed. This Logos stands as a Utopian promise, a 
language so pure, so quintessential that to discover it again 
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will ensure a semantics not about life but of life. The 
promise of this primal language is that we will no longer 
have to harness words, batter and barter with them in order 
to create a small clearing where words can, once more, mean 
without inverted commas. For all the apparent malevolence of 
Yahweh the belief remains, and in a sense has outlived its 
creator, that this original can be retrieved from the debris 
of merely functional speech. Babel, with its emphasis on 
language, is a tale that fictionally portrays the space upon 
which art must build. The process of artistic and linguistic 
representation does not begin with the Fall from Eden but 
with the Fall from Babel. The confusion of language, its 
breaking up into splintered tongues, details a widening 
breech within signification. This hiatus exists between the 
moment where Adam named and, in so doing, completed the 
creation of the animals -
I named them, as they passed, and understood 
Their nature, with such knowledge God endued 
My sudden apprehension ... (Paradise Lost Book VIII, 
352-54) 
- and the moment of Babel where humanity lost the remaining 
vestiges of a pre-lapsarian consciousness. From this moment 
on language became a system of signs operating within a 
social construct. These signs are little more than gestures 
at the impossibility of the Real, but they are all that 
remain. Babel then is a sign of the courage and folly of a 
people trying to reach, with flawed materials, the 'gates of 
the gods'. The fall that began with Eden finds its conclusion 
in Babel. 
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In its incomplete presence, Babel exists as a space of 
promise and damnation, of knowledge and confusion. And as a 
compounded paradox it can communicate only by being 
constantly translated out, made to appear finished. Not only 
is it a parable for the act of translation but it involves 
itself in this act before its parable can be encoded. This is 
at the heart of the matter. Babel's emptiness is an incentive 
to create, albeit it on a lower level than God's summoning 
into being. Here however God destroys this creation by an act 
of translation: one that entails a crossing over from the 
order of construction to the chaos of an impasse in speech, 
from a busy populace crawling through its infrastructure 
(directed by a common speech towards a common goal) to empty 
ramparts and individuals, lost in the idiosyncrasy of 
Wittgenstein's private language. But even in these alienated 
towers there is, once more, the need to create, if only on a 
lesser scale. Construction and destruction feed into each 
other, follow from each other. Absence is eroded by presence, 
Babel is always given dimension, its ruins are forever being 
unearthed and in this process more and more translations 
gather to support this archetypal artifice. 
If Babel sets a biblical precedent with the fall from a 
universal language it also establishes another limit. It 
names the first site of madness. Not that madness had not yet 
appeared 1 for it had been used to describe Noah's mad project. 
Noah's madness however, belongs to a higher cause (the 
legislation of Yahweh) and his sanity is proved in 
retrospect. The flood washes away this impeachment. Babel 
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designates a break with history, a break made more severe by 
the comprehensive genealogical parentheses that are its 
frame. Babel, or as Steiner puts it, "a lunatic tower , • 
launched at the stars'' (57) is the place where madness finds 
its biblical roots: firstly, because it depicts an attempt to 
contravene God's reasoning - an attempt to escape God and to 
reach him - and hence alienates itself from the 'sanity' of 
God's being; secondly it ushers in a complete breakdown in 
communication and with it the confusion of madness. Nowhere 
in this history had there appeared the blank look that 
questions all that the self (as a social and linguistic 
construct) appears to be. 
Incomprehension disintegrates all that hitherto had 
meant unity and familiarity and leaves, in its wake, all the 
symptoms of an alienated mind. Alienation, in turn, scatters 
these people, drives them away in search of another horizon, 
a place where reconstruction can begin again. 
This tower of paradox endures as a disturbing motif 
simply because it flaunts, on all these tiers, the polysemy 
of its design. Babel's inexplicability, its very silence 
taunts, challenges us to give it a name and thereby to make 
it present. Arguably the most popular of these attempts is an 
approximation that, suitably, is found in the visual rather 
than the written canvas. Pieter Bruegel the elder depicted 
Babel on three occasions. It became for him, as it did for 
Kafka (see Steiner 67), an image that troubled his 
imagination. Babel, it seems, denied his attempts to 
concretise it within one enduring form. 
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The 'first' version was painted on ivory and is 
"recorded in the estate of Clovio" (Martin 16). This version, 
in miniature, is perhaps the true Babel, the one that cannot 
be possessed, the lost one. 
The Rotterdam version works by the immense size it 
conveys, the uniformity of the tiers ascending far into the 
heavens while, below, clouds hover in vague threat. It leans 
precariously and the unfinished infrastructure appears as a 
skeleton bearing its heady message. Human life is reduced to 
insect-like forms labouring in the distance, indistinct and 
overpowered by the magnitude of their creation. In overall 
effect its statement is devastating: Babel has achieved its 
status as the tower reaching into the heavens but in so doing 
it has created something that approximates the awesome 
dimensions of Yahweh. The tower represents God in magnitude 
and in threat, reducing humanity to insignificance on the 
threshold of obliteration. Most disturbing is the rigour of 
its construction for it depicts an alien order and provides a 
perspective open only to painter and viewer. There is no-one 
near to corroborate this sight, no mediating vision to 
humanise this awful construction. It juts from the linear 
plane, disturbing the space of an unspoiled countryside: a 
monolithic phallus, unyielding, remote and cruel. While this 
represents the God to whom it inevitably refers, it also 
describes a humanity dwarfed and engulfed by its own 
megalomania - a removed people challenging an equally removed 
creator, a faceless people defying and deifying the God they 
deserve. 
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To shift our terms slightly, this tower speaks as 
eloquently of a dominant conception of madness. 
Here madness itself is cruel. rt too sits stark upon the 
horizon, an unnatural structure that disrupts the languid 
contours of natural geometry and appears to be devised 
according to an ungainly linearity. Again its message is one 
of threat: an irrevocable break with the natural. The 
perspective in this painting is such that the building bulges 
out, almost rupturing the canvas in which it is enclosed. 
This wide-angle prospect ensures that the threat is 
exacerbated for the viewer. Uniformity of colouration and the 
low hanging clouds darken and render visually silent both the 
right side of Babel and the countryside that lies in its 
shadow. The disproportionate angles of the building (which 
create its leaning effect) predict the imminence of the fall 
but also displace nature's axis, making nature appear as if 
it is imbalanced in terms of the tower which dwarfs its 
milieu. 
The madness of this enterprise is thus represented by 
the tower - physically it stands (in) for madness. As viewer, 
one is forced into seeing the many aspects of madness as 
danger, as a threat that looms over the (sanity of the) 
viewer: silent, huge and inhuman. 
For Bruegel's audience it was perhaps enough to turn 
away enlightened, aware of the madness present in all 
attempts to contravene God's word. But if this kind of 
didacticism was all that concerned the Flemish painter, one 
version would have sufficed. 
7 
Appearing as an earlier version of the tower the 
painting in Vienna bears a resemblance to the former in 
perspective, the direction of the light source and the 
presence of a sea-port. However, this repetition of Babel 
works by difference rather than similarity. This 1563 version 
depicts Babel within the confines of a town and gains a 
certain proportion by being placed between the angular houses 
to its left and the ramparts of the castle apparent in the 
shadows on its right. It is 'accommodated' between the 
peasants' houses and the royal apartments. That it spans 
class is lent further support by the foregrounded presence of 
Nimrod and his subjects. Nimrod's viewing of the work in 
progress also allows the viewer a point of reference, an 
aspect that humanises this tower. Babel is the focal point of 
the painting: it encompasses and unifies those who live 
beneath it. 
The estranging twilight sky of the former is replaced by 
placid blue skies, the sunlight is gentle and even the clouds 
lend a harmony to the uppermost turret. These lyrical 
qualities are testimony to an indulgence on Bruegel's part. 
Here Babel is not only conveyed as an essentially human 
construct but also as something that belongs to the natural. 
Although nature has been disrupted by the consequences of the 
mercantile spirit (the wall that extends from the left and 
barricades the town from the countryside, the road that leads 
to the horizon) nature re-appropriates this world, enclosing 
the town with its sea and 'greening' (colouring green) the 
houses in the distance. 
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But perhaps most surprising is that the tower appears to 
be built out of rock, out of the unformed granite in its 
centre and above to the right. What is thus presented is an 
ingenious, although foolish, attempt to mould out of nature a 
solution to the threat of another cataclysm. Perched upon 
Babel's periphery a collection of small dwellings -
cottages upon the precipice - that complete this picture of 
tenacity and folly in the face of experience. For all its 
intricate structure and the frenzy of activity of those upon 
its walls it does not appear as if it will assume the same 
estranging dimensions as the Rotterdam canvas. 
Again, to translate this into the terms of madness 
produces an extremely different view of Babel. Madness is no 
longer a proclamation of the alien but follows the contours 
of the natural and the social landscape. Its potential danger 
is diffused by it being a participant within a hermetic 
world. Possessing a somewhat clumsy symmetry it nevertheless 
incorporates all dimensions of social standing. The result is 
a mawkish lyricism of line broken by a fundamental folly 
built in from its inception. Here the madness of the tower is 
neither alien nor particularly threatening, it fits in along 
the axes from right to left and from foreground to background 
and like the green hue that spreads over the houses, madness 
is infused into the whole picture. As a perception of madness 
it becomes integral to both the natural and the social world. 
It is normalised and while it never loses its fundamental 
violence it is suitably accommodated in the range of 
behaviour. Madness is built out of natural materials, it is 
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an idiosyncratic response fashioned out of the unformed 
material of living. 
These two versions of the tower produce a concatenation 
of meanings that spiral like the path around the 
circumference of the tower: a creation that embraces sanity 
and madness, that sees madness as alien and, also, as a 
fundamental part of all human endeavour and finall~as a 
place at once uninhabited yet eroded constantly by 
presences. 
II Translating Babel 
As with so many paradoxes, the history of the tower, and 
the history of madness, is a history of trans-lations out of 
its silence into a reading that makes sense upon the terra 
cognito of the prevalent discourse. The tower must be brought 
back to earth. 
These two versions of the tower provide a dual response: 
a response firstly to the incomplete presence of the tower 
and secondly to the proportions of the 'other' tower. To 
speak of madness is also a response to the lack of completion 
in madness; like the tower it exists in a space that does not 
give itself up easily to description, to words. Madness 
registers itself as silence either because it has become 
entirely autistic (Schizophrenic catatonia) or because it 
yields none of the sustained patterns that constitute 
everyday speech. The latter (Hebrephenic, Paranoid) 
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constitut~s a silence perhaps more disturbing than the 
catatonic 'type'. It is normal speech hopelessly distracted 
by the obsession of the speaker: "I am dead", "I am damned by 
the wrath of an all-loving God". The initial premise which 
commences contact ~ith another person operates according to 
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rules which are lost on the madman. Mad discourse forever 
veers from the plane of 'normalcy', making obvious (and hence 
drawing attention to the artificiality of language) the rules 
that enable social intercourse. This inappropriateness denies 
response and forces the sane into a silence from which he or 
she may answer with another kind of silence {that of 
treatment and exclusion). 
Both silences serve to place the madman within the 
mirror: as a fragmentary, ethereal being lost in the delusion 
of the mirror world, the unreal world. It is precisely the 
surface of the mirror - the '\' of this paper's title - which 
sanity relies on for its reflection and verification. The 
madman is a prisoner beyond that reflection and thus the 
entrapment within the mirror does not, as Lewis Carroll knew, 
merely involve an inverted mimesis. Existence within the 
mirror operates according to rules of mutation not simply 
inversion, of contraries not mere refutation. The experience 
is such that the madman looks in the mirror and finds not 
himself but someone more real than the self that looks. 
Madness is, thus, also a response to the otherness of sanity, 
it takes and corrupts the language of normality and creates 
languages (each uniquely distracted) that comment on and 
challenge the discourses by which we live. To an extent, 
then, to speak of madness is an impossible task which, at 
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best, can only speak of the limits of madness: a point at 
which discourse can be aimed only to fall short. The study of 
madness is a study of a double failure: the individual's 
failure to remain within the established limits and a failure 
for those who desire to read that madness. Shoshana Felman 
acknowledges both the obligation and the failure: 
[O]ur historic task would be to give madness a 
voice, to restore its language: a language of 
madness and not about it. Now, our present cultural 
predicament ... derives precisely from our 
incapacity to articulate this language: while 
intending to 'say madness,' one is necessarily 
constrained to speak about it. (14) 
This breakdown is not limited to madness but is intrinsic to 
all acts of translation. Whether as paraphrase, phonetic 
transcription, poetic rendering or imitation, translation 
produces a text about rather than of the source language. And 
this in turn can be taken further. All languages are in 
themselves translations. As Octavio Paz puts it: 
No text is entirely original because language 
itself, in its essence, is already a translation: 
firstly, of the non-verbal world and secondly, 
since every sign and every phrase is the 
translation of another sign and another phrase. 
(qtd. in Bassnett-McGuire 38) 
Babel becomes the elaborate site where sanity, madness, 
language and translation cross over each other in a continual 
act of definition and redefinition. If the translation of 
madness is open to the same problems as translation itself 
then its failure, its incompleteness, is symptomatic of all 
attempts at signification. In this sense madness plays out in 
exaggerated form the problems of crossing over from signified 
1. to signifier, from the source to the target language, from 
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the world out there to the language in here. The drama of 
madness is made all the more 'realistic' by its proximity to 
the structure of the sane discourse. Madness, as I will 
attempt to show, may consist of an extremely specific and 
deluded language but is, nevertheless, one that operates 
according to the same conditions as ours: it makes use of a 
'reason' and language in a way that emulates the way in which 
sanity makes sense. Furthermore, all of the writers I intend 
to examine are intimately involved in the problematic of 
translation, either in the usual sense of the term or in 
Paz's more figurative reading: Cowper spent many of his later 
years involved in the translation of Homer, Smart produced an 
important translation of Horace and Beckett is arguably one 
of the most astute translators of our century not only in his 
translations of Rimbaud, Paul Eluard and Sebastien Chamfort 
but in his meticulous translation of himself into words and 
into different languages. Finally there is Nietzsche 
(discussed in translation) whose 'philosophising with a 
hammer' was an attempt to break through, to translate, the 
crust of the present. This was to be a translation from the 
lowliness of 'the herd' to the height of the Overman. 
A question remains however. How does one translate 
madness without it becoming, as Walter Benjamin acerbically 
puts it, "the inaccurate transmission of an inessential 
content" (70)? This kind of translation is best exemplified 
by Egas Moniz whose inventiveness in 1935 'solved' much of 
the puzzle of madness's silence. David Cooper describes this 
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solution as follows: 
you just sat in the dentist's chair and had a 
chisel hammered home just above your eye-ball to 
sever the fronto-thalamic tracts to separate your 
thought from your feeling. You paid not too much 
more than a dentist's price to go home with one ... 
black eye - and a new personality. No personality. 
(102) 
Moniz is perhaps an extreme example but he is not alone in 
the history of madness-translation. Moniz represents one way 
in which madness has been (and is) decoded into the language 
of health. As there are two towers there are two translations 
of madness. 
Michel Foucault, in Madness and Civilisation, begins his 
history of madness with Bruegel's near contemporaries (Bosch 
and Byrant) and the way in which the high Middle Ages 
designated the beginning of a change in the attitude towards 
madness. This entailed a movement away from a perception of 
madness whereby it was tolerated - an irritation upon a skin 
that had until recently festered with leprosy - towards a 
reading of madness as threat, as something that must be 
locked away, expelled from the social body. Foucault's 
reading will inform much of this essay partly because it 
serves to expose so much that is pertinent to my study of 
Cowper and Smart (both victims of this Classical exclusion) 
and partly because it provides an explication of Bruegel's 
Babels. The Rotterdam canvas presages the Classical attitude 
towards madness: as something alien and foreboding, a gesture 
incomprehensible and, hence, dangerous. The Vienna Babel also 
depicts madness as folly but does so with understanding and 
sympathy: it reads madness as it was (a thing intrinsic to 
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living) and not as it was to become (a proof of one's 
animality, of an inhuman state). 
These translations are not simply an event that happened 
with the changing sensibility of the Renaissance. Madness 
continues to be read in either one of these ways. From 
Plato's Phaedrus to Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus 
authors have been taking sides, reading into its silence 
threat or the lost fragments of the human. 
The arch-translator Freud forged a language of dreams 
and repression in an attempt to create a mediating discourse 
between sanity and madness. This vocabulary is strange to 
both states and yet in its very strangeness creates a 
linguistics of translation that seeks to break through the 
boundary separating them. However, in continuing to see 
madness as something alien, and thus maintaining the 
conviction of the Classical episteme, Freud pushed the madman 
even further into exclusion. The madman was now a victim 
entirely subject to the otherness of the therapist: 
The doctor, as an alienating figure, remains the 
key to psychoanalysis. It is perhaps because it did 
notsuppress this ultimate structure, and because it 
referred all the others to it, that psychoanalysis 
has not been able, will not be able, to hear the 
voices of unreason, nor to decipher in themselves 
the signs of the madman. Psychoanalysis can unravel 
some of the forms of madness; it remains a stranger 
to the sovereign enterprise of unreason. (Foucault 
278) 
However, for all of Foucault's animosity toward the praxis of 
psychoanalysis it still does not detract from Freud's genius 
as translator. It is as translatji (and the audacity of that 
translation), as one groping towards the essence of 
insanity's silence in his libidinal theory, in his Eros and 
1 5 
Thanatos that Freud set a precedent for all those who would 
follow. He created a space that not only enabled Klein and 
Lacan but his detractors - notably Foucault, Deleuze and 
Guattari, R.D. Laing, and Cooper - to speak. 
If Freud designates one of the faces of the approach to 
madness, it is 'balanced' by the other face: 
Although the mad often seemed so alien, so alien of 
mind as (it was believed) to require exclusion from 
society, their testaments plainly echo, albeit 
often in an unconventional or distorted idiom, the 
ideas, values, aspirations, hopes and fears of 
their contemporaries .... When we read the writings 
of the mad, we gain an enhanced insight into the 
sheer range of what could be thought and felt, at 
the margins. (2) 
Coming at the beginning of Roy Porter's A Social History of 
Madness, this statement not only sets the tone of his study 
but offers an increasingly popular approach to the study of 
madness. This study has reviewed madness in historical terms 
in an attempt to disinvest psychology's hold over the 
subject. Since the 1960's - this period that Umberto Eco (61-
85) sees as the new Middle Ages - mainstream psychology has 
come increasingly u~der attack from those who question the 
validity of its classificatory system and its diagnostic 
treatment of madness. Psychology's abstruse vocabulary in its 
articulations about madness has largely succeeded in 
continuing the mystification of insanity. What Porter and, to 
a greater extent, Foucault have done is, by careful 
historical analysis, to re-appropriate madness - to demystify 
it and to show that it is not as marginal as it was believed 
to be. 
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Madness, when historically decoded, comes to mimic the 
proportions of normality. Not that, for Porter, madness 
vanishes under the microscope of historical retrospection but 
that it is incorporated into the spectrum of idiosyncrasy 
that constitutes, at any given moment, normalcy. The 
sensation of the mad looking increasingly like the merely odd 
is encouraged by the distance between past and present. Our 
legacy of lunacy is decoded according to the present 
'reasonableness' and is translated into terms that are 
familiar, if not filial. The madman comes home. 
Porter re-examines, for example, the case of Daniel 
Schreber and criticises Freud's approach (and the many neo-
Freudian readings which have followed) arguing that in 
Freud's pursuit of the unconscious he ignores the bulk of 
Schreber's Memoirs (156). For Porter, Schreber's claims of 
persecution are not necessarily fanciful and arise not from 
childhood experiences but from deprivation and solitary 
confinement: 
the soul-deadening, soul-murdering tedium of one 
without company, deprived of books, pen and paper, 
of anything to occupy his mind .... Under those 
circumstances what else could Schreber do but go 
mad? 'Only he who knows the full measure of my 
sufferings in past years can understand that such 
thoughts were bound to arise in me.' (165-66) 
From here, the second response is inevitable. Yesterday's 
lunatic becomes a hero, or at worst, a pathetic guru 
preaching a lost wisdom. And madness, newly understood, 
assumes the dimensions of a romantic ideal; in escaping from 
the inner sanctum of psychology it finds itself enclosed in 
another kind of mystery, a different religion. So we find 
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Foucault stripping away the mask that holds madness captive 
but replacing it with, admittedly, a more esoteric one. 
Foucault mourns the loss of madness to psychology (by this he 
means psychoanalysis) and recalls, with a certain nostalgia, 
a time when madness still had access to truth: "Madness deals 
not so much with truth and the world, as with man and 
whatever truth about himself he is able to perceive" (27). 
Less restrained is the glorification of madness offered by 
David Cooper's 'anti-psychiatry'. It is not that the mad 
should merely be included in our definition of the normal, 
but that sanity should look to madness for its wisdom and its 
hope: 
Non-psychiatry means that profoundly disturbing, 
incomprehensible, 'mad' behaviour is to be 
contained, incorporated in and diffused through the 
whole society as a subversive source of creativity, 
spontaneity, not 'disease'. (117) 
This is obviously tempting to the student of literature. 
Madness becomes an artistry unconscious of itself but 
providing literature with a 'new' source of inspiration, 
imagination freed from the shackles of what can, at any one 
time, be thought. But in the same way that Freud allows 
Cooper to speak, the latter is still governed by the need to 
allocate blame. Freud's blaming of the Oedipal scenario is, 
ironically, no different to Cooper's Marxist blaming of The 
Family. In this analysis of blame he merely replays the kind 
of thinking he finds so objectionable in the psychoanalytic 
paradigm. His anti-psychiatry would fit in neatly with the 
likes of Freud, Ernest Jones, Jacqueline Rose and Lacan in 
their efforts to find the site of blame within Hamlet. As 
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inescapable as blame is to the critical process it also hides 
behind its accusatory causality an idealism, a belief that 
the world would be better if some aspect of the pathology of 
the normal was brought to trial. Central as this unsaid tenet 
is to criticism it has to be foregrounded because of its 
particularly invidious relation to madness. The dialectic of 
blame establishes a causality that although focused on 
madness begins and plays itself out elsewhere: it pursues 
madness by running parallel to it. This imposition of what 
Foucault calls a ~axonomic grid is perhaps essential for 
those who would cure madness by changing and reforming the 
structures that have been built around madness. My task in 
this essay is more modest. It is, in a sense, pre-critical in 
so far as I am not interested in diagnosing and curing 
Cowper, Smart, Nietzsche or Beckett but rather in discovering 
their madness, in hearing the violence that has been lost 
through commentary and time. Translation seeks, above all, to 
hear the original, to hear as fully as possible the rhythms 
of its internal voice, to penetrate the silence that lies at 
the centre of its art. Within the diversity of translations 
there is the possibility of assuming more and more the 
contours of the original. 
Madness, as I have argued, feeds off sanity; it is 
located upon the horizontal plane of common perception. Again 
like Babel, madness exists unnoticed until it breaks with the 
horizontal and forges for itself an edifice of difference, a 
place where its vision is other. Madness 'begins' by 
, 
asserting its verticality, as the many cliches on madness 
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testify: "off his head" or "out of her tree" are expressions 
that denote people whose behaviour not only signals a dis-
placement ~f the axes of stability but suggest a height, a 
severing of the links that hold humanity to the plane of the 
rational. It is the verticality of madness that must be 
reappropriated, not as a way of domesticating it within an 
order (be it Marxist, psycho-analytic or Laingian), but as a 
way of throwing it into crisis, of criticising so as to 
reveal, if only obscurely, the lines of an older 
architecture. 
In the practice of psychology, for example, the 
diagnostic manual currently in use employs five different 
axes in order to narrow down the extent and the nature of the 
dis-order. Open to constant revision it attempts to refine 
its categories so as to facilitate precise treatment. Now 
this is commendable for those involved in an understaffed and 
difficult profession, but it does encourage the practitioner 
to believe that these mental categories (beginning with 
neurosis and psychosis) are fact rather that approximations, 
are, finally, precisely ways of not hearing. The attempt to 
document the madman must eventually be recognized as an 
endless record of the exception and one that must inevitably 
inculpate the documenter. A supposedly clear case of lunacy, 
for example, refers to another whose madness is perhaps less 
obvious, which, in turn, evokes another. Soon one has pursued 
madness's variegated forms into the heart of normality and 
the documenter is forced to disband the project or impose 
limitations which exist only in abstraction. Thus we have the 
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DSM III with its diagnostic categories that substitute the 
complexity of the individual case with a clarity that is 
finally no more than a series of generalizations so vaguely 
applicable as to be nothing more than a sophisticated 
fiction. Given the slight modification in vocabulary, we have 
in the DSM III a document that strives for scientific clarity 
only to find, even if not to itself, a kind of horoscope of 
mental categories, a work of fiction. 
What is needed is not the creation of increasingly 
refined categories of mental illness but rather the 
postponement of diagnosis; not permanently as Cooper suggests 
out of hand but long enough for madness to be heard 
critically, as a state in crisis. My translation seeks this 
in three interrelated ways. 
Firstly it is necessary to trace madness back to its 
literary genesis. The models of madness derive not from 
empirical observation but from metaphor, from a poetic 
impetus. Although concentrating on the culpability of madness 
Jennifer Radden makes the point: 
Mental disorders are often spoken of as diseases 
even in the case of functional conditions which 
want for any widely accepted explanation in organic 
terms and are as yet identified only as a set of 
psychological and behavioural manifestations. What 
was once a metaphorical extension has come to 
acquire a literal meaning. (17-18) 
If this is true of the disease model of madness it is equally 
true of the moral model prevalent in the reading of madness 
from the early Greek myths to the Middle Ages and discernible 
in the work of the anti-psychiatrists. Whether as disease or 
as divine possession, for sanity to speak about madness 
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requires that it borrow from other discourses. Madness 
rendered explicable by means of linguistic convention sets a 
precedent for a consideration of madness solely as the 
subject of language. An attempt must be made to find a space 
before madness becomes like something else. 
But where is this space, this point where the silence of 
madness is converted into speech? This question can best be 
answered by concentrating on the place and the moment where 
madness first asserts its verticality. Here lies the second 
site of my translation. There is a moment when the 
co-ordinates of the familiar no longer function in their old 
ways and they collapse in confusion - a transitionary state 
before the formation of a new and estranged pattern becomes 
apparent. Although there are obviously other manifestations 
indicative of the onset of madness I have limited myself to 
the changing perceptions towards spatio-temporal continuity. 
Space and time continue to provide us with a sense of 
enduring normality. To misuse Nietzsche's dictum: 'I fear we 
are not getting rid of space and time because we still 
believe in grammar'. These images provide a sense of order, a 
fixed point around which we revolve. And yet as we know, our 
conception of space and time changes in our experience of 
ecstasy, tragedy, hunger and boredom. If this change is 
coincidental with all moments of excess then for the mad 
(dwelling within the paradigm of excess) it is to be expected 
that their spatio-temporal conceptions must change in order 
to 'normalise' that excess. 
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In very different ways these writers are engaged in an 
act of self voyeurism; they see themselves gazing from afar, 
watching themselves as strangers. These authors enact 
Pascal's crisis of vision - to see themselves transported 
from the knowing centre to the edge of ignorance. From here, 
high upon the walls of Babel they create desperately, create 
implausibly but create and give form to the platform upon 
which they stand. It is this desperate creation that 
constitutes the third aspect of my investigation. Creation 
becomes a way of re-solving the disorientations of space and 
time, a way of finding a unique resolution to their state. 
Unique it may be but this does not mean that their resolution 
is chaotic or disordered. What is remarkable in each of these 
writers is that the expression of madness follows a logic -
whether it is motivated by terror, praise or boredom it is 
that logic that both alienates and seduces the reader. If 
logos comprises the etymological base for both 'word/ speech' 
and 'reason', the insane discourse parodies the established 
effectiveness of any given discourse. It is a discourse that 
usurps the 'reason' of the logos while making use of the 
supremacy of the 'word'. Insanity drives a wedge into the 
logos creating a lacuna between reason and its expression. 
Madness continually modifies 'reason', reshaping the use of 
the 'word' until it reflects and explains the world once 
more. But this moulding necessarily asserts a world sui 
generis: a way of perceiving that approaches the limen of 
Wittgenstein's private language. Radden also recalls 
Wittgenstein but she holds that discourse cannot exist under 
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these circumstances: 
A 'private language' like the schizophrenic's 
speech is hardly a language, and certainly 
'thought' undertaken in it could not rightly be 
described as rational or reasonable. The minimum 
requirement of having reason ... would seem to be 
communicable thought ... which presupposes the 
ability to test reality [and] is the basis upon 
which the application of logic proceeds. (82) 
While this is crowded with questionable assumptions it does 
raise the difficulty encountered in the mad poet. Surely 
"communicable thought" is a possibility even given a faulty 
testing of reality? The idea of communicable thought requires 
both a communicator and one who can interpret or translate 
the message. For the madman pre-occupied (again the spatial 
reference) with delirium, madness is a matter of language - a 
logos distorted and deranged but one that requires exactly 
the same process of translation as is encountered in all 
attempts to read. To translate madness is then an enquiry 
into the nature and limits of reading. It is an enquiry into 
the potential of language's ability to represent, for madness 
does not know of (or can no longer believe in) the prevalent 
forms of representation. Madness constantly postulates 
demented worlds which are contiguous with ours and yet are 
not governed by what Erich Fromm calls the "pathology of 
normalcy" (12). The challenge involuntarily undertaken by the 
madman's logos is that which Steiner sees as central to the 
demands of contemporary literature: 
So that 'words may again be the word' and the 
living truth said, a new language must be created. 
For meaning to find original untarnished 
expression, sensibility must shake off the dead 
hand of precedent as it is, ineradicably, 
entrenched in existing words and grammatical 
moulds . ( 1 8 5 ) 
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What Steiner is essentially describing here is the Vienna 
Babel, a centre of creation that incorporates the diversity 
of social standing into the project of generating a new 
language, a language of verticality. This is not the alien 
language of the other Babel but a rough hewn and dynamic 
discourse struggling to assert itself above the plane of the 
vulgate, the place of dead, dry words. It is this language 
that we find in Smart in his assertion that the Hebrew lamed 
is physically inscribed within all aspects of creation 
(Jubilate Agna Fragment B 477-491 ). 
If this constitutes the potentiality of madness it is 
tempered by the limitations of madness as discourse. Here is 
the other Babel. Seemingly void of human presence it 
represents the place where madness approaches the threshold 
of Wittgenstein's private language and the unspeakable 
language of catatonia. This is the pole to which Cowper is 
drawn in his final years. He could be describing this Babel 
when in the year prior to his death he translates his own 
"Montes Glaciales": 
Their lofty summits, crested high, they show, 
With mingled sleet and long-incumbent snow. 
The rest is ice .... 
Thus stood - and, unremovable by skill 
Or force of man, had stood the structure still; 
( 430-31) 
The rest, as Beckett notes, is silence. These Babels thus 
provide a correlative for the reading and the experience of 
madness. Bruegel's existing versions assume, with this kind 
of consideration, an uncanny mobility. rhey slip and slide 
about the surface of signification, attaching themselves to 
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the plethoric perspectives of madness: at once depicting the 
ways in which it can be read by the sane and the ways it is 
suffered by the mad. 
My wish is then to retain, as far as possible, this 
sense of continuity (given the irreducible silence of the 
ivory Babel), constantly to bridge. The most obvious way of 
bridging these worlds, of searching for ways across the 
divide of translation would be, as Porter and Foucault do, to 
follow a historical course, to trace through time the 
historical productions and mL 1ifestations of madness. 
Although there is some kind of chronological movement between 
Cowper and Smart (18th century), Nietzsche (19th) and 
Beckett, my concern is with madness as a supra-historical 
condition - as that which exists in tandem with history, and 
yet as that which exists in a vertical relation to the plane 
of history. Irrespective of the existing model of madness, 
the terms according to which it is addressed guarantees it a 
marginalised status. It towers above the vocabularies of 
social discourse and while its foundation is rooted in 
history, its onset and culmination subvert the time and space 
- the historical locale - of its origin. Thus, on the one 
hand, it is not fortuitous that Cowper and Smart form an 
early part of my analysis. They depict the Classical crisis, 
in the history of perce~ving madness (described by Foucault) 
and deserve consideration as such. On the other hand however, 
the multivalence of Babel suggests that in madness there is a 
silence that is disguised by the very history that sets out 
to expose it. Between the genealogies of historical 
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continuity the madness of Babel continues (as a void) to 
avoid transcription. 
Foucault stands out as one who, in Madness and 
Civilisation, attempts to encroach upon that which is 
forbidden by the decency of accepted speech. In part the 
evocatory beauty of Foucault's treatise can be ascribed to 
his ability to penetrate beyond his essentially historical 
scheme into a poetics of the timeless: a poetry of those 
caught up in the "lyric glow of illness" (qtd. in Felman 52). 
Although Derrida finds this pot _cising objectionable (61-63) 
he acknowledges the challenge undertaken by Foucault: the 
desire not to talk about madness, but of madness, to pursue 
the accepted terms of academic discourse into a place where 
it begins to glow with its own disturbing lyricism. It is 
this same fund beyond control that lies at the heart of the 
creative process and it is this that Foucault (and Derrida 
for all his protesting) implicitly realises. This signifies 
the point of contact between the madmen of writing and the 
writing of madmen, the desire behind all translation. 
Rather than focusing solely on those who suffered under 
the curse and blessing of madness I will attempt to follow a 
continuity that begins with one who dwelt in the lands of 
both madness and sanity (Nietzsche) before moving into those 
whose personal relation to madness was lifelong (Cowper and 
Smart) and finally to Beckett whose mental condition has 
never been in doubt. The procedure is to follow the writer 
imbalanced to the world displaced. 
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Because of the difficulty encountered in too rigorous an 
historical approach my analysis will commence in the middle 
of Foucault's history. The middle state is also personally 
important to any examination of madness. Not only does it 
depict the initial manifestation of turbulence, the collapse 
of an ability to act within the constraints of the normal, 
but it also furnishes a time that contains the beginning of 
madness and the end of sanity. The subject poised between 
incompatible languages thrashes about in the face of a sane 
language that no longer makes sense and one that does not yet 
make sense. 
Nietzsche's writing conveys exactly this struggle within 
languages, between a language that he sees as corrupted and 
empty and the language of his philosophy with all the dangers 
of a new semantics. Above all Nietzsche realises that madness 
is conceived of within the folds of sanity, it breaks clear 
and in the resultant clarity yearns (even in its silence) to 
return. But in its returning it offers nothing more than 
violence to an existence concerned with encouraging the dream 
of the normal. Violence in madness is a violence motivated by 
language against language. In 1596, 'violence' related both 
to physical injury committed against another as well as 
designating the disruption and perversion of the authority of 
the word, a sin against language. The violence of the madman 
is the tension of one pulling against the pillars that uphold 
the edifice, straining against the folly of sanity and the 
terror of its complement. But it is also a violence that 
creates the tower of its own obsession and in this 
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simultaneous destruction and creation plays out the drama of 
unreason to which we cannot afford to contribute and yet 
which we cannot afford to ignore, a gift from the periphery 
of ourselves. 
III Nietzsche's bridge across 
Take one for example entirely free from pain all 
over, both his body and the other yoke. Where can 
he turn for relief? Nothing simpler. To the thought 
of annihilation. Thus, whatever the conjecture, 
nature bids us smile, if not laugh. (Mercier and 
Camier 58) 
The laughter that intervenes at the last for Beckett, is 
the laughter that Zarathustra battles for and finally finds. 
Zarathustra has to journey from the thought and threat of 
annihilation to the smile and laugh therein. He is one who 
traverses the longest distance: from the centre of the known 
to the periphery and back again without losing his footing. 
But changing the foundation. Nietzsche led the way for his 
protagonist but found something else in the place where 
nihilism and laughter meet. 
Nietzsche belongs to those thinkers who lurk in the 
shadows of mainstream philosophy like a dog harassing the 
footsteps of the master. What Diogenes the cynic (the dog) is 
to Plato, Nietzsche is to the presence of Kant. And once this 
peripheral position had been assumed, his investigation was 
necessarily into the elsewhere. From the beginning his 
writing went against the dominant 'style' of philosophising -
as witnessed by the poor reception of his Birth of Tragedy -
and, in the process, became a threat to the rules of 
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philosophical writing. Nietzsche, and to a lesser extent 
Schopenhauer, were not philosophers, or rather, were not only 
philosophers but were thinkers who adopted philosophy as an 
available genre. As R.J. Hollingdale points out in his 
introduction to Schopenhauer's Essays and Aphorisms, Goethe 
had cornered the literary market. The novel, the play, 
autobiography, collected letters, the travel book and poetry 
had all been mastered under Goethe's genius: 
One effect of all this was to drive original 
intellects out of the conventional literary 
categories into other fields, especially the field 
of philosophy, which Goethe had not harvested; and 
so it is that the world figures of German 
literature in the age after Goethe are not to be 
found amongst novelists or poets or dramatists, but 
among philosophers: Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, 
Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche ... (10) 
However, Nietzsche's difference from these thinkers is, 
above all, a matter of style. By using this awkward word I am 
not constructing a Form and Content debate. What the logos is 
to the madman, style is to the 'normal' writer. Nietzsche's 
style encompasses both his form and content, his subject 
matter and his choice of language. This produces a text, to 
use Barthes' formulation, where 
style is always a secret .... The allusive virtue of 
style is ... a matter of density, for what stands 
firmly and deeply beneath style, brought together 
harshly or tenderly in its figures of speech, are 
fragments of a reality entirely alien to language. 
(ijf_ 33) 
The attempt, through style, to say that which was the 
fulfilment of style, to say that which was alien to language 
became his obsession. The need 
was to translate an invisible source language into the words 
of the target language. Thus the purple prose that overleaps 
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its subject matter at the end of The Birth of Tragedy was to 
be honed until it became, in itself, a perpetuation of that 
subject matter. This stylistic exaggeration produces a 
language that seeks to lacerate, to cut open the stitching, 
to open again the old wound where the desire for homogeneity 
smothers contradiction, absorbs the impact of paradox and 
annihilates those traces that betray the otherness of the 
self. In the same way Nietzsche is obsessed with the 
lineaments of the vertical; in every plane he searches for 
that which is hidden by hegemony, that which upon its surface 
contains the premonition of height, the brick and bitumen of 
Babel. The presence of unreason is implicit, for Nietzsche, 
in the very fabric of sanity. 
His style is then an attempt to make the 'natural' (the 
naturalised) appear as an instance of perversion, to throw 
into doubt the ancient absolutes - from God, through the 
external world, down to the constitution of the subject. He 
is arguably the great philosopher of Babel, one who sets out 
to disorientate and confuse the tongues of normal discourse 
in order to produce the vertigo of transition. Nietzsche's 
impossible philosophy was nothing less than an attempt to 
drive the reader into a state like unto that of the madman 
where. in the collapse of the familiar there is the 
possibility of the transvaluation of all values. Thus on one 
level, Nietzsche is an image of one who spans much of the 
19th century (1844-1900) and as such is a chronological nexus 
- a kind of temporal analogue of transition - between Cowper 
and Beckett. More importantly, he is a philosopher of the 
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transitional, one who seeks to force the reader into a state 
of transition, a place where reading can begin to read the 
reader. 
He is transitional in so far as he belongs to history 
and is part of the transition that is time. Any fixed moment 
in time contains all past moments which are being modified by 
the present into that ideal object called 'the future'. This 
is so even if the future is no more than a re-discovery of 
the past. The present is always transitional to those who are 
resident in it. 
It is with this awareness that his work is driven to 
reformulate, in a radical way, much of the past in an attempt 
to find some correlation between a present that he found 
intractably alien and a past ill-equipped: a past that had 
become dated. His sight was firmly set on the future. In a 
wry parody of Christ he notes: "My time is not yet come, some 
are born posthumously" (Ecce Homo "Why I write such excellent 
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books" I). Writing for the future, his 'method' is an 
excavation of the past. By constructing a genealogy he 
expresses the hegemonic limitations of past thought, 
philosophical presuppositions that were, according to 
Nietzsche, 
only a scholarly form of faith in the prevailing 
morality, a new way of expressing it ... and in any 
event the opposite of a testing, analysis, doubting 
and vivisection of this faith. (Beyond Good and 
Evil 186) 
These surgical metaphors, once more introduce the knife, the 
necessity of laceration and the duty of the 'new 
philosopher', one who wages war "by laying the knife 
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vivisectionally to the bosom of the very virtues of the age" 
(212). Morality, and the humanity that it implies, is seen 
here almost as a corpus (if not catatonic, then in pain) upon 
which he - as pathologist and midwife - must operate. In so 
far as he is a pathologist, his duty is to operate upon the 
body without recourse to an anaesthetising discourse: hence 
his ruthless and wantonly polemical statements. His work is, 
in this sense, an exploratory biopsy that takes place during 
the transitional phase between the first suspicion of disease 
and prognosis as (or and) cure. As a midwife however, he is 
carefully attempting to bring to birth a more healthy 
offspring: one that will grow into the future as something 
above 'the herd'. Here he is a philological midwife bringing 
the future - one that more closely resembles his conception 
of the human - to birth. His relation to Babel is plotted 
according to these two axes. The first is the vertical axis 
where the pathologist's scalpel makes an incision that 
exposes the seam by which contradiction (the small signs of 
the irrational) is brought back to the folds of the linear. 
This assault works at liberating unreason, parading the 
fragility of the construct that is sanity. Secondly, and in 
conjunction with the first, Nietzsche (the midwife) is 
concerned with bridging, with crossing over from the 
Classical prescriptive perception of madness to a more 
accepting attitude - from Rotterdam to Vienna. This is not to 
posit Nietzsche as a Pinel or Tuke, not as a liberator of 
madmen but as a liberator of the language of unreason. 
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The knife, however, cuts both ways. In subjecting 
humanity to the sutures of his kind of philosophising he 
becomes consciously (and later unconsciously) the subject of 
his own investigation. Nietzsche depicts a movement away from 
the kind of 'objective' philosophizing typical of, say, Kant 
who in his concern with categorical imperatives seeks a 
universal set of laws. His crusade is against this supposed 
objectivity, against a philosophy that is a science of the 
impersonal; a philosophy that asserts itself as something 
imposed from without the human sphere. Thus in Beyond Good 
and Evil he advocates a philosophising intricately bound up 
with the subjective: 
It has gradually become clear to me what every 
great philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on 
the part of its author and a kind of involuntary 
and unconscious memoir .... there is nothing 
whatever impersonal; and, above all, his morality 
bears decided and decisive testimony to who he is. 
( 6 ) 
Nietzschean philosophy is less an empirical quest for 
universals than a matter of subjectivity, less a science and 
more an artistic vision. 
Nietzsche (like Swift and Blake before him) is then one 
who is precariously balanced between the personal affects of 
madness and the detailing of an apatheia that he saw as 
engulfing the human spirit: a banal euthanasia visited upon 
society by collective wisdom. 
Again as with Swift's later melancholia it is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible at the end, to delineate a sane 
from an insane discourse, pessimism from paranoia, justified 
arrogance from megalomania. In the prolific output of his 
34 
last articulate year (1888) he equates, more and more, the 
task of philosophy with the achievements of madness; a 
philosophy that repeatedly asserts the primacy of its own 
inverted vision. Nietzsche's style is simultaneously one that 
seduces and alienates: seduces because, as he repeatedly 
asserts, he was one of Germany's greatest writers of prose; 
alienates, partly because of the zealousness of his criticism 
against humanity and partly because his writing echoes the 
way in which he wished to live, in suffering and exclusion: 
Philosophy, as I have hitherto understood and lived 
it, is a voluntary living in ice and high mountains 
- a seeking after everything strange and 
questionable in existence, all that has hitherto 
been excommunicated by morality. (Ecce Homo 3) 
Nietzsche's pursuit of "everything strange and questionable" 
is in fact a reaching after madness, or more precisely, the 
boundaries in which it resides. The excess present in all his 
writing, from The Birth of Tragedy onwards, is not simply a 
prolonged insult directed by an obstreperous prodigy against 
the body of philosophy. That he sought to be realised in the 
future is not a rationalisation, a palliative for the lack of 
recognition in the present. It is a discourse that battles 
against the stability of the present and the way in which 
Babel is hidden even in the architecture of sanity. 
Nietzschean excess harasses the present - both as temporal 
entity and as a symbol of the prevailing state of things - as 
a way of extending himself into the future and as a means of 
creating a future of possibility: a time when the world is 
expanded. The driving back of these limits necessarily means 
that he encrc hes on all the established "virtues of the 
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age". Madness, that which negatively defines the adherence to 
'virtue' is one of those limits. 
For one who desired the transvaluation of values, it was 
required that he create a new kind of hero. Rather than 
compromise his message he created an ambassador of a new 
world - a fictional figure of such proportions that he 
encompassed and symbolized, far more accurately than any 
system, Transvaluation. The creation was, of course, 
Zarathustra. Zarathustra could go where Nietzsche could not, 
he could trespass upon areas that even Nietzsche's 
epigrammatic style found inaccessible. In Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra the limits of polite philosophising were 
ruptured. Replacement came in the form of a parody (because 
illogical) of the Socratic dialogue, the antithesis of 
Bacon's induction and the scornful fulfillment of Descartes' 
supposed dictum of operation: de omnibus dubitandum (Beyond 
Good and Evil 2). And perhaps most damaging to the ethos of 
philosophy, he replaced philosophy's drive towards truth with 
fiction: that which is, by definition, beyond the rationalist 
notions of truth. Here philosophy becomes its contradiction; 
the farmer's reliance on consistency of logic and coherence 
is transformed (exposed for what it is) into anecdote, dream, 
poetry and mixed metaphor. 
Nothing is sacred here - least of all the respectability 
of the generic, of the exclusivity of forms. The only 
consistency within this new genre is (and this will be 
discussed below) the conspicuous moment that is repeatedly 
reached when, as his philosophy affirms a 'certainty', 
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discovers a 'truth' it is undercut by the drama of the 
narrative. Without warning, philosophy is refuted by the 
circumstance of the plot. In short, it is a text that asserts 
the certainty of a continual usurpation of discourses. 
Throughout Zarathustra there is a threat of a dual madness: a 
dislocation within the text and the protagonist. But it is 
precisely this dislocation that has generated so many bad 
readings of Nietzsche. From here it is a small step into the 
interpretative insanity that associated Nietzsche with Hitler 
and Mussolini and gave rise to a poetry of irony as German 
soldiers marched into World War I armed with St. John's 
Gospel and Thus Spoke Zarathustra: "A book for every one and 
no one". It becomes necessary to find a reader and a reading 
between these mutually exclusive terms, within the 
impossibility of this initial warning. To discover 
Zarathustra (and its madness) one must look to a place before 
Zarathustra, before this philosophy of the irrational. 
In a chapter entitled "Thus spoke Zarathustra" Nietzsche 
recalls that the composition of Zarathustra was unconsciously 
heralded in Joyful Wisdom. The quality he finds essential to 
the new hero is "great healthiness": 
dangerously healthy, healthy again and again - it 
seems to us as if we have, as a reward, a yet 
undiscovered country before us whose boundaries 
none has ever seen, a land beyond all known lands 
and corners of the ideal, a world so overful of the 
beautiful, strange, questionable, terrible and 
divine ... (2) 
During the period (1881-1883) between the completion of 
Joyful Wisdom and the beginning of Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
Nietzsche was anything but healthy: either physically or 
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emotionally. His proposal to Lou Salome had been rejected and 
he was involved in a circle of recrimination and petty 
jealousy propagated by his sister Elizabeth. It was 
Elizabeth, he remarks in a letter to Peter Gast, who 
has deprived me of the fruits of the best victories 
I have won over myself, so that I have, in the end, 
become the victim of a ruthlessly revengeful 
sentiment, although my innermost mind has foresworn 
revenge and punishment. This inner conflict is 
bringing me step by step nearer madness .... (qtd. 
in Lea 178) 
Obviously the author and his philosophy were not equal to 
each other but this is neither new nor interesting. What is 
of interest is the way in which he uses personal failure and 
illness as a way of giving birth to a new form. This is not 
only an indication of the therapeutic balm of artistic 
creation but is another instance of a trend that recurs 
throughout Nietzsche. Zarathustra is the offspring born out 
of a perceived movement towards madness and from a desire to 
overcome the spitefulness in himself and those around him. 
The result is partly the desire for escape from the 
temptation to despair of humanity and partly an incisive 
critique of that humanity: its illness and its bland worship 
of a geography of the known. 
In Zarathustra, then, we find the presence of the 
multiplicity of faces that we have detailed: Nietzsche as 
midwife, bringing himself and the future to birth, as surgeon 
operating on the sickness of the past and the present, as 
explorer searching for new lands, as a bridge-builder for a 
'new' kind of thought and finally in the persona of the 
child, Zarathustra. In each visage Nietzsche is identified as 
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a mediator, a go-between. He resides in the 'time' before and 
after birth, during the operation, uncovering a new world and 
representing an unknown country. But what of Zarathustra -
surely he is not transitional, surely of all Nietzsche's 
work, he has arrived? 
Martin Heidegger uses precisely such an image to 
introduce his comments: Zarathustra is the bridge that leads 
from humanity to the Overman (The New Nietzsche 68). This is 
explicitly supported by Zarathustra in his assessment of the 
'higher men' : 
you are only bridges: may higher men than you step 
across upon you! You are steps: so do not be angry 
with him who climbs over you into his height. ("The 
Greeting") 
Zarathustra yearns for the alien, for the Overman and the 
joyous refrain of the alien-ated: "I teach you the Superman. 
Man is something that should be overcome" ("Zarathustra's 
Prologue" 3). Zarathustra is that bridge; excommunicated from 
'the herd' on one side and like Moses (although Nietzsche 
would not have approved of the comparison) unable to reach 
the promised land of the Overman. Zarathustra is also caught 
within the dedication, belonging neither to the "everyone" of 
sanity nor the "no one" of the Overman - a sanity beyond 
sanity. Zarathustra having written the new tablets or, as he 
calls them, the "new law-tables" may only yearn for the time 
when they will find fulfilment in the Overman. As Heidegger, 
with customary style, phrases it: "Longing is the agony of 
the nearness of the distant" (68). In Zarathustra we have 
neither a sufficient Godnor a sufficient madness. He strains 
towards a wisdom that lies in the nebulous reaches where 
39 
sanity becomes madness - a point at which the boundary falls 
away and Transvaluation may really occur - for perhaps wisdom 
is this point of mingling. 
That wisdom carries with it the strains of the 
irrational, is one of Zarathustra's favourite conclusions 
("with all things one thing is impossible - rationality" 
["Before Sunrise"]) and one that suggests the fabric of 
paradox that goes to make up the bridge. If we take our 
impetus from Nietzsche's vehement refusal of a system, then 
the metaphor of the bridge (this metaphor of transition) is 
as viable a 'method' as any and one that may allow us to 
follow the contours of Zarathustra's journey. 
As has been suggested, the bridge that is Zarathustra 
and over which he must cross is one that requires to be built 
en route to the Overman. It does not possess the certainty of 
a madman's logos and has none of its 'stability'. Each step 
may be the one that causes him to topple and everything that 
has been gained by experience, by the process of construct-
ion, will be lost. The epigraph to The Wanderer and his 
Shadow explains how precarious this kind of existence must 
be: 
You'll ne'er go on nor yet go back? 
Is e'en for chamois here no track? 
So here I wait and firmly clasp 
What eye and hand will let me grasp! 
Five-foot-broad ledge, red morning's breath, 
And under me - world, man and death! 
(Human, All Too Human III) 
Zarathustra is the wanderer pursued by his exhausted shadow 
(the incident actually occurs in Book IV), is the congruence 
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of the interrogative and the exclamatory. Faced with 
questions that render him motionless in fear and doubt, he 
perceives from the height of his excess "red morning's 
breath" - a vision equally excessive in its violent beauty. 
He is suspended above an indifferent world, the mediocrity of 
humankind and the inevitability of an ungracious demise. This 
gives way, with a continuity that appears dreamt rather than 
contrived by any conscious attempt. Like the overlapping of 
episodes in a dream, the epigraph to The Wanderer flows, with 
its own strange logic, into the opening section of 
Zarathustra. 
Zarathustra has left his mountain in order to preach the 
Overman to the world. His message is phrased, as can be 
expected, in terms of the bridge: 
Man is a rope, fastened between animal and 
Superman - a rope over an abyss. 
A dangerous going-across, a dangerous wayfaring, 
a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous shuddering 
and staying still. 
What is great in man is that he is a bridge and 
not a goal ... ("Zarathustra's prologue" 4 ) 
No wonder that under these circumstances the wayfarer is 
required to be "dangerously healthy". But what of this word, 
this "danger"? First: the usual injunction that follows 
'danger' is somewhat removed. Danger, as that which advocates 
the establishing of a distance, appears unavoidable. Second: 
danger is related to excess. As a word, its meaning begins at 
the point at which it escapes the secure, the specified 
boundaries. Thus we have the presence of two inter-related 
aspects. One registers danger in the continual presence of 
the inexplicable (from dreams to madness) and the other sees 
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danger in the way humanity distances itself from this danger; 
from recognising the implications of this "going-across". 
The audience rejects his message partly because they do 
not wish to be reminded of the insecurity of their footing 
and partly because their attention is directed elsewhere. It 
is here that we first meet the real dialogue of the text: the 
dialogue between philosophy and literary narrative. The 
audience is enraptured by a tight-rope walker who has begun 
his walk across a rope that spans the market square. He 
provides for them a distancing from danger. His walk is both 
the epitome and the fulfilment of a danger they realise 
dimly enough to reject when annunciated by Zarathustra. The 
appearance of the clown - this balance between the fool and 
the madman - is just sufficient to topple the equilibrium 
between balance and gravity. The tight-rope walker finds 
certainty, or arrives at a state of rest, in his death. 
The clown advances over the rope "with rapid steps" and 
his cry of "Forward lame-foot! ... forward sluggard, intruder, 
pallid-face!" ("Zarathustra's Prologue" 6) indicates that the 
walker is out of his 'depth' and he realises how tenuous is 
his footing. But it is the buffoon's precipitous action that 
is the most telling: "he emitted a cry like a devil and 
sprang over the man standing in his path" (6). For 
Zarathustra-the-godless there are many demons, devils and 
portentous visions that plague the action of the narrative. 
This is partly explained in the next section where he 
summarises himself in terms of the event: 
I am still distant from them, and my meaning 
does not speak to their minds. To men I am still a 
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cross between a fool and a corpse. (7) 
The bridge slowly begins to assume more concrete proportions. 
Not only is it an open-ended artifice but while its origin is 
within the physical and verifiable world, its inclination is 
to the boundary and beyond. Following directly from this 
comes an awareness of a severe limitation in the lexicon of 
available signifiers. In a dual sense, Zarathustra inhabits 
the realm where these signifieds exist (fools, madmen and 
corpses) while also being required to use these inexact, if 
not irrational, terms so as to grasp the nature of the milieu 
in which he finds himself. 
The crowd "that flew apart in disorder" (6) responds 
exactly as a crowd is wont to do. While they are able to face 
the death of the tightrope walker - Elias Canetti points out 
in Crowds and Power that the presence of danger is the 
"discharge" that provides the crowd with a reason for being 
(18) - they are terrified by the strangeness of the buffoon, 
as one who personifies death in all its 'inhumanity'. Above 
all they take flight from Death as it perversely illuminates 
their lives and stains, with physical mutilation, the market 
square. If this is applicable even to "the herd" it is, for 
Zarathustra, a question that constantly bedevils his journey, 
his process of creation. As a reminder then, he carries the 
dead rope-walker with him on his departure from the town. 
The corpse, and its attendant message, are omnipresent 
and have given rise to a conception of Zarathustra (and, for 
that matter, Nietzsche) as a morbid variation on the theme of 
.f Arthur Schopenhauer. The best phrasing of the 'corpse' 
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occurs when the despondent prophet speaks of the corpse we 
carry; the death of, and in, life: "Everything is empty, 
everything is one, everything is past". He continues in a 
language that will become familiar: 
The earth wants to break open, but the depths 
will not devour us! 
Ala~ where is there still a sea in which one 
could drown: thus our lament resounds - across 
shallow swamps. 
Truly we have grown too weary even to die; now we 
are still awake and we live on - in sepulchers. 
("The Prophet") 
The impossibility (because desired) of the end, the 
geographical claustrophobia and infinite weariness echo 
exactly Cowper's "Lines written during a period of insanity" 
and "The Castaway". This designates the point where Cowper 
ends, the point he cannot traverse. For Zarathustra it is the 
original premise, that which must be overcome. Zarathustra's 
response is not registered in philosophical terms, but in 
physical: he is "transformed", refuses food and finally sinks 
into a long sleep. The certainty of the previous chapter has 
vanished and, upon awaking, his 'answer' to the charge is in 
terms of a dream. The climax is worth examining: 
Then a raging wind tore the door asunder: 
whistling, shrilling and piercing it threw to me a 
black coffin ... [which] burst asunder and vomited 
forth a thousand peals of laughter. 
And from a thousand masks of children, angels, 
owls, fools, and child-sized butterflies it laughed 
and mocked and roared at me. ("The Prophet") 
That his favourite disciple fails to interpret the dream 
correctly should be warning enough. The dream does not 
symbolise anything but itself. Dreams reside in that cloud of 
unknowing where everything is paradox and approximation. What 
can be read in this case is only that the dream encapsulates 
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a cul-de-sac where the slow constitution of the self meets 
its simultaneous disintegration; the child meets the coffin, 
truth meets the mask, sincerity and seriousness meet the 
laughter of mockery, assertion meets refutation. This is the 
dream of nihilism. In "The Child with the Mirror" exactly the 
same thing happens. He dreams that a child presents him with 
a mirror in which he sees "the sneer and grimace of a devil". 
From this he concludes, rather arbitrarily, that his doctrine 
is in danger of being misunderstood. Like death, these dreams 
cannot be overcome but neither can the 'message' be avoided. 
The dream is hermetically sealed - it cannot be entered from 
the outside and only dimly grasped in the silence of the 
interior: "he gazed long into the face of the disciple who 
had interpreted the dream, and shook his head" ("The 
Prophet"). 
Either in the form of dreams, visions or action, 
Zarathustra's journey carries with it this temptation to 
despair and stasis: the building of the bridge always has 
before it an abyss, a dead-end. Michael Haar's definition 
aptly describes the terrain of the bridge and the effect of 
standing there: 
Nihilism ... installs itself insidiously as a 
sentiment that is first of all one of gloom, and 
then one of terror, at the debacle of all 
meaning .... It is the moment when we feel ourselves 
- as in the onrush of a nightmare or as in a 
complete disorientation in space and time - flowing 
or drifting toward ill-defined borderlands where 
every previous meaning, every previous sense, still 
subsists, but has been converted into non-sense. (p 
1 3) 
In this way, nihilism becomes the point of contact between 
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madness and sanity. To go forward is absurd -not only 
dangerous but impossible for how can Nothingness be 
confronted without oneself becoming no-thing? Maurice 
Blanchet, who revels in thinking the impossible, unearths the 
final contradiction that rests at the bottom of nihilistic 
thought: 
Nihilism is tied to being. Nihilism is the 
impossibility of coming to an end and finding an 
outcome in this end ... it tells us that when we 
think nothingness we are still thinking being .... 
Nihilism here tells us its final and rather grim 
truth: it tells of the impossibility of Nihilism 
(p 126). 
If we translate Blanchot's expression into mathematical terms 
we arrive at Frege's Nothingness: 
~he set with zero as its only member, which 
mathematicians write as {O}. Just by looking at 
this symbol we can see what Frege saw: nothingness 
is not nothing, but is actually something. (Guillen 
96) 
But to be confronted with that which is beyond thought does 
not excuse the thinker from the involuntary procedure of 
thinking it. Because the demon is always at the point of 
opening the door of the present, it does not mean that the 
coffin of masks will never "vomit forth [their] thousand 
peals of laughter". 
The only other alternative, it appears, is to return to 
the thoroughfare, to join with the herd in the celebration of 
the mediocre. Book IV of Zarathustra deals with the "higher 
men", those who have forsaken the going-over and have 
retreated in despondence. Nietzsche addresses them in his 
"Fragments of Dionysus-Dithyrambs": 
Already he mimics himself, 
Already weary he grows, 
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Already he seeks the paths he has trod -
Who of late still loved all tracks untrodden. (87) 
For Zarathustra this is not an alternative. Behind him lies 
the the graveyard of his youth, fragments of his self that 
have been destroyed by his ubiquitous "enemies". Only one 
thing remains: "a sweet odour comes to me from you, my 
dearest dead ones, a heart - easing odour that banishes tears" 
("The Funeral Song"). 
It seems we have reached an impasse. Zarathustra's 
visions of the unthinkable constantly return the prophet, 
like the tightrope walker, to immobility. What is worse in 
his confrontation with the dwarf is that the great sophist 
is rendered silent. But who is the dwarf, what was the silent 
message understood only by Zarathustra? The incident occurs 
in a chapter called "Of the Vision and the Riddle". 
A partial answer has been essayed. The dwarf is another 
)f the creatures that inhabit the boundary and, of course, 
like the corpse he carries earlier, this apparition sits on 
his shoulder: 
half dwarf, half mole; crippled, crippling; pouring 
lead drops into my ear, leaden thoughts into my 
brain ... 
Thereupon the dwarf fell silent; and he long 
continued so. But his silence oppressed me; and to 
be thus in company is truly more lonely than to be 
alone! ( 1 ) 
Although expressed as external, the dwarf weighs upon his 
introspection - a dead-end fashioned for one. Extending 
Blanchot's dictum, nihilism sounds at our most solipsistic 
depths. Indeed it is tied to being but not a communal being. 
It is insurmountable because in its nightmarish quality it 
refuses to become public. We all have a different dwarf, we 
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see a different expression upon the face of nothingness. 
If the dwarf is the ultimate threat to Zarathustra it is 
because he embodies the "Spirit of Gravity": that which 
threatens to dislodge him from the bridge's edge. At the 
point of confrontation between himself and the dwarf the 
dream-like narrative alters the bridge into a path where he 
confronts his version of nihilism. Two paths, one running 
into the past and the other into the future are joined under 
the gateway of the "Moment". At this point of junction the 
question is phrased: 
must we not return and run down that other lane out 
before us, down that long, terrible lane - must we 
not return eternally? ("Of the Vision and the 
Riddle" 2) 
Repeatedly Zarathustra is trapped by the same demon (note 
also the presence of the demon in Gay Science 341): time as 
the eternal present versus time as the eternal recurrence of 
the same. For Nietzsche, this is his temptation to despair. 
And truly it is with this thought (this "what if" as he 
phrases it in Gay Science) that Zarathustra reaches far into 
madness. For in articulating. however partially, the 
Unthinkable, by translating it into words it creates an 
epicentre of futility that ripples through time, engulfing 
memory and hope alike, razing all the artifices, bringing all 
to degree-zero. What is left are the remains of 
existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet 
recurring inevitably without any finale of 
nothingness: the eternal recurrence. (Will To Power 
55) 
But what happens,on these occasions, when Zarathustra thinks 
madness? The first response designates the disappearance of 
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Zarathustra. He retreats from the endless discourse that 
generally sustains him and retires into silence and stasis. 
The narrative falters and we, as readers, find ourselves 
alone; no longer privy to the endless stream of philosophic 
confession. In "Zarathustra's Prologue" we find him "on the 
ground beside the dead man lost in thought", shaking his head 
at the disciple in "The Prophet" and in "Of the Vision and 
the Riddle": "Thus I spoke, and I spoke more and more softly: 
for I was afraid of my own thoughts and reservations" (2). 
At first glance, then, it appears that he is defeated, 
forced to retrace his steps. In "Of the Child and the Mirror" 
the meeting of 'self' and demon is brief and obscured as is 
his resolution. But to retrace our steps we discover not 
avoidance but re-solution. To return to our mathematical 
analogy, this statement of the minimal, of the end of numbers 
is also a statement of potential: 
The set {O} is the blank realization of the null 
set 
[{ }], just as the musical pause is the blank 
realization of the a musician's potential to create 
sound. (Guillen 96) 
It is not too extreme to argue that this set is the 
prerequisite to other numbers, as silence is to speaking, as 
nothingness is to meaning and as folly and madness are to 
sanity. 
In following the image of the corpse let us not forget 
the presence of the clown. As Zarathustra has met the horror 
of madness, he has also become acquainted with its mirth. As 
a fool he is freed from the constraints that bind others, as 
a philosopher of foolishness he is the ultimate graffiti 
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artist scrawling, with his life, the paradox of wisdom: 
My hand - is the fool's hand: woe to all tables 
and walls and whatever has room left for fool's 
scribbling, fool's doodling! ("Of the Spirit of 
Gravity" 1) 
Haar's statement to the effect that in the face of nihilism 
there is a conversion from sense to non-sense assumes a new 
dimension. Everything is rendered foolish and falls under the 
domain of foolishness but that conveys only the negative 
aspect of the paradox. To accept non-sense is the positive 
aspect and to a certain extent Nietzsche had already prepared 
the way for this kind of conclusion. It was not merely, as 
F.A. Lea would have us believe, that his proclaiming chaos 
contains an intellectual confusion that asserts the existence 
of order (p 331-32). Nietzsche takes Schopenhauer further: 
chaos is given, what is required is a way of living in it, a 
way of living with the most abysmal thought. A hint is 
contained in the potential of foolishness. For Zarathustra 
the word becomes the instrument of creation: 
Are things not given names and musical sounds so 
that a man may refresh himself with things? Speech 
is a beautiful foolery: with it man dances over all 
things. ("The Convalescent" 2) 
Language is the means by which Zarathustra refreshes himself; 
even more it is the means by which he resuscitates himself. 
Again to flesh out Blanchet - nihilism is inextricably bound 
to silence. It is the silence that intrudes upon speech (like 
the corpse upon life), upon music, upon action. Continuance 
therefore is essentially a matter of language where the first 
word wards off the silence. If only for a while. 
Of course language is, in this sense, a lie and for two 
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reasons: firstly, it avoids the absolute of nihilism; 
secondly, any discourse has within it a grammar that seeks to 
order: 
'Reason' in language: oh what a deceitful old 
woman! I fear we are not getting rid of God because 
we still believe in grammar. (Twilight of the Idols 
5) 
Enter the fool. The fool and the madman are able to penetrate 
language, making of its certainties a matter of doubt, 
emulating its order while parodying with non-sense its 
semantics. The foolish Zarathustra uses language to retain 
his status in madness, as a way of mimicking the language we 
take for granted. Even Nietzsche realised that the parody of 
the history of thought was not sufficient. The fool also has 
to answer. 
The 'answer' is found in "Of the Vision and the Riddle". 
After his confrontation with the dwarf he has a vision of a 
shepherd and the snake whereupon he orders the shepherd to 
invert the order of things: "Bite!/ Its head off! Bite!" (2). 
:he snake in this case is a continuation of the corpse, the 
dwarf, the Spirit of Gravity. If it can be overcome it allows 
transfiguration: 
No longer a shepherd, no longer a man - a 
transformed being, surrounded with light, laughing! 
Never yet on earth had any man laughed as he 
laughed .... and now a thirst consumes me, a longing 
that is never stilled (2). 
Its visionary quality makes it both known and inaccessible. 
The Overman has crossed over the bridge and is visible from 
Zarathustra's purview. For the fool, laughter is the most 
obvious solution: both a laughter 'at' and 'with'. And both 
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aspects are entailed in The Will to Power. 
The Wi 1 l To Power: the great metaphor of 
misunderstanding. Of all Nietzsche's ideas this one best 
served the more perverse faces of ideology. How seriously 
this idea was appropriated is understandable if we consider 
how seriously (he who is usually so ironic in his treatment 
of extremism) Georges Bataille sought to repudiate its claim 
in "Nietzsche and the Fascists". Bataille's concern is to 
point out the logical contradictions between Nietzsche's 
concept and the way it was twisted in order to preach a 
doctrine of patriotism. Bataille emphasises the homeless 
nature, the desire for another, as yet uncharted, country. 
But there is also a contradiction between Il Duce's desire to 
make public (accessible to all) The Will To Power and the 
essentially solipsistic nature of that Will. Like the 
singular face of "the abysmal thought" the Will To Power 
cannot be disseminated, it refuses publicity. Its relation to 
nihilism is immediate: The Will To Power exists in the 
silence of the confrontation with the Spirit of Gravity. If 
one cannot evoke that Will, one is condemned to the weary 
treading of existent paths. 
In the silence where the self is threatened with 
disintegration The Will To Power implies two distinctive 
movements. One is negative: a distancing from the temptation 
to succumb to 
the prophet of the great weariness who taught: 'It 
is all one, nothing is worth while, the world is 
without meaning, knowledge chokes'. ("The Cry of 
Distress") 
Here the laughter is addressed at those who have failed and, 
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in the process, at the possibility of failing oneself. 
Zarathustra takes his example from life: "and life itself 
told me this secret: 'Behold,' it said, 'I am that which must 
overcome itself again and again' ( "Of Self-Overcoming"). This 
implies the positive: a continual re-creation of oneself out 
of oneself. The laughter that resounds is a laughter with 
oneself; a laughter of forgiveness and acceptance. Finally it 
is a laughter that is self-perpetuating: 
Perhaps it is precisely here that we are 
discovering the realm of our invention, that realm 
where we too can still be original, perhaps as 
parodists of world history and God's buffoons -
perhaps, even if nothing else of today has a 
future, precisely our laughter may still have a 
future! (Beyond Good and Evil 223) 
The paradox in the fool's answer is simply that nothing 
changes except the fool's perception. Invention exists in the 
parody "of world history" and in the continual creation of 
the self out of the ruins of the encounter with nihilism. 
This is the laughter of the gods, the laughter that overcomes 
the boundaries of fear, sanity and self. It is exactly this 
Nietzschean laughter that Harry discovers at the end of 
Herman Hesse's Steppenwolf. But the laughter does not end 
here, it flows back into the body and becomes the dance. 
It is in the dance that the Spirit of Gravity is finally 
conquered. The dance is the physical counterpart to the 
laugh: in both, the self is lost in the act of creation. At 
bottom, Zarathustra's message is simply this: laughter, 
rejoicing in itself, in its ability to ridicule the threat of 
failure becomes the dance, the positive movement out of 
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stasis. The fool, laughing and dancing, continues the 
construction of the bridge by converting the abyss into 
something solid (through his mad perception). He achieves the 
impossible - he learns to dance upon the chaos. And in 
dancing the abyss is made solid by that which hitherto most 
threatened his destruction. It becomes 
A dance-song and a mocking-song on the Spirit of 
Gravity, my supreme, most powerful devil, who they 
say is 'the lord of the earth'. ("The Dance Song") 
The bridge to the Overman is paved with dwarves: 
For must there not exist that which is danced 
upon, danced across? Must there not be moles and 
heavy dwarves - for the sake of the the nimble, the 
nimblist? ("Of Old and New Law-Tables" 2) 
The threat posed by the Eternal Return of the same is met by 
a change in perception that no longer desires to avoid but to 
embrace eternity. Throughout "The Seven Seals" Zarathustra 
chants this acceptance - "how should I not lust for eternity 
and for the wedding ring of rings - the Ring of Recurrence" 
(1). To accept the possibility of the Eternal Return, even if 
the logic of acceptance is impossible, generates a change 
within the metaphor of the bridge. The resolution of Time 
inspires a resolution in Space. 
From the first the bridge departed from the market 
square in search of more ether~al reaches. Zarathustra's 
narrative traces the laborious construction of the bridge at 
the point where opposites meet without contradiction. The 
repetitive process that marks the journey from stasis to 
dance, from sanity to insanity, from eloquence to dumb 
silence, merely exacerbates Zarathustra's longing. He may 
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call it the Overman or the time of his children ("The Sign") 
but its most immediate manifestation is a desire for a 
beyond, a desire for a "wild wisdom" that is able to break 
loose of physical, moral and cultural boundaries: 
And often [this wisdom] tore me forth and up and 
away in the midst of laughter: and then indeed I 
flew, an arrow, quivering with sun-intoxicated 
rapture: 
out into the distant future, which no dream has 
yet seen ... where gods, dancing, are ashamed of all 
clothes .... ("Of Old and New Law-Tables" 2) 
What he yearns for (and his visions attest to) is the 
certainty of a logos: of a beyond that ridicules the world of 
distinction. In the certainty that has hitherto been the 
property of the madman, Zarathustra's narrative renders 
insignificant the boundary between sanity and insanity, 
between truth and lie, between good and evil. From this 
height he no longer wishes to understand or to be understood. 
This is the space he wishes to escape from. The bridge, and 
its philosophical counterpart The Transvaluation of all 
Values, is a crossing over understanding itself: 
I no longer feel as you do: this cloud which I see 
under me, this blackness and heaviness at which I 
laugh - precisely this is your thunder-cloud. 
You look up when you desire to be exalted. And I 
look down, because I am exalted. ("Of Reading and 
Writing") 
Zarathustra becomes the one who 'overstands': who stands over 
the respectability of past thought, its fabricated 
distinctions and its trivial concerns. From here he sees a 
typically Blakean vision ("The Sign") - the gathering of 
birds, the arrival of the placid lion, the turning away from 
the "higher men" towards the "great noontide" and the final 
step towards the Overman, the one who stands over. 
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Although by the end of the text Zarathustra has not 
arrived, the journey seems almost completed. According to its 
dialectic, he has managed the impossible task of reaching 
into and beyond madness. In sanity to insanity and back to a 
heightened vision where one informs the other, becomes the 
other. But Zarathustra could not reach the other side because 
he was a fictional entity and could only be made real in 
Nietzsche. Within the infinite ironies of madness it was 
Nietzsche who finally gained the certainty that has eluded 
Zarathustra. The lion that had come as a sign to Zarathustra 
is translated (six years later) into a beaten horse that 
Nietzsche embraces before collapsing into madness. It was at 
this time he declared the achievement of his logos; he had 
finally found "the mask that hides a knowledge which is fatal 
and too sure" (qtd in Haar 35). 
For many years Nietzsche had carefully explored the 
notion of value, an exploration which focused on the 
established criteria and necessarily involved an exploration 
of what it was to be healthy and sane. And inversely, what it 
was to be mad. But if he examined madness, madness examined 
him. We know very little of his madness except that it was 
plagued by ironies. After a life-time's 5truggle against the 
petty mindedness of his mother and sister, he ended up as 
their captive only able to watch as Elizabeth converted his 
'homeless' teachings into a pro-Nazi ideology, to see 
(without the power to comment) his works become recognised 
after years spent labouring in alienation; to live in a 
silence beyond words following his prolific output of 1888. 
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In Nietzsche's silence, a silence of the same order as 
Aquinas in his later years, there is the fulfilment of 
Zarathustra's flight from, and entrance to, the truth of 
nihilism. For Zarathustra, nihilism meant a peeling off of 
action and words to expose a vacuum which, in turn, became an 
incentive to create again. And indeed the nature of fiction 
encouraged and made posssible this continuation, each word 
overcoming the silence of the page. Creation begins out of 
silence, it acts upon it, but, and this is where Nietzsche 
and Zarathustra meet, it is the place where creation also 
ends. 
Within the narrative of being, the beaten horse is, for 
Nietzsche, the moment of verticality. rt breaks through the 
succession of events and inserts a silence where the sounds 
of sanity should be. In exactly the same way as Dostoyevsky 
uses the horse's slow death in Crime and Punishment, 
Nietzsche's encounter rises above the familiar and he sees 
the coming together of power and beauty with defeat, of 
Dionysus and the Crucified. That he signed his final letters 
in this fashion is indicative of a sensitivity of these 
opposites achieving reconciliation. And these opposites, with 
their echoes of Vienna (the frenzy and folly of a building 
Dionysian in spirit) and Rotterdam (austere and broken as the 
crucified Christ) are resolved in the last Nietzschean 
paradox. His whole creative act had been the translation of 
the hidden (Babel's unfinished battlements) into a 
philosophy, a logos; but this logos was not accessible until 
he himself reached madness. His infantile regression and his 
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catatonia completed the logos that Zarathustra had so 
desperately sought, but completed it within silence. 
Nietzsche spent his life discerning and deciphering the 
patterns of Rotterdam and Vienna eventually to find the 
silence that was the climax of his enterprise and the 
fruition of his creativity - the silence that was Clovio's 
lost ivory tower. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Cowper: The Art of Nearly Drowning 
One is supposed to be cast into belief without 
reason, by a miracle, and from then on to swim in 
it as in the brightest and least ambiguous of 
elements: even a glance towards land ... even the 
slightest impulse of our amphibious nature - is 
sin! ... What is wanted are blindness and 
intoxication and an eternal song over the waves in 
which reason has drowned. (Nietzsche Daybreak 89) 
For Cowper the sea contained a dual and diametric 
valency. It was the place where God was most evident, where 
he placed his footprints in "Light shining out of darkness" 
and where he appears as a beacon in the storm of 
"Temptation". As Nietzsche suggests it was the place where 
Cowper could lose himself within belief. But it is no 
coincidence that his last poem "The Castaway" details a 
sailor caught between the imminence of death and a 
consciousness that continues to record unabated. This poem 
was based upon an entry in Anson's sea travels and while it 
was a· popular document for a society fascinated by discovery, 
Cowper's use is somewhat idiosyncratic. So is his use of 
Alexander Selkirk (Defoe's source for Crusoe) in "Verses" 
where water is, again, an image of immensity and alienation: 
From the centre all round to the sea, 
I am lord of the fowl and the brute. 
Oh, solitude! where are the charms 
That sages have seen in thy face? 
Better dwell in the midst of alarms, 
Than reign in this horrible place. (311) 
It becomes apparent that it is not the sea itself that 
concerns Cowper but rather its magnitude that designates 
simultaneously providence and danger. The size of the waves, 
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the infinite prison of water and, in his penultimate poem 
"Montes Glaciales", the dimensions of the approaching 
glaciers dwarf and threaten to obliterate the speaker. Cowper 
interpolates himself, somewhat hysterically, between the 
forces of nature and his various protagonists; it is always 
Cowper who is at the mercy of the wrath of nature. 
And here, Nietzsche's metaphor becomes germane. After 
Cowper's first outburst of madness he did indeed plunge into 
evangelical waters, he found a place where reason could 
submit to the rigour of a JXOlogy. That was the miracle of 
his conversion - the surrendering to a religious logos - but 
it existed in a state of tension with another conversion, 
another logos. It was madness that kept on averting his eyes, 
dragging him back to the land, to Selkirk's isolated island: 
transforming that which should have been his salvation into 
the threat that heralded his damnation. The eternal song that 
played over the waves was, for Cowper, the song of an 
unobtainable succour and an impending doom. 
A sense of enormity is always present within Cowper's 
madness and goes some way toward explaining the extent of his 
ability to represent madness. Insanity conjures up the 
Rotterdam Babel for Cowper - all around him he perceives the 
huge shadow of his blasphemy and with it a revenge in 
proportion to his 'sin'. The tower with its sickening 
inclination, the way it swells to engulf the canvas and its 
severe disposition mimicks the image of God Cowper came to 
realise. Cowper belongs to those who have, through history, 
dwelt on Babel and lived in suffering in its tortured 
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heights. Under the sign of this Babel the "deer who left the 
herd" is particularly well placed. In the same way as this 
tower conveys the macabre and preternatural construction 
arising from a refusal to heed the Covenant - something 
unnatural born from an unnatural contravention - it 
ironically assumes the visage of the creator (the vengeful 
God of the Old Testament). Such is Cowper's madness: it 
consists of a logic of damnation that is built out of a dogma 
of salvation.·cowper is one who, in his desire to reach into 
the heavens, to attain the gates of the gods, fashions the 
very gates that deny him entry. 
If Cowper plays out, in an excessive manner, a scenario 
of futility common to those who could remember the strange 
justice of Yahweh, then where does society place him and 
where does madness locate him? The pressure of this paradox 
was, for Cowper, not merely a fascinating, if essentially 
intellectual concept, but was a word made flesh and occupied 
an obsessive vitality within him. It isolated him from a 
secular landscape as well as from evangelical submersion. As 
I have suggested, the initial outcome was to take up 
residence upon the island that although belonging to neither, 
offered some kind of footing; a condition, after all, 
expressive of most of humanity - at least as far as Pope is 
concerned: 
Know then thyself, presume not God to scan; 
The proper study of Mankind is Man. 
Plac'd on this isthmus of a middle state, 
A being darkly wise, and rudely great: 
With too much knowledge for the Sceptic side, 
With too much weakness for the Stoic's pride, 
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest, 
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In doubt to deem himself a God, or Beast; 
In doubt his Mind or Body to prefer, 
Born but to die, and reas'ning but to err; 
Alike in ignorance, his reason such, 
Whether he thinks too little, or too much: 
Chaos of Thought and Passion, all confus'd; 
Still by himself abus'd, or disabus'd; 
Created half to rise, and half to fall; 
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all; 
Sole judge of Truth, in endless Error hurl'd: 
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world! (516) 
Consider the dualities Pope mentions: action or stasis, 
body or mind, god or beast, even life or death. The tendency, 
encouraged by the Aristotelian presence, is one of either 
life or death whereas for the Judea-Christian death is the 
affirmation of (eternal) life; for the nihilist, death 
constantly intrudes upon life - the conundrums are endless. 
One is almost tempted to join with Wittgenstein in asserting 
that there are no philosophical problems, only problems of 
definition. But this is an avoidance of the issue. Pope draws 
attention to paradox not because he wishes to amuse himself 
with the titillation of the double-think that it produces. 
Rather, Pope sees in paradox a concept that reflects humanity 
itself; a concept that repeatedly threatens to disintegrate 
in its simultaneous statement and negation of itself. What 
becomes central is the locus of the individual. Pope 
repeatedly emphasises humankind's context: "placed on this 
isthmus of a middle state", "in doubt" within this "chaos of 
thought"" he hangs between". However, in the clarity and 
austerity of these lines a certain distance is established, 
the poem recedes from the topic it attempts to confront. Pope 
makes his incision with one hand and stitches with the other. 
Paradox is thus both an entrance and an exit. Paradox 
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designates one of the places where language chokes on itself, 
at once mocking language as a neutral vehicle of 
representation and damning the subject who dares to utter. 
But by the very term, this rift is sealed. As Barthes points 
out in relation to myth, paradox (its internal contradiction) 
is naturalised (119), it simply becomes 'the way things are'. 
The implications of paradox are diffused by the very word: in 
uttering 'paradox', paradox is tamed. The moment of crisis -
the moment when languages proliferated on Babel - is resolved 
'naturally' by the majority, but not by the madman. It was 
precisely these small words, these trivial things that loosed 
Cowper from his stayed moorings into the immensity, the awful 
size of madness. 
Anyone who has read Cowper's Adelphi will be struck 
first by the almost vaudeville quality in his repeated 
attempts to commit suicide. What begins as an entirely normal 
fear of having to exhibit his knowledge before his 
prospective employers is transformed, through a process of 
innovative reasoning, into a compulsive urge to suicide, or 
at least the charade of suicide. We follow Cowper to the 
Tower wharf where he intends to jump to his death, but cannot 
because "a porter or two seated upon some goods" (I 21) 
impedes his way, back to his chambers and his twenty attempts 
to take an overdose of laudanum; his attempt to stab himself 
with a broken penknife and finally, in a suitably ironic 
finale, his attempt to hang himself with his garter. Even 
given his obvious 'distraction' what must strike the 
contemporary reader, although not the protagonist, is the 
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absurdist humour of it all. Cowper appears as a precursor to 
Buster Keaton. Apart from a certain similarity between them 
physically, both suffer under an increasingly cruel fate but, 
and this is the second point, do so impassively. Like 
Keaton's face, Cowper's tone throughout is dead-pan. Perhaps 
this can partly be explained by the fact that he writes 
Adelphi after the fact (indeed after re-birth) but this does 
not diminish the discomforting sense of having irrationality 
described in such rational terms. Consequently Cowper's 
critics are bound to be polarised over the importance (even 
the presence) of insanity in his work. 
In Cowper's case, for instance, there are those who 
prefer to avoid any mention of his insanity because it is 
seen as extraneous to the merit of the work. Then there are 
those of the psycho-analytic and anti-religious persuasion 
who see equivocation in his most 'innocent' 1 pastorals . But 
what of his mad productions, what of this subject that is 
either absent or made into an alibi for religious self-
destruction or fear of castration? By and large criticism has 
distilled off all traces of Cowper's madness, leaving in its 
place specific critical preoccupations - madness is cleared 
away, translated into modes of discourse that bear little 
relation to that madness. Hence Nick Rhodes' anti-
biographical stance in his edition of Cowper's Selected Poems 
(selected by whom, with what in mind?): 
Of dementia and hopelessness there is astonishingly 
little evidence. We must assume either that they 
were not 'suitable subjects', or that biography can 
never tell the whole story. (15) 
He continues by singling out "Lines Written during a Period 
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of Insanity" noting that 
it registers itself ... as a piece of literature. It 
is not, in any useful sense, 'insane'. Nor does it 
pretend to be the naked language of the soul -
though that may well be its impact. (15) 
It is precisely the contrast between Cowper's main body of 
poetry and that written during periods of imbalance that 
should draw attention to poems so uniquely different from his 
didactic satires and his prayers to rusticity. For Rhodes, 
madness belongs elsewhere and although it may qualify as "the 
naked language of the soul" it can never be translated, let 
alone into "literature". As loaded as this statement is with 
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all the cliches about madness, it allows a distinction to be 
made between 'madness as failure' (Rhodes' reading) and the 
'failure of madness'. The latter is exemplified in "The 
Shrubbery". 
"The Shrubbery" (292-3) was composed in 1773 after his 
second breakdown and attempted suicide. The psychodramatic 
events that had marked his first attack returned: extreme 
depression, nightmares, infantile regression and a pervasive 
paranoia. As he remarks at a later date: "I believed that 
everyone hated me ... [I] was convinced that all my food was 
poisoned, together with a thousand megrims of the same stamp" 
(qtd. in Quinlan 89). It was at this time that his ecstatic 
religious conversion came under demented scrutiny, 
culminating in a dream in which God rejected the evangelical 
Cowper in papist Latin: "actum est de te, periisti" ( qtd. in 
Quinlan 91). This perceived rejection is registered in the 
title of the poem where he notes that it was "Written in a 
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time of affliction". 
From the opening line nature is afflicted by the 
speaker's perception which is, in turn, disturbed. The shade 
does not inherently possess happiness for it is an attribute 
placed on the shade by the speaker, nor is it a projection of 
self (as would normally be the case) for the "happy shades" 
exist in spite of - "to me unblest" - his presence. Cowper 
has surreptitiously introduced a 'normal' non-afflicted 
personage who could not but perceive the shade as "friendly 
to peace". By introducing sanity into the poem, at this early 
stage, he isolates himself from the subject matter in his 
attempts to translate between the voices of sanity and 
madness and, while he dismisses this in his later work, here 
madness constantly needs apologies. Madness is made 
accessible to the reader by being simply an inversion of 
sanity. The landscape viewed as subjectively peaceful by a 
hypothetical viewer contrasts to the speaker's melancholic 
status which constantly inverts nature's "fruitful scenes" 
into wasted prospects that "tell of enjoyments passed,/ And 
those of sorrows yet to come". This sense of nature 
contaminated by loss is not only a typically elegiac 
technique, but one that recurs in Cowper to signal the 
severity of the rape (in its original sense 'to forcibly take 
away') of his treasured nature. That which should give him 
joy reiterates his mental anguish. So, in "Lines on the Death 
of Sir William Russel" we find, almost verbatim, this 
inverted vision: "Why all that soothes a heart from anguish 
free,/ All that delights the happy - palls with me" (285). 
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The Cowper of the fables, the descriptive pastorals, the 
pedagogic satires is shadowed by Cowper insane and by a 
different vision: a vision distorted by its subjectivity and 
yet in its distortion creating a pattern that strives to give 
that subjectivity form. 
As is usually the case in his nature poetry, the poem 
unfolds by accumulating visual components into a total scene 
thereby allowing the poet, as reference point, a part in the 
whole. Here, however, the description begins by asserting the 
speaker's non-participation: 
This glassy stream, that spreading pine, 
Those alders quiv'ring to the breeze, 
Might sooth a soul less hurt than mine, 
And please, if anything could please. (292) 
Each of the nouns - stream, pine, alders - requires a 
different adjective before it gains its precise vitality; 
rather than the fluid movement of a camera pan, these are 
snapshots without overlap. The "glassy stream" in its 
transparency (or its fragility as glass) is isolated not only 
from "that spreading pine" and "those alders quiv'ring" but 
also separate from the luxuriant viscosity of "the stream/ 
That as, with molten glass, inlays the vale". Nature has 
become as fragile and friable as the one who describes. It 
has been appropriated by his own basilisk thoughts, a 
melancholic erosion that wears both the speaker and his 
description down to a hopeless silence. This is achieved, in 
stanzas two and three, with a certain grace in a kind of 
alliterative lisp: "glassy steam", "soothe a soul", "shows 
the same sadness", "slights the season and the scene". 
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Here the poem should end, at the point where sound 
slopes towards a silence beyond language. But Cowper, the 
apologetic, feels obliged to continue, to wrest the remainder 
of the poem back to the social world. In part, the problem 
with the poem is that it is already too sociable, too 
crowded. Consider what appears and colours the landscape: the 
shrubbery itself, a kind of featureless presence that shadows 
the poet's world; a hypothetical and stable presence for whom 
the "fruitful scenes" are accessible; the feminine "care" who 
has withdrawn "her animating smile" from nature; the "saint 
or moralist" searching for "the secret shade" and, finally, 
the 'victimized' poet who acts as a disorganizing principle 
failing to control the tincture of his mind or the poem. 
The vague presences that over-populate the poem can 
perhaps be equated with the paranoid suspicion as to the 
intentions of God and humanity alike. He is caught in the 
exact place where paradox can either be an entry or an exit. 
He is sane enough to suspect that his perceptive organs may 
be at fault, and yet unable to explain away these real (to 
him) anxieties. If Cowper is rendered impotent before the 
failure of his own mind, so too is the poem helpless and the 
remaining three stanzas are stranded in a middle state 
neither able to return or to leave (entirely) the social, 
sane world. 
The final stanzas portray (and betray) an exhaustion of 
technique and emotion through repetition. By forsaking the 
singularity of his visior. of nature for a dull overview he 
deprives the poem of the nuances he has been at such pains to 
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create: the honed image of "alders quiv'ring", falls into the 
blandness of "wood and lawn", then no more than "fruitful 
scenes" before being dissipated entirely by the abstract 
generalisation of wasted prospects. By the poem's close 
Cowper has lost control precisely in his attempts to assert 
a control foreign to the experience itself; in his peopling 
of the poem he finds madness crowded out, driven from the 
stage that should have brought it to light. In all this there 
is no time for madness: "These tell me of enjoyments past/ 
And those of sorrows yet to come". 
Cowper is caught in an unchanging present that is 
suspended between an idealised past and a foreboding future: 
the former taunts, the latter threatens. In "The Shrubbery" 
this terrain is artificially tamed by a blurring of focus, a 
looking elsewhere. Nothing is confronted here - the suffering 
speaker retreats into the luxury of pain and what is left is 
the sour flavour of tombstone platitudes and obituary lists. 
Viewed from the perspective of one who suffers, this is the 
poetic exposition of Foucault's melancholia: 
In melancholia, the spirits are swept by an 
agitation, but a feeble agitation, without power or 
violence: a sort of impotent jostling which does 
not follow marked paths, nor open roads (aperta 
opercula), but traverses the cerebral matter by 
endlessly creating new pores; yet the spirits do 
not wander far upon the paths they trace; very soon 
their agitation languishes, their strength 
fails ... ; melancholia never reaches violence; it is 
madness at the limits of its powerlessness (121-22) 
This not only succinctly points out the weakness - "I am a 
stricken deer" - that exerts its force over Cowper's very 
character, but also comments on the poetic range of his 
expression. "The Shrubbery" is an exemplum in miniature of 
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the man and the poetry. The catatonia to which he was reduced 
in his later years, conveys this awareness of defeat. As a 
man, the chronic agitation that governed his life, albeit 
intermittently, from 1763 to his death in 1800 eventually 
wore down his strength, leaving him powerless. Furthermore, 
this defines more explicitly the erosion present in "The 
Shrubbery": the introspective agitation that motivates the 
poem is worn away precisely because "the spirits do not 
wander far upon the paths they trace". Cowper faltered, and 
eventually surrendered, before the jostling of the world; he 
failed where Blake, in Bataille's view, succeeded: 
If a poet's life conformed generally to reason it 
would go against the authenticity of his poetry. It 
would remove an irreducible element, a sovereign 
violence from poetry, without which it is 
mutilated .... Blake, who was not mad, haunted the 
frontiers of madness. (62) 
Cowper, who was, loitered on the same frontier in "The 
Shrubbery" but with his gaze tt.1r·r1t,,<-I in the opposite 
direction. And in an unobtrusive annotation to Spurzheim, 
Blake conducts a conversation with the ghost of Cowper about 
fulfillment in madness: 
Cowper came to me and said: 'O that I were insane 
always. I will never rest. Can you not make me 
truly insane? I will never rest till I am so. 0 
that in the bosom of God I was hid. You retain 
health and yet are as mad as any of us all - over 
us all - mad as a refuge from unbelief - from 
Bacon, Newton and Locke". (772) 
In Smart I will investigate the latter part of this 
admonition, but Blake is correct in so far as Cowper still 
had to discover and use the "sovereign violence" of his 
madness. Madness, here, is failure: not only in the usual 
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sense of its failure to comply with normalcy, but as a 
failure to recognise itself. Thus it is important to consider 
what Cowper's speaker could not, to speculate on the vision 
he was unable to express. The reconstruction of this vision 
requires that words are put into his mouth, to find the 
poetic of madness hidden behind "The Shrubbery". 
Blake obliquely touches on this. The posthumous presence 
of Cowper cannot rest, cannot find a place of rest and calls 
to Blake out of his agitation. The distracted movement from 
the external to the introspective, between the past and the 
future, and from a world "peace possessed" to one of "fix'd 
unalterable care" locates him at a time and in a space that 
his agitation seeks to escape: he is located where he is not. 
This is contingent with the perception of Cowper persecuted 
by rebuke and threat, his hand shaking uncontrollably, 
attempting to raise the laudanum to his lips. If he is 
present it is only because he desires to escape the present. 
The second threat of the present is immobility and he who has 
been "admonish[ed] not to roam" is reduced to a voice 
responding with melancholic passivity and wallowing in his 
own pain. Here, like the paralytic in The Task Cowper "sits,/ 
Spectatress both and spectacle, a sad/ And silent cipher" 
(Book I 139). Cowper escapes "The Shrubbery" through a 
frenetic agitation that yearns for release from an 
overwhelming gravity that draws him to stasis and silence. In 
both forms his is a fear of the present, of gazing at and 
facing its gaze in turn. 
The Task, for example, relies entirely upon the poet's 
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perceived presence as he conducts the reader on a rambling 
tour of nature and home-spun philosophy. Its effect is 
achieved through a sense of immediacy: of the speaker being 
present and describing a scene temporally unfolding within 
the moment. Patrica Spacks speaks of this as a form of 
aesthetic ordering in which Cowper delights (180-81 ). This 
poetry works by means of the 'sanity' (and here read the 
ideal of the 'average perceiver') of the description. As the 
author of The Task he assumes an easily verifiable part in 
the 'tradition'. On one side he has been associated with 
Milton's Paradise Lost, with Gay, Thomson and Gra~ and on 
the other as the precursor to Wordsworth, Coleridge and 
2 Keats. Above all Cowper was an Augustan; he was willingly 
subservient to the existing conventions and possessed, as 
Rhodes would have it, "no desire to flout tradition" (16). As 
Leigh Hunt dismissively comments: "[Cowper] was not alone 
because he led the way, but because he was left on the 
roadside" (qtd. in Hartley 4). Both these statements are 
redolent with the assumptions of period; nevertheless it is 
tempting to see his mad productions as a defiance of 
classical constraint. 
Accordingly, madness is a prophetic voice that heralds 
the future and contains, in its excess, the birth of a new 
consciousness. Because it is dislocated from the prevalent 
ideology it can see, albeit it in fragmentary form, the 
fractures of that culture. A reading of madness as the 
original subculture, and Cowper as the unwitting hero, is 
encouraged by the restive period between 1750 and 1800. Not 
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only was it marked by growing industrialisation, the French 
Revolution, the Jacobin uprising in England and a 
proliferation of religious dissent, it also signified the 
beginning of an aesthetic revolution in response to these 
changes. Moreover, this "Age of Sensibility" (and its more 
appropriate title: "The Transitional Age") was becoming an 
age of 'Insensibility', where the visage of classicalism 
experienced within its mask of decorum, the nightmare of 
unreason. Madness began, as never before, to make its 
presence felt. While Foucault and Andrew Skull examine the 
incarceration of madness - undoubtedly the main consequence 
of the newly perceived danger of madness - other aspects 
deserve mention. It is of some metaphorical significance that 
during this period England was ruled by King George III who 
was mad, "north north-west", according to Porter's sources 
until he lapsed into senile dementia in 1810 (42). Madness 
was not only on the rise but ruling the country. However, to 
conceive of madness not only as a freedom from rationality 
but as free to proclaim itself is to be mistaken. Dr. Francis 
Willis, the king's mad-doctor, clearly states the terms of 
agreement under which madness is acknowledged: 
As death makes no distinction in his visits between 
a poor man's hut and the prince's palace, so 
insanity is equally impartial in her dealings with 
her subjects ... When therefore my gracious 
sovereign became violent, I felt it my duty to 
subject him to the same system of restraint as I 
should have adopted with one of his own gardeners 
at Kew. In plain words, I put a strait waistcoat on 
him. (Porter 47) 
The restraint in his expression is matched bythc restraint 
in his action: stripping madness of its power as the king is 
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stripped of his and quite literally confining it to the realm 
of the respectable. While we must agree that madness was 
poised between threat and domestication, its presence can be 
found throughout Europe - and nowhere more evident than in 
the artist. One immediately thinks of Cowper, Smart and Clare 
who spent time in asylums; of Chatterton's suicide, of 
Collins' insanity in his later years; in Germany the 
'modernity' of Holderlin's poetic ravings and the confinement 
of Schiller in the early 19th century; the madman de Sade 
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shouting from the Bastille and the suicide of Gerard de 
Nerval. Although this can be explained away in part by 
pleading extreme sensitivity on the part of the poet it is 
indeed tempting to construct a causal relationship between 
madness and periods of social change. Madness then, is the 
resultant eruption that momentarily occurs before being 
restrained by a topography that alienates its Babel. But this 
is of limited help in the case of Cowper who, having spent a 
brief period in Dr Cotton's private asylum, retired to the 
country where he lived out the remainder of his days as an 
ascetic recluse. If Cowper's biography emphasises the 
domestication of madness, surely its presence as threat must 
be evident in some form? In madness does Cowper not produce 
the first signs of the mania that was to mark romanticism? 
F.L. Lucas would seem to think so: 
From the more primitive energies within us comes 
the artist's creative powers; from the twilight of 
preconsciousness rise his visions and his 
dreams .... but it was unfortunate, though 
inevitable, that the new movement early developed 
signs of mania - as in Blake. (103) 
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Romanticism as madness harnessed by words is also the thrust 
of Von Schlegel's summation. This "new movement" is "the 
expression of a secret attraction to a chaos which lies 
concealed" but which "approaches more to the secret of the 
universe" (343). What Lucas fails to realise is the 
difference between the "signs of mania" (one recalls 
Bataille's Blake) and mania itself. "Imagination", says 
Foucault "is not madness": 
Even if in the arbitrariness of hallucination, 
alienation finds the first access to its vain 
liberty, madness begins only beyond this point, 
where the mind binds itself to this arbitrariness 
and becomes a prisoner of this apparent liberty. 
(93) 
Cowper's madness finds no voice in these versions of 
classicalism or romanticism. Madness is located "only beyond 
this point". Madness belongs to (our) history only in an 
adjacent sense, it generates its own history that bears an 
idiosyncratic affinity with our readings of space, time and 
the events they hold. Proposing, for the moment, that 
history is linear, the history of insanity (from Dionysus to 
Sexton) is a history of vertical movements - a multitude of 
Babels - that break with history into an alienated height 
where the resources of history (that which makes existence 
familiar) can offer no succour. In madness one is constantly 
forced to re-discover the world - to reinvent the wheel of 
one's own turning - according to the particular shade of that 
madness. The madman wakes to a lonely world where nothing is 
familiar. The collapse of the familiar begins with the 
breakdown of the coordinates that make it so; time is one of 
these fundamental signifiers of stability. 
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Saint Augustine is at his Aristotelean best on the 
subject of Time and it allows him to become hopelessly 
enmeshed in a tantalising quandary. Time, he holds, "is 
coming out of what does not yet exist, passing through what 
has no duration, and moving into what no longer exists" 
(269). "Lines Written ... " (289-90) begins with this premise 
only to take it further, deeper into the paradox. Present 
time is that which is always happening (an eternal moment) as 
well as that immeasurable instant teetering on the edge of 
the Past and the Future: that which never happens. This kind 
of metaphysical callisthenics is necessary preparation for 
the seeming confusion of the opening stanza: 
Hatred and vengeance, my eternal portion, 
Scarce can endure delay of execution, 
Wait, with impatient readiness, to seize my 
Soul in a moment. 
The merciless emotions of "hatred and vengeance" are not 
tempered by the passing of time; neither is there a 
rationality available to diffuse or tame their consequence. 
Faced with this, Cowper succumbs before a twofold 
victimisation. Firstly they are the speaker's 'eternal 
portion" in so far as the present is an eternal moment; thus 
Cowper evokes a tortu .. ous futility that is similar in tone, 
if not in predicament, to Dante's unbaptised souls in Hell 
We heard no loud complaint, no crying there, 
No sound of grief except the sound of sighing 
Quivering for ever through the eternal air. 
(Canto IV 25-27) 
But Time's other quality is also activated - that which 
"scarce can endure delay" - whereby Time is perceived as 
"impatient readiness". Painful eternity and catastrophic 
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instant are fused and suspended around "wait" which is as 
applicable to the endured suffering of Vladimir and Estragon 
as it is to the closing 'hours' of Marlowe's Faustus. Like 
the two tramps he is entirely uncertain of the temperament of 
his saviour; like Faustus, Cowper does not fear to lose his 
life but his soul. 
Something of Cowper's unique obsessions - his paranoia, 
his prophetic nightmares - have already been mentioned. 
Whatever their psychopathological import they served to 
deprive him of his former evangelical surety of salvation, 
that which had secured his return to sanity after his 
attempted suicide. Excluded from the hope given by religious 
salvation he found nowhere to turn even at a time when 
religion held its greatest currency. As Sir Leslie Stephen 
points out,the 18th century could be roughly described as a 
continuum ranging from a perception of God open to individual 
comprehension (Deism) to the emotional loss of self in God 
(Evangelicalism). The former attempted to make God resemble, 
as far as possible, humankind and the approach to God 
available through the intellect. Stephen summarises Locke's 
Reasonableness of Christianity: 
The excellence of [Christianity] appeared not from 
its transcending the limits of human knowledge, but 
from its entire coincidence with the teaching of 
the unassisted intellect. (100) 
But if Deism was attacked by the 'recognised' churches as 
being a blasphemous attempt to demystify God, the Wesleyans 
were reproached for the opposite. Donald Davie quotes the 
following: 
77 
[The Wesleyan's] devotion was unreasonable, 
irregular and injudicious .... Their spirits appear 
to me [an Anglican minister at the time] to be 
turbulent, unruly and censorious ... like other 
[forms of] enthusiasm [it] will promote infidelity 
and turn out to be the damage of religion and the 
souls of men. (43) 
During one of his more tempered moments, Hugh !'Anson Fausset 
describes Cowper's madness according to the Deist/Evangelical 
spectrum: 
The rational self-assurance of the Deists could not 
re-assure such a nature as his, because it offered 
nothing to his emotional sensibility; but the 
emotional self-assurance of the Evangelicals not 
only failed to satisfy, but distorted his reason. 
(97) 
Between the extremes of individualism and submission, between 
logical exegesis and emotional blind faith in a literalist 
scripture, we find Cowper agitated but immobile: without the 
ability to humanise God (to make God in the human image), to 
submerge himself in God or to reject God. 
As evinced in his Adelphi Cowper converts his past into 
a series of sins which he then exhibits on the stage of 
evangelical re-birth. Reinterpretation on this scale requires 
that one's sinful past assume a chimerical quality - it 
should become less than real in the face of the 'reality' of 
re-birth. But for Cowper this reality was constantly 
infiltrated by h; · past - as sinful - not merely as a 
reminder of his fallibility but as something finally more 
real to him than any birth, any salvation. Thus,according to 
the perverse logic of madness (and again we witness the 
deviation from the alternatives of rationality) the only 
remaining choice was to reject himself or, in the terms of 
religious discourse, to see his soul as rejected by God: 
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Nature revives again, but a soul once slain lives 
no more ... Next month will complete a period of 11 
years in which I have spoken no other language. For 
causes which to [my friends] it appears madness to 
allege, but which rest upon my mind with a weight 
of immoveable conviction ... there is a mystery in 
my destruction. (II 200) 
As he asserts, the "language" in which he speaks is not one 
of apostasy but one of a belief that is unreasonable. Like 
insanity's flight from the plane of history, the language of 
madness commences its articulation in logic only to arrive at 
a place seemingly contrary to what is understood by logic. 
The language in which Cowper speaks is arrived at through the 
raiments of syllogism: 
- God has repeatedly spoken to humankind through 
dreams and visions. 
My soul has been rejected in a dream. 
- God has condemI'1.ed me: "I [am] fed with judgement". 
If this be madness, Foucault assures us that it works 
according to the familiar and within the realm of a stringent 
mathesis: 
The marvelous logic of the mad which seems to mock 
that of the logicians because it resembles it so 
exactly, or rather because it is exactly the same, 
and because at the secret heart of madness, at the 
core of so many errors, so many absurdities, so 
many words and gestures without consequence, we 
discover, finally, the hidden perfection of a 
language. ( 9 5) 
Here we find the final paradox of the numerous in which 
Cowper was involved. The language of which, and in which, 
Cowper speaks threatens discourse itself. Whereas language 
sets out to present a homogeneous and transparent picture of 
things, madness inadvertantly ridicules this. It is as if a 
sane discourse (one that 'invites' us to share a perspective 
and in so doing to normalise it) is a stained-glass window 
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through which we are all taught to see a similar world, 
albeit coloured by the materiality of that discourse. In 
madness, however, all hope of homogeneity is disappointed for 
what is confronted here is more akin to a kaleidoscope. The 
stained-glass window is shattered and the view is of the 
fragmentary: incomprehensible patterns gathered from the 
shards of normality. The Babel of insanity not only departs 
from the plane of history and from logic but also makes 
itself visible above the plane of a shared language. It not 
only validates the Saussurean precepts but concretises them 
as it ruptures the illusionary fabric between signifier and 
signified. The connection between the two is revealed as 
entirely arbitrary (lacking even the 'meaning' offered by 
convention) and it is this arbitrariness that is celebrated 
in madness. Neither does it stop here; arbitrariness is re-
charged by madness and a new (and ancient) signification 
takes form. This language exposes the semantic conventions 
and initiates a new language that arises from the very 
distortions of the madman's logic. Faulty as this syllogism 
is, it provides an entry into an animated language. This is 
the logos that Cowper refused to recognise in "The Shrubbery" 
and which finds him, for all his aversion, in "Lines 
Written". In the latter the distortion of language and reason 
engenders the strange sense of vague familiarity together 
with the presence of the alien: the smell that all madness 
gives off. 
What is familiar in "Lines Written" is religion, what is 
alien is the way~ religious perception is turned back on 
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itself until it becomes a grotesque parody of extant 
religious belief. The unique flavour of Cowper's madness is 
tangential to the Deist/ Evangelical continuum. Thus, 
although his vocabulary is typical of the period in general, 
his fashioning of it has nothing to do with the alternatives 
of the time - his madness is, in this sense, out of time and 
space and vertical to that continuum. 
This is evident if we acknowledge that Cowper almost 
certainly used Isaac Watts' "The Day of Judgement" as his 
model. Both are wi~tten in sapphics, both are similar in 
their apocalyptic tone and imagery: Watts' lines "to receive 
them headlong/ Down to the centre" are re-cast by Cowper as 
"to the centre headlong". Watts has produced a poem that 
faithfully proclaims the tenets of dissent - specifically the 
belief in divine selection - and, as such, gives us an 
instance of 'sanity' against which we can measure Cowper's 
private logos. Watts and Cowper were from the same mould. 
Both made use of poetry as a way of conveying, in lyrical 
form, the tenets of evangelicalism. In Cowper's madness there 
is, however, a parting of the ways. Although he continues to 
use the vocabulary of dissent it does not indicate an 
expression of belief but a distance from it. It is precisely 
this distance (and the vigour of the logic that underlies it) 
that initiates a commentary on Watts' poem and brings to the 
surface a turbulence within Watts' reasoning. Cowper's 
madness uncovers in Watts the very same inconsistencies that 
disrupted Cowper's belief in the first place. In madness 
Cowper finds the logic that Watts strives to disguise. 
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Certainty of expectation provides Watts with a didactic 
vehicle for this meditation in spiritual terror. Without 
exactly prophesying the time of the apocalypse, the 
description's vivacity suggests an imminence that is near 
enough to be described, on the verge of realisation: 
When the fierce north wind with his airy forces 
Rages up the Baltic to a foaming fury, 
And the red lightning with a storm of hail comes 
Rushing amain down,. 
(Norton Anthology 399) 
Prophecy is the hymnist's natural temptation and is fully 
exploited by Watts as he disguises the underlying fictional 
basis of his cataclysm by using "when" (similar to Cowper's 
use of "wait"): a word that has to be accepted on 'good 
faith' before the poem can assume meaning. It designates a 
conjectural time that is belied by the assertive tone and the 
precise violent description that follows. Imagination ("my 
fancy") parades as fact in Watts' claim that he knows the 
cataclysm's origin ("the Baltic") and the focus of the 
senseless destruction that will firstly annihilate "the poor 
sailors" before moving onto "the guilty wretches". Without a 
Miltonic constraint to temper his doomsday ruminations, Watts 
sacrifices theological consistency for the purposes of 
emotional impact, for emotional blackmail. Although the 
macabre imagery has its source in the propagandist technique 
of 'salvation through irrational fear', Watts unwittingly 
draws the same distinction as does Cowper between the 
merciless and benign persons of the trinity; inadvertently, 
Yaweh is set in opposition to Christ: 
Stop here my fancy: (away all ye horrid 
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Doleful ideas); come arise to Jesus; 
How he sits God-like! 
Watts' yearning for salvation is finally a desire for 
salvation not in Yahweh, but from Yahweh - from a God who has 
come to embody "ye horrid/ Doleful ideas" - favouring Jesus 
who is merely "God-like". By evoking the cataclysm, Watts 
exposes an uncertainty that nearly escapes the text and 
reconciles the dual faces of God only through the contrivance 
of platitude. This is not possible for Cowper whose focus is 
directed exactly upon the dual 'personality' of the Judeo-
Christian ( J. On the one hand there is the old testament 
Yahweh who can say to Moses "leave me now, my wrath shall 
blaze out against [the Israelites] and devour them" (Exodus 
32 10) and on the other hand, Christ as the sacrificial 
victim. The perverse resolution that he reaches is to become 
both victim and executioner: his madness fuses the faces of 
his God. The doubt is highlighted in Cowper, hidden in watts. 
But this dubious doxology causes Watts' poem to falter for it 
can only conceive of salvation as an abstract alternative to 
damnation. Damnation (like Milton's Satan) has a vitality 
that is conspicuously absent in those ascending 
to glory 
While [their] hosannas all along the passage 
Shout the Redeemer. 
To be fair, these limitations are allayed by the use of the 
sapphic form. The final line of each stanza signals an 
abruptness that is singularly pertinent to an apocalyptic 
content. It is as if leisurely completion of the stanza is 
hindered by an awareness of urgency and ideally the 
concluding line acts as an epigrammatic summation of the 
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stanza. But if the form serves to heighten this sense of the 
apocalypse, it also contaminates the final joyous stanzas, 
imbuing the supposed "shout" of victory with a residual 
fear that spills over from the bulk of the poem. watts' 
"shout" gains an added, but contrapuntal, resonance - beneath 
the "hosannas" the "shrill outcries" continue to sound. 
In all senses of the word Watts sets himself up as 
visionary: one who makes use of worldly objects to extend 
reality towards the eternal. In the case of Cowper however, 
the excuse of Time Fulure cannot be used in order to create a 
prospective reality. In his insanity, the time is now - the 
reality in all its hideous distortion already present. He too 
is a visionary, not of a world expanded, but distorted. That 
from which he retreated in "The Shrubbery" is that which 
finds him in "Lines Written ... ". Watts' densely populated 
world of worms, vultures, sailors and skeletons gives way to 
a stark landscape inhabited only by the poet's mind and 
biblical nightmares. Indeed the sense of the timeless, so 
carefully constructed in the opening stanza, is matched by 
the virtual lack of spatial reference. For two poems so alike 
in form and tone, there is a 'world of difference' between 
them. 
The theological inconsistency that subverts "The Day of 
Judgement" stands in contrast to the brilliant piece of 
logical 'reasoning' in Cowper's poem. Although Cowper's 
initial assumption - God's rejection - may be questionable, 
what follows is a finely wrought argument, far superior to 
the clumsiness of Watts' cogitation. The unholy 
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identification between the poet and Judas not only reiterates 
the charge against Judas but measures Cowper's more extreme 
betrayal: "Damn'd below Judas: more abhorr'd than he was,/ 
Who for a few pence sold his holy Master". Judas sets a 
horizon beyond which betrayal cannot go, but in so doing 
allows Cowper to project a language beyond that point and yet 
one still harnessed by Judas' example. The logic of madness 
allows language to breathe another air, the air of its own 
delirious height (and depth): 
Man disavows, and Deity disowns me; 
Hell might afford my miseries a shelter; 
Therefore hell keeps her ever hungry mouths all 
Bolted against me. 
According to Cowper's inverted world, the succour of eternal 
damnation is denied him not because it is too extreme but 
because it is not extreme enough. This pristine logic of 
madness was also noted by Polonius - "though this be madness 
yet there is method in't" (Hamlet II, II 205-06) - who could 
be describing Cowper's coding of experience: 
- I am "damn'd below Judas". 
Judas: who suffers in perdition, is history's 
precedent. 
- Hell cannot admit anyone "below" Judas. 
In hell's rejection, Cowper irrefutably proves his continued 
existence but, at the same time, colours that existence with 
all the horrors of hell and more. Hell's righteous rejection 
defines further the experience of one "who hangs between", 
one whom "man disavows and Deity disowns". The human/ divine 
continuum finally places him precisely on the isthmus of 
Pope's contradictions: a point where presence becomes absence 
and where he is alienated from salvation, damnation, humanity 
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and God. Although he is excluded from the possibilities of 
hope and futility, he remains a captive. He exists solely in 
terms of that from which he is excluded: "hell['s] hungry 
mouths all bolted against me". This, in turn, explains the 
esculent imagery that underscores the poem. The act of eating 
(and we remember his conviction that his food was poisoned) 
does not indicate sustenance but the vitriol of God's wrath: 
Hatred and vengeance, my eternal portion ... 
Hell keeps her ever hungry mouths all/ bolted ... 
I, fed with judgement, in a fleshy tomb ... 
Diet and confinement gain new semantic dimensions while their 
guiding logic (however deranged its assumptions) seeks to 
convince that these dimensions are plausible. watts' 
preteristic salvation fails to convince simply because it 
attempts to describe an apocalypse that is, as St. John 
discovered, literally indescribable. Cowper's poem works by 
its refusal to image. Even its weakest lines - "Hard lot! 
encompass'd with a thousand dangers;/ Weary, faint, trembling 
with a thousand terrors" - intimate a horror larger than the 
mechanisms of representation. So the visionary aggrandisement 
in Watts is converted into torpor: both a numbing in the face 
of excess and a depiction of an abstract cerebral world. 
Cowper remains inert but for the self-referential "weary, 
faint, trembling''. And when he is finally acted upon, it is 
not physical but perceptual; he does not change (no movement 
is involved), his perception of self changes: "I, fed with 
judgement, in a fleshy tomb, am/ Buried above ground." 
Inverted confinement and poisoned sustenance establish an 
intraversible distance between the subject "I" and the verb 
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"am". This suggests the final consequence of Cowper's 
autonomy from the material world. Cowper's language is 
startling because it seeks to locate subjectivity outside 
language: he exists in a negative relation to words. Whereas 
Watts moves towards meaning, towards the moral of his 
conclusion, Cowper retreats from the implications of words. 
The subject recedes from language and from the positioning 
that language implies. 
His madness insists that if he bothers to write, he can 
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write~of one thing: the desire for dissolution, an end 
to it all. But how - and this is a typically 20th century 
problem - can one write of the presence of nothingness? 
"Lines Written ... " shows one way: to subtract constantly, 
with the utmost dedication, from the already deprived, to 
detract from the minimal. Of course, here too he must fail. 
The poem is written. With all his other imprisonments, .he 
must add language. 
At last the impotence of "The Shrubbery" is poetically 
conveyed in a fitting manner. Impotence, that previously 
demarcated failure, is now charged with a violence that 
accurately portrays the battle between a subjective desire 
and the impossibility of its fulfilment in action. 
Dissolution is that which Cowper desires - not merely death 
for that would only "delay [the real] execution". Ironically, 
the emotional submission to the whole that evangelicalism 
purported to render accessible lingers in Cowper. Although it 
is not an alternative it is a shape that, in the insane 
discourse, presents itself as a desire to submit to any whole 
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beyond life, even if it is to be "sent quick and howling to 
the centre headlong". But Cowper's damnation is like 
Nosferatu's - a damnation that uncovers our fear that 
consciousness does not cease with death and that within a 
grave, and rotting body, we will continue in a state of 
eternal privation. 
Exactly that which he desires is that which he cannot 
obtain: in yearning for dissolution into any whole he is 
answered by his own estranged reflexivity. It is this sense 
of weakness, this resultant impotence, that is not only at 
the culpable heart of "Lines Written ... " but in the marrow of 
his insane poetry. Time, space, belief and language have all 
been subjected to the Mobius strip of paradox. Each of these 
devices of location has been twisted into another plane 
where, although they remain, they are worthless: no longer 
signifiers of meaning but signifiers of the distance from 
meaning. 
The movement that has been detailed is from artistic 
impotence in "The Shrubbery" to the art of impotence in 
"Lines Written ... " and "The Castaway" (431-2). Of the latter 
much has been said. "The Castaway" lends itself more easily 
than the nebulous milieu of "Lines Written ... " to critical 
d . 3 1scourse. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that 
Cowper uses the same techniques to create the perpetual 
imminence of personal catastrophe. Forsaking the allusion to 
Abiram and Judas, he turns to a factual incident recorded by 
George Anson in his travels. "The Castaway" uses the drowning 
of a sailor, firstly as an external correlative by which he 
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can construct a sympathy between himself and the sailor for 
"misery still delights to trace/ Its semblance in another's 
case" (76-8). Once again, he proceeds from here to plot his 
more extreme distance: 
snatch'd from all effectual aid, 
We perish'd, each alone: 
But I beneath a rougher sea, 
And whelm'd in deeper gulphs than he. 
This extended metaphor raises and transforms his theme. It 
retains the excess of an indifferent storm, thus evoking a 
cruel parody of his earlier "Light shining out of darkness": 
Cowper is trapped under the God who "plants his footsteps in 
the sea,/ And rides upon the storm". Here the mysterious ways 
of God are poetically linked to the "mystery in [Cowper's] 
destruction" in a manner that again disrupts - through the 
logic of its narrative - the seeming t· 1nsparency of 
language. Expressing his imminent destruction and the mystery 
of its ways, Cowper, again, portrays himself as dead and 
alive: dead, as he paradoxically remarks "We perish'd, each 
alone" and later "r beneath a rougher sea"; yet alive, for 
the poem is completed while the poet is still "whelm'd in 
deeper gulphs". He continues to exist in the long hour before 
drowning, perceptive only of the futility of a "destiny 
[temporarily] repell'd". Cowper would have found Anson's 
words perfect diet for his obsession: 
[I] conceived from the manner in which he swam, 
that he might continue sensible for a considerable 
time longer, of the horror attending his 
irretrievable situation. (Qtd in Rhodes 118) 
Some of the most stable expressions of humanity's sanity 
- temporal and spatial consistency, certainty in fact, 
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'shared' experience - are placed in doubt by Cowper's 
madness. "The Castaway", as in "Lines Written ... ", dislocates 
a moment in time (the sailor's death) from its moorings in 
the past and the future in order to examine the poet's sense 
of perpetual torment. Within the historical event he finds a 
correlative for his insanity with all its illusionary 
assumptions. 
By focusing on actuality he attempts to find succour for 
his own condition. Irrespective of the sailor's painful 
demise his death is appropriated into a historical world: a 
realm which is ordered if only by the passing of time and its 
ability to be documented. That Cowper sought to use poetry as 
a therapeutic escape from madness is emphasised in a letter 
to Samuel Teedon: 
Time and the pen have been my only remedies for the 
deepest wounds that ever soul received, these many 
years. (IV 302) 
Poetry then (the passing of time was hardly a remedy) 
provides him with a means of avoiding madness - thus 
explaining his averted gaze in "The Shrubbery" - or at least 
a way to normalise and diffuse it, a way of patching up the 
fissures that appear. Unlike "Lines Written", "The Castaway" 
seeks to achieve exactly this mending. The sailor's death 
offers him a parable by which he can begin to express the 
insular theme of his madness with the intention of returning 
from that madness to order and security. He returns by way of 
the poetic immortalisation of the sailor: "And tears by bards 
or heroes shed/ Alike immortalize the dead". This is Cowper 
sane - safe and secure within the bosom of a typically 
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Augustan moral. However, (and here "The Castaway" provides an 
incisive parable of his life's battle) the pen refuses to 
cease. In the two concluding stanzas the poem is "snatch'd 
from all effectual aid" and madness, once more, ruptures the 
surface that he has laboured to sanitise. 
We depart from this, his final poem, with him again 
caught in motionless agitation: "I beneath a rougher sea,/ 
And whelm'd in deeper gulphs than he". Here the picture 
freezes: the waves are about to engulf him and the 
dissolution he fears and desires is about to be made flesh. 
So imminent is this that it is tempting to conclude for him, 
to bring down the waves, to add in the inevitable period. 
Cowper's madness, however, refuses this closure. Insanity 
locates him in an eternal state of suspended animation. He 
closes his life as he had lived it: at the dimensionless 
point where assertion and refutation meet, at the heart of 
the paradox. 
Cowper's Babel (so close to Bruegel's Rotterdam canvas) 
remains, to the end, unfinished. Fashioned out of paradox its 
tiers spiral out of its surroundings, alienating him from the 
familiar and yet plummeting down into the strangeness of what 
was familiar. And in the midst of this architecture was 
Cowper, nowhere at home, a barely visible figure upon the 
broken fortifications of unreason. But even in his impotence, 
his size and his insignificance, his madness is sufficient to 
bespeak the resonances of an eternal signification - a 
language ascending out of representation and offering a small 
glimpse of the beyond. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Smart: The Fool's Asylum 
Though vine, nor fig-tree neither, 
Their wonted fruit should bear, 
Tho' all the fields should wither, 
Nor flocks, nor herds, be there: 
Yet GOD the same abiding, 
His praise shall tune my voice; 
For while in him confiding, 
I cannot but rejoice. (Cowper "Joy and Peace in 
Believing" 464-65) 
Although Cowper experienced joy after his conversion, it 
was an ecstasy all too brief and finally agai"~st the grain of 
his madness. The logos that he fashioned in madness was, like 
the image of his God, entirely lacking in humour and overcame 
all serenity with the 'terrible thought' that dogged 
Zarathustra's travels. If Cowper was transfixed by Bruegel's 
Rotterdam painting then Smart represents the Vienna version. 
Confined, by his family, to a madhouse, isolated from the 
nature he adored, he tunes his voice in a celebration of 
folly. Madness smiles in Smart's logos, he is caught up in 
building a tower that wishes to reach God so as to bless him 
better. Thus to journey from Cowper's universe of damnation 
to Smart's world is to travel through psychiatry's looking-
glass (the '\' that separates worlds), to traverse in another 
way the representations of Babel. 
These two poets depict the extremes of a malady that is 
usually seen to exist within the manic-depressive 
personality. Although contemporaries, Cowper's insane 
'message' is one of pessimism, damnation and confinement; 
whereas Smart's mad poetry is of unbridled ecstasy, a 
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delirious joy that seeks to unify self with the world. The 
only similarity in their imbalance would be registered in 
their excess. There are, however, points of contact. The 
discovery of Jubilate Agna is indirectly due to Cowper's 
madness,for William Hayley attempted to examine it as a 
measurement against which Cowper's illness could be gauged 
(Bond 16). As contemporaries, their sane work adhered to the 
tenor of the Classical period, both in their use of genre and 
their sober propriety in matters of poetic representation. 
Both exhibited in their nature poetry a love of pristine 
creation that pre-figured - if not influenced - the 
romantics. Cowper was briefly confined in a private asylum in 
1763 - the same year that Smart was re-eased from his seven 
year period of incarceration. Finally, however different 
their respective manifestations of madness, God lay at the 
centre of their obsessive convicti,~s. 
Cowper's 'art of impotence' follows a line of entropy 
beginning with joyous rebirth into God's salvation only to 
decay into silence and death. Never does his faith in God 
diminish; it is merely reinterpreted (from God the loving 
father, to God the distant, to God the vengeful) until it 
again makes sense of the fragmentary process. Excess, faith 
and the presence of an order of madness unite these poets in 
all their difference. 
As with Cowper, Smart's madness began (inevitably in a 
paradoxical manner) with a restoration to sanity. Cowper's 
Adelphi is a commemoration of his return to sanity from sin 
and madness. However, as mentioned earlier, the extremes were 
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not brought into balance merely by evoking God. If Cowper saw 
God as having given him life it was not long before he 
believed God had retracted his gift. Sanity was accompanied 
by evangelical hysteria that eventually faded,leaving only 
the grimace of a displeased creator haunting him for the 
remainder of his days. Supposedly Smart also underwent a 
birth out of madness which he described in "Hymn to the 
Supreme Being on Recovery from a Dangerous Fit of Illness": 
When reason left me in the time of need 
And sense was lost in terror or in trance 
My sinking soul was with my blood inflamed, 
And the celestial image sunk, defaced or maim'd. 
(20-24) 
These words may be Smart's but the vocabulary on which he 
draws is entirely conventional, smacking of Augustan 
sentimentality as when he describes his children as ''My 
little prattlers, [who] lifting up their hands,/ Beckon me 
back to them, to life, to light" (51-52). Uncertain as to 
what he should ascribe his madness to, he flounders between a 
causality of humours and a more religious doctrine - an 
equivocation that may give us insight into the available 
readings of 18th century madness but not something that aids 
his poetic task. The bulk of this poem warbles through 
contrived hypostatisations of charity, hope and devotion, 
sentimental references to his family and vague references to 
ailing biblical monarchs. This qualifies as Smart's 
'shrubbery', overpopulated with pointless allusions that 
destroy any possibility of a sustained effect. Confronted 
with poetry of this calibre one recalls Browning's commentary 
on Smart's early poetry: "All showed the Golden Mean without 
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a hint/ Of brave extravagence that breaks the rule" (22-23). 
It is exactly this awareness of, and dependence on, "the 
Golden Mean" that prohibits him from making a powerful 
statement either about his illness or his path to 'recovery'. 
As Cowper discovered, his age possessed no formulated 
discourse of madness (in spite of Burton's The Anatomy of 
Melancholy [1621]) and it remains up to the madman (as poet) 
to forge a language capable of conveying that madness. 
Preaching from the heights of salvation - both 
physically and spiritually - Smart dimly perceives the 
precariousness of his footing; an instability that is, 
fittingly, registered in temporal terms. Supposedly the poem 
progresses from a despairing loss of reason, through health 
and into an acceptance of God's revitalizing intervention: 
its movement, in this sense, is chronological. Yet after 
his cure, within the progression of the poem and his 
celebration of a God "whose power's uncircumscrib'd, whose 
love's intense" (57) he returns, without reason, to dwell on 
his illness: 
My feeble feet refused my body's weight, 
Nor would my eyes admit the glorious light; 
My nerves, convuls'd, shook fearful of their fate; 
My mind lay open to the powers of the night. 
(67-70) 
The power of these lines when compared to the rest of the 
poem need not suggest morbid self-pity (as did Cowper's in 
"The Shrubbery") but rather a certain force that finds its 
strength by attending to the uniqueness of his experience; it 
is here that Browning's "brave extravagence" is briefly 
uncovered. This brief temporal reversal in the midst of 
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Augustan platitudes of stability give rise to fissures in the 
poem's architecture. Even with a liturgical addendum - "And 
justify those sweetest words from Heaven, / 'That he shall 
love Thee most, to whom Thou'st most forgiven" (107-108) -
the poem seems about to collapse. As a poem on the verge of 
collapse it is contingent with Smart's instability at this 
time, and his collapse into madness led to his confinement in 
the same year as the poem's completion. From the ruins of 
this pastiche of convention can be found not only the poetry 
1 that was to assert itself in Jubilate Agna and A Song to 
David but the very logos that inspired his new perception of 
the world and his duty therein. 
The problem he experienced with a causality based on a 
"blood inflamed" is indicated by the hesitant way he tries to 
describe his own perception of madness: was sense "lost in 
terror or in trance", was his soul "defaced or maim'd"? This 
descriptive confusion vanishes however in his journey out of 
madness. For Smart there is no doubt that God was the 
physician that "pitying, did a second birth bestow:/ A birth 
of joy - not like the first of tears and woe." (71-72) 
Situated somewhere between evangelical ecstasy and Blake's 
"Infant Sorrow" these lines foreshadow the poetry that was to 
come. Smart's birth into madness will allow him to achieve a 
synthesis - a unique declaration of faith. Smart's madness is 
something that avoids both the proscriptive generation of 
guilt that typified evangelicalism, and the kind of liberal 
apostasy advocated by Blake. 
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One would seemingly have no difficulty in reading Smart 
as joyous evangelical who perceives himself as "the Lord's 
News-Writer - the scribe evangelist" (B 237) while becoming 
vitriolic in his condemnation of past pleasures as evil: "For 
all STAGE-playing is Hypocrisy and the Devil is the master of 
their revels" (B 345). 
Neither would it be extreme to place Smart with Blake 
for they are undoubtedly the great English visionaries of the 
latter half of the century. In addition Blake's imagery and 
thought seem to bear a certain family resemblance. In "The 
Little Girl Lost" Blake begins with a vision: 
In futurity 
I prophetic see, 
That the earth from sleep 
(Grave that sentence deep) 
Shall arise and seek 
For her maker meek: 
And the desart wild 
Become a garden mild. (119-120) 
The earth as alive, in a very real sense, and its natural 
inclination to God are decidedly Smart's major themes. 
Jubilate's Fragment C is preoccupied with a prophetic vision 
of mankind having returned to God and, in so doing, 
establishing a "garden mild". 
The validity of these associations and the further 
possibility of producing two, almost opposite, readings must 
render any one reading of Smart's work (especially that 
composed between 1756-1763) extremely tenuous. To offer an 
evangelical reading would risk missing the playfulness (even 
to the point of irreverence) of Smart as journalist for the 
Lord. Furthermore, this reading would find it difficult to 
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accommodate Smart's platonic Idealism in his objection to 
drama's "Hypocrisy". Similarly, a Blakean reading would 
struggle to reconcile Blake's prophetic work with one whose 
New Jerusalem would be heralded in the following manner: 
For I prophecy that men will live to a much greater 
age. This ripens apace God be praised. 
For I prohecy that they will grow taler and 
stronger ... 
For men in David's time were ten feet high in 
general. (C 88-91) 
No doubt there are connections to charismatic forms of 
belief, to Blake and, for that matter, to a myriad of 
philosophies and poets in between. However, in fairness to 
the poem's spirit we are bound to return to its vision and 
the logos of its creator. 
His madness, for example, is not as self evident as 
Cowper's. Although there is much uncertainty about the 
particulars of his confinement, it seems that his crime was 
simply one of religious enthusiasm. Even Johnson, the great 
spokesman of the 'Age of Sensibility' finds this strange: 
I did not think he ought to be shut up. His 
infirmities were not noxious to society. He 
insisted on people praying with him; and I'd as 
lief pray with Kit Smart as any one else. Another 
charge was, that he did not love clean linen; and I 
have no passion for it. (qtd. in Price 517) 
That he was effluent, both in physical and spiritual areas, 
hardly seems reason enough to restrict his movements to an 
asylum. This can be partly explained by recourse to the 
hygienic temper of the day and a pervading understanding of 
madness that is wryly expressed by Swift in A Tale of a Tub. 
Perhaps no-one could understand the whims of any period 
better than Swift; certainly there are few who could describe 
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madness in terms both reasonable and absurd. With his 
inimitable mixture of irony and utter seriousness, Swift 
presents the following understanding of madness in "A 
Digression Concerning Madness": 
there is a particular string in the harmony of 
human understanding, which in several individuals 
is exactly of the same tuning. This if you can 
dexterously screw up to its right key, and then 
strike gently upon it, whenever you have the good 
fortune to light among those of the same pitch, 
they will, by a secret necessary sympathy, strike 
exactly at the same time. And in this one 
circumstance lies all the skill or luck of the 
matter; for if you chance to jar the string among 
those who are either above or below your own 
he_ jht, instead of subscribing to your doctrine, 
they will tie you fast, call you mad, and feed you 
with bread and water. (330) 
Whatever else has changed in the history of madness, this 
pre-occupation with the normative has endured. The rather 
flippant tuning analogy hardly hides the dark implication 
that sanity is finally a matter of "chance" or "skill". 
Foucault is at pains to point out a shift that occurred 
during the classical age: a shift in a consciousness that 
could no longer tolerate the unsightly visage of madness 
dwelling at liberty in the midst of a society preoccupied 
with order. Madness no longer provided an exemplum of 
instruction - the acknowledged wisdom of the fool - but 
became a grotesque and regressive aspect of human refinement 
and deserving only of isolation. The madman's former power to 
instruct was replaced by an avowal of his impotence: 
Until the Renaissance, the sensibility to madness 
was linked to the presence of imaginary 
transcendences. In the classical age, for the first 
time, madness was perceived through a condemnation 
of idleness .... If there is, in classical madness, 
something which refers elsewhere, and to other 
things, it is ... because [the madman] crosses the 
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frontiers of bourgeois order of his own accord, and 
alienates himself outside the sacred limits of its 
ethic. ( 58) 
The implication here is that the madman's message had been 
entirely demystified by translating the insane into economic 
terms. The prophet had, in losing his voice, become a 
vagrant. And vagrants in a society that showed a growing 
interest in industrialization and the utilization of labour 
must either work or be excluded from that community. The 
former solution, while working in the case of the poor, was 
doomed to failure when applied to the mad: 
The order and discipline of the whole work-house 
were threatened by the presence of a madman who, 
even by threats and punishment, could neither be 
persuaded nor induced t2 conform to the 
regulations" (Scull 41) . 
As in classical aesthetics, the concern was primarily one of 
order. John Aiken's "Thoughts on Hospitals" (1777) emphasises 
this in his call for the removal of the madmen "from the 
public eye to which they are multiplied objects of alarm" 
(qtd. in Scull 42). It is here that these various strands 
converge (in time) on Smart who had become an "object of 
alarm": his unbridled song was seen as dissonant according to 
"the harmony of human understanding", his impropriety had 
alienated "himself outside the sacred limits" of a society 
obsessed with restraint, decorum and the proclamation of a 
self-evident order. In this context, the fact "that he did 
not love clean linen" issues forth a hygienic irreverence of 
almost symbolic proportions. Metaphorically, Smart was doing 
the dirt on the dress of his age. 
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We are now more in a position to understand the specific 
"skill" that sanity required and which Smart did not possess. 
In perhaps the most famous of his lines from Jubilate, Smart 
innocently describes his contravention of that order: 
For I blessed God in St James's Park till I routed 
all the company. 
For the officers of the peace are at variance with 
me, and the watchman smites me with his staff. 
(B89-90) 
Viewed from without, Smart appears an object of embarrassment 
who was, in his outburst, able to provoke severe restraint 
being placed on him. Those who would refuse to acknowledge 
his imbalance as anything more than religious enthusiasm 
should re-consider the dimension of a prayer that "routed all 
the company". Malesherbes, writing at the same time, provides 
a summation of the kind of 'crime' committed by Smart and its 
implied solution: 
It seems that the honor of a family requires the 
disappearance from society of the individual who 
by vile and abject habits shames his relatives 
(qtd. in Foucault 67). 
With a desire for mental cleanliness of this proportion, 
the solution adopted by Smart's friends and relations was 
simply to evict him from the space of that community - an 
exclusion that lasted, with brief reprieves, for seven years. 
His spatio-temporal isolation carried with it all the 
indignities of confinement in the 18th century. He had 
personally become a spectacle, more fascinating than the 
famous dwarf, Thomas Hall, and the rarest of birds: "For I 
have seen the White Raven and Thomas Hall of Willingham and 
am my self a greater curiosity than both" (B 25). And 
publicly, he had (with his mad brethren) become a grotesque 
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side show in an asylum that had turned itself into an 
amusement arcade of Failure: ''For they pass by me in their 
tour, and the good Samaritan is not yet come" (B 63). To 
exist beyond the social ethic was not really to exist at all. 
The madman had reached the end of his journey: from prophet, 
to vagrant and finally to an empty cipher on the threshold 
between the human and subhuman. It is not extreme to suggest 
that during the period in which Smart was confined, madness 
had reached its darkest age. The madman had been 
·~ojectified' and was treated accordingly: 
Let Andrew rejoice with the Whale, who is array'd 
in beauteous blue and is a combination of bulk and 
activity. 
For they work me with their harping-irons, which is 
a barberous instrument, because I am more unguarded 
than others. (B 124) 
This brings us to a point where we must acknowledge his 
madness, but a madness operating in a sensibility that is 
remarkably conscious of itself and its surroundings. Smart's 
madness is decidedly not something that is easily classified 
or dismissed. Criticism has, in general, sought to achieve 
exactly this in its response to Smart. Williamson retrieves 
Smart and places him in a prevalent framework by holding that 
"Smart's insanity may account for the obsessional nature of 
his beliefs, but does not 'explain' those beliefs themselves 
or their origins" (1979 414). This amounts to severing 
madness from the creating consciousness that contains, or is 
contained by, that madness. Alternatively, to classify Smart 
as cyclothymiac using, as evidence, Jubilate, also seems 
singularly unhelpful (See Dearnley, 4). Sensing the 
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inadequacy of this diagnosis, there are those critics who 
categorise Smart by a special pleading to the Unknown. Thus 
Geoffrey Grigson would like to see madness as a quality that 
"enabled Smart to concentrate his mind for a while in trance-
like states of pure consciousness" (5). What, exactly, is 
meant by "pure consciousness" we are never told. In insanity, 
criticism can so easily find a hermeneutic escape clause that 
'explains' by classifying madness in terms of chaos: the 
random nature of the poem comes to reflect the randomness of 
a disturbed mind. Dearnley is not at all sure whether this is 
a good or a bad thing. Her ambivalence causes her to see the 
poem as some form of poetic catharsis in which "all the 
affectations and emotions of the soul, its sudden impulses, 
its hasty sallies and irregularities, are conspicuously 
displayed" (145). It may be confessional but it cannot 
receive her approbation - one is tempted to say, absolution -
while she suspects the confession is nonsense: 
We realise that it is sometimes difficult, even 
impossible, to distinguish between sane metaphor 
and insane vision in Jubilate Agna. Yet the 
imaginative fantasies and strange grammatical forms 
suggest that the poem is the reckless product of a 
deranged imagination. (155) 
Dearnley's hesitation is shared by most critics on Smart. 
This poem - incomplete, swaying between lyricism and obituary 
lists, part visionary, part obscurity - seems to contribute 
more to the rich tapestry of literary anecdote than to any 
coherent poetic intention. Rightly, the suspicion is that the 
critic always runs the risk of seriously explicating that 
which is nothing more "than the reckless product of a 
deranged imagination". As the critic goes in search of 
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progressively more esoteric influences on Smart, the fear is 
that finally meaning is found where none was intended and the 
critic duped into the seriousness of scholarship and the 
. t. 1 3 cri 1ca process 
So it appears that for the scholar of Smart's Jubilate 
there are two related approaches. The first is the most 
obviously alluring: to view the poem as a work in progress, 
as something that requires to be finished by the reader. Thus 
those who are concerned with sources are interested in 
validating tLe text as already complete, as containing a 
pattern beneath its surface. This would also include (as we 
shall see) Hartman and Lui who 'ghost write' the poem using 
the extant text as raw material and their endeavour is 
creative rather than critical. The second path is to 
'surrender' to the poem's vicissitudes: to see it as one 
would a living organism. Here Jubilate is left as 
fragmentary, mad as the poet was mad, boring, repetitive and, 
at times, poetic as life is sometimes oddly so. While never 
escaping the temptations of the first approach, it is in the 
second that the 'reader of madness' may best find insanity's 
strange spirit. 
Immediately we assume this position, we find a series of 
echoes between Jubilate and other voices on the periphery of 
sanity. 
/ Consider, for example, Mac-da-Cherda, an Irish geilt 
(wildman) of the 7th century. While apparently drawing the 
obvious distinction between the folly of earthly wisdom and 
the wisdom of his folly, he laments his outcast state: 
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It is unjust to call me a fool, 
God endowed me with the best of sense. 
When I am foolish, I strike heaven; 
when I am wise, I am repentant ... 
Other periods come to me of foolishness 
and of madness; when they (the men of the world) 
come to me after that, 
I do not follow the true path. (qtd. in Saward, 40) 
As suggested in these lines, the distinction between wisdom 
and madness disintegrates and his concluding question - "is 
wisdom any better than foolishness" (40) - is impossible to 
answer without perjuring oneself. The poem not only 
celebrates his foolishness but implicitly lures one into the 
fool's domain; the reader, finally, is the fool, rejoicing in 
his or her own foolishness. This playfulness of the fool is 
so much a part of Smart's campaign in Jubilate. 
In society's exclusion of Smart, he had been located in 
a limbo where fools, madmen and other forms of social 
ineptitude resided. The full import of Smart's innocence and 
joy find a context in this limbo on the periphery of 
society's consciousness; peripheral perhaps, but excessive, 
recalling the latin excere - to go beyond. Already we have 
discovered a version of Smart who, in his incessant prayer, 
implicitly outrages the polite domestication of conventional 
religious worship by taking prayer from the church into the 
'playground' of St James Park - and there routing the 
company. Subsequently we find Smart as one accused, attacked 
by watchmen, perhaps physically tortured (at least 
psychologically maltreated) in the asylum. In his unwitting 
assault on the society he has been made a victim and it is in 
Jubilate that he sets out to re-dress himself within a malign 
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world. The poem then is a document of his reconstitution: the 
building of a world made coherent according to his gospel of 
madness. 
In redressing his predicament, Smart refuses to hanker 
after a re-admittance to the social order but rather strips 
away his remaining attachments to that order. The first 
tangible bonds that he dissolves are financial and, by 
extension, maternal. Thrice he bequeaths his inheritance to 
his "mother in consideration of her infirmities ... her 
age ... [and] her poverty" (B46-48). Amidst the variegated 
brilliance of imagery, this unanimated repetition signals the 
death, in incantatory fashion, of the mother-son affiliation. 
The finality of this severing is ironically conveyed, as is 
so often the case, in the context of "Let": 
Let Sared rejoice with the Wittal - a silly bird is 
wise unto his own preservation. 
For I this day made over my inheritance to my 
mother in consideration of her poverty. 
Let Shuni rejoice with the Gull, who is happy in 
not being good for food. 
For I bless the thirteenth of August, in which I 
was willing to be called a fool for the sake of 
Christ. (B49, 51) 
Williamson is content to point out Smart's bitterness at the 
loss of his inheritance by noting the references to cuckoldry 
(20). That is as may be, but one cannot ignore the complexity 
of the dialogue in which Smart is involved. The wittal and 
gull survive because of the farmer's insignificance and (its 
wise) foolishness; the latter, only because it is unfit for 
human consumption. The contextual implication is that Smart's 
survival is partly due to the economic inefficacy of 
cannibalism - one is reminded of Swift's A Modest Proposal -
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and partly due to his supposed foolishness. Smart uses Paul's 
words when the latter rebuked, also through irony, the 
Corinthians: ''we are fools for Christ's sake, while you are 
such sensible Christians. We are weak; you are so powerful. 
We are in disgrace; you are honoured" (1 Cor., 4). To 
associate Smart's madness with that of the fool is not so 
extreme if we consider William Willeford's basic definition: 
The fool is, in short, a silly or idiotic or mad 
person, or one who is made by circumstances (or the 
action of others) to appear a fool in that 
sense .... (10) 
Willeford has, in turn made extensive use of Desiderius 
Erasmus. The Praise of Folly draws a distinction between a 
self-destructive madness that destroys the victim (Cowper, 
for example) and a madness that "brings no small share of 
delight both to those who experience it and to those who 
observe it without being mad to the same degree themselves" 
(59-60). 
Only from the vantage point of folly is Smart able to 
consign his reputation, together with his family, to 
Providence: 
For silly fellow! silly fellow! is against me and 
belongeth neither to me nor my family. (B 60) 
For the Fatherless Children and widows are never 
deserted of the Lord. (B 70) 
For I pray God to give [my children] the food which 
I cannot earn for them any otherwise than by 
prayer. (B 76) 
Where once his prattlers bade him to return from madness, now 
he gives them away to God from within that madness. While the 
earlier madness was filled with hesitancy and doubt, trapped 
within the locus of transition, the madness in which he has 
taken up residence displays a surety. That he has irrevocably 
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traversed the social limits is certain. Beyond his mother, 
beyond his wife and children (with whom he is never 
reconciled), beyond his life, he stands and sees, as the poem 
suggests, perhaps for the first time: 
Let Micah rejoice with the spotted Spider, who 
counterfeits death to effect his purposes. 
For they lay wagers touching my life. - God be 
gracious to the winners. (B 92) 
This is the humorous triumph of the absent. In the camouflage 
of folly he joins with Christ to watch impartially his 
material remains being wagered, but nonetheless to bless the 
ignorance and folly of humankind. Compassion proceeds from an 
absence. Removed from the immediacy of participation - "I 
meditate the peace of Europe amongst family bickerings and 
domestic jars" (B 7) - Smart sees more clearly, or more 
precisely, sees a different world. This is the rebirth that 
occurred - not in any narrow religious sense but in a 
metaphorically pro-creative sense. Without idealising madness 
or glossing over the pain and humiliation of his 
classification as ''silly fellow", Smart finds in his folly 
the vision of a child. He stands, as it were, on the other 
side of Blake's "doors of perception" and while not claiming 
to see into the Infinite, he sees infinite potential, "as 
numerous and musical as the grasshoppers of Paradise" (B 
100). Smart's logos was not, as Grigson would have us 
believe, merely involved in keeping "a species of journal" 
(35) but rather in creating a poem necessarily incomplete; 
one that implies an ellipsis reaching into an infinity where 
the poet would continue "to bless the Lord JESUS in the 
innumerables, and for ever and ever" (B 133). 
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We may accept, with Professor Sherbo, that Fragment D 
was composed at a fixed rate and that Smart was some kind of 
Robinson Crusoe marking off days (see Williamson xxiii); what 
we cannot accept is the further implication that the poet was 
a helpless captive of time or, more damning, that Fragment D 
is useful only to prove that Smart was an avid reader of 
obituary lists. 4 The extent of his vision could not allow him 
to see time, anymore than space, as something to which he 
must submit: 
For innumerable ciphers will amount to something. 
For the mind of man cannot bear a tedious 
accumulation of nothings without effect. 
For infinite upon infinite they make a chain. (C 
35-37) 
As with numbers, time - in Smart's limbo - must "amount to 
something"; the poem, in fact, is an impossible taking stock 
of that amount. What could be "a tedious accumulation of 
nothings" is constantly manipulated in excere so that it 
transcends its limitation; as Stead pointed out the sign for 
infinity (00) appears as "a chain of noughts" (qtd. in 
Williamson 94). Similarly, specific days are mentioned not as 
a dreary accumulation of time but as a means to transform it 
in prayer. His last mention of calendar time may serve as an 
example: "Let Poor, house of Poor rejoice with Jasione a kind 
of Withwind - Lord have mercy on the poor this hard weather. 
Jan: 10th 1763" (D 216). The individual (dead or not) joins 
with his or her family and Jasione to praise God who is, in 
turn, asked to grant mercy to the poor on this specific day. 
This complex process of reciprocity and association, while 
not making for stirring poetry, elevates 10th January so that 
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it comes to rest beyond its temporality. Time loses its 
factual respectability and instead gains - as in his maternal 
denial - an incantatory and evocative quality. 
The strange relation that exists between madness and the 
fundamental instability of space and time is one that, 
consciously or unconsciously, is confronted and resolved in 
the most unique ways. To return to St. Augustine. Smart does 
not see either an endless, or furiously expectant, torment as 
did Cowper; Smart's incantation gathers up the past, brings 
to birth the future in prophecy and collates this in a 
timeless present that is endlessly evoked. Evocation: a 
calling up that, in this poem, seeks to blur the distinction 
between past and future, between here and elsewhere. 'To call 
up' implies that the elsewhere, the other time is always 
present - surrounding us but invisible because dormant. In 
calling it up we resurrect (make active} language and gain 
entry into all moments and places. Sequence and distance 
collapse into a timeless and spaceless event which contains, 
and is contained by, all. Thus the Word in the beginning was 
simply "Let": the word that, according to Western doxology, 
began the lighting of candles in the dark. And for Smart, 
within his madness, within the darkness of his cell, "Let" 
achieves exactly this purpose: it breaks down the walls of 
his incarceration and allows history and universe to become 
visible. His madness literally allows him to call it to mind. 
So, to call this present ~imeless is a misnomer that should 
not imply a languid eternity between one moment and an 
unknown next but an immediacy that results from the meeting 
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of supposedly mutually exclusive entities: transplanting 
people, animals and plants from their historical moorings and 
placing them in a world that exists only for the 'duration' 
that the imagination requires to bring this world into being. 
The closest parallel is the world described by John in 
Revelation. Indeed, the opening of Jubilate is extremely 
close to John's vision (7: 9-10): 
Rejoice in God, 0 ye Tongues; give the glory to the 
Lord, and the Lamb. 
Nations, and languages, and every Creature, in 
which is the breath of Life. 
Let man and beast appear before him, and magnify 
his name together. (A 1-3) 
The roll-call that follows makes it clear that in appearing 
before God, "man and beast" are freed from space and from 
time into an abyss made solid by God's, and to a lesser 
extent Smart's, creation. But there is a more interesting 
corollary to this. From within the limbo of his social 
exclusion (which is again both temporo-spatial) he reclaims 
and reconstitutes the world supposedly denied him. At this 
point, Smart differs absolutely from Cowper who found here 
refusal and fragmentation. Smart discovers what the 
Kabbalists are fond of calling 'atonement'; an einfuhlu.ng of 
mystical proportions. 5 Willeford, intent on stressing the 
amorality of the fool, and his affiliation with 
"nothingness", raises an apposite point: 
The fool in his connection with nothingness [in 
Smart's case, 'everythingness' ] ... may seem both a 
threat to reality and to our ways of seeing it 
complexly. But the fool in his link with 'nothing' 
[or everything] may also transform both reality and 
these ways of seeing it. (62) 
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Absolute pattern (the patterns of the Absolute) and absolute 
negation of pattern are very similar, Smart, as fool, imposes 
mad order on all that he sees in the same way as Zarathustra 
decodes the artificiality of social arrangement. To see 
either order or chaos challenges a society which has defined 
sanity in terms of seeing just enough of one or the other. 
Smart's foolishness is guaranteed by excess and does not 
arise out of his confrontation with chaos and a need to flee 
from its blank truth. His madness turns the possibility of 
chaos into a perception of the eternal and his poetic 
response is an expression of this eternal ( and hence 
incomplete) presence of a Creator's hand. 
The fool's awareness of an underlying chaos is, in 
fact, very close to Smart's vision of an Order patiently 
awaiting exposure. This can be partly explained by the 
subjectivity of the perceiver, but it is a subjectivity 
refined by the fool's peripheral locus. As Anton Zijderveld 
observes in Reality in a Looking-Glass (1982): 
The fool's nature ... lies on the borderline 
between man and animal where it is subjected to 
strange impulses which are not controlled by the 
mind and the traditional values and norms ... He 
represents the chimeric no-man's-land between 
nature and culture, between meaninglessness and 
meaning. ( 1 7) 
Willeford's point is much the same (see 132). Both the fool 
and Smart react in the same way, both find themselves 
instinctively drawn to nature for it is here that man and 
animal meet; it is here that order and chaos exist in such 
close proximity that they become indistinguishable, 
synonymous. Furthermore, there is the renowned sympathy that 
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exists between the fool and nature; the fool sees therein a 
reflection of his own vulnerability before a world enamored 
with control. Smart sees the same process as that which 
isolated him: a socially imposed ordering has occurred that 
rids itself of all that is not useful to humanity's 
conceptions of the world and itself. From the "no-man's-land" 
of the asylum, his gaze falls equally on nature and culture. 
The former elicits a joyous celebration while in the latter 
he detects a 'false' mathesis and here his criticism is 
unyielding. 
In fragment A Smart not only unearths Old Testament 
personages to appear before God, but he seeks those animals 
that supposedly offer little testament to the glory of the 
animal kingdom. From his alienated purview he identifies with 
those from nature who, for some reason (or unreason), have 
become the 'under-dogs', the peripheral: 
Let Tola bless with the Toad, which is the good 
creature of God, tho' his virtue is in the secret, 
and his mention is not made. (A 29) 
Let Ethan praise with the Flea, his coat of mail, 
his piercer, and his vigour, which wisdom and 
providence have contrived to attract observation 
and escape it. 
(A 36) 
Repugnance is swiftly altered into a delicate and mysterious 
beauty in this making mention. The truth of these lines is 
not scientific, does not depend on Bacon's agitation of 
nature in order to control it. Smart's poetry displays a 
shift in emphasis from control to celebration. Poetry is 
determined by the creature's action. Order exists in 
participation: not only in the poetry's participation in 
action, but also in the strong gender identification that 
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binds nature to the poet. This identification exhibits 
astounding prowess. While acknowledging the difference in 
intention, Donne's flea is lifeless even before the final 
verse. Smart's flea is magnified, decked in its military 
regalia and growing in size and animation with each comma. 
But at the moment when it could regain its repugnance, Smart 
incorporates it into "the secret" of God's "wisdom and 
providence" until it is magnified and reduced in the same 
glance. Enlarged by the poet to "attract observation" it is 
reduced by nature to "escape it". Hartman rightly emphasises 
the theme of magnification in Smart's Magnificat, but at the 
price of the limiting supposition that Smart's Magnificat 
works on "the pun (magnifi-cat) alluding to the 
'magnification' of the cat Jeoffrey and the animal kingdom 
generally" (431 ). The flea is enlarged so that it can be 
reviewed, seen beyond its connotation, seen newly awoken from 
its dormancy. Alan Liu is closer to the mark in his 
examination of Hartman's examination of Smart's line: "For I 
pray the Lord Jesus to translate my MAGNIFICAT into verse and 
represent it" (B 43). For Liu, Christ (and by extension 
Christ-opher) is the translator: 
Jesus is the 'voice' of God's writing speaking 
itself in the garden of mortality, in the cool of 
the day. Precisely by the death he both pronounces 
and suffers, he allows all the fallen 'voices' of 
generation to be 'translated' upwards into heavenly 
being. (123) 
Browning puts it well when he exclaims that Smart 
pierced the screen 
'Twixt thing and word, lit language straight from 
the soul, -
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Left no fine film-flake on the naked coal 
Live from the censer... (86) 
So precisely does Smart capture, and is captured by, a 
certain creature - both real and mythical - that he freezes 
it, imaginatively, in the purity of its uniqueness: we find 
"the Coney, who scoopeth the rock, and archeth in the sand" 
(A 20), the mythical "Salamander, which feedeth upon ashes as 
bread and whose joy is at the mouth of the furnace" (A 65) 
and "the Cameleon, which feedeth on the Flowers and washeth 
himself in the dew" (A 75). The formal diction acts as a 
gentle counterpart to the reverence he seeks to convey, one 
that states and diffuses his isolation through this subtle 
projection. But it is more than merely projection; Smart 
conquers his isolation through a poetry that communicates 
immediately with the reader. He uses a printer's analogy to 
convey his intention and the force behind that intention: 
For my talent is to give an impression upon words 
by punching, that when the reader casts his eye 
upon 'em, he takes up the image from the mould 
which I have made. (B 404) 
In the neglected creatures of nature, Smart discerns 
God's creating hand and by extension - as lesser creator -
himself. The link established in Fragment A between biblical 
protagonists and the animal kingdom, and the recondite 
association between aspects of himself and the described 
gathering of the clans, reiterates his isolation at the same 
time as it overcomes its implication. Within this final 
paradox Smart asserts the 'verticality' of his mad poetry. It 
is poetry located in an imaginative dimension that, although 
not alleviating his confinement, his feelings of betrayal, 
11 5 
allows him company in a timeless zone where the past and 
future generations join in the inspirare, the breath of God. 
This is not Hartman's blasphemous usurping of God's 
omnipotence (431-32) or Dearnley's megalomania (see 42) but 
an insane transcendence, achieved poetically, through a 
continuous and elaborate diffusion of self into the timeless 
wealth of human, animal and fictitious precedent. 
If this is so, it is necessary to understand something 
of the nature of this 'insane transcendence'. The 18th 
century had taken care to locate the asylum elsewhere -
geographically and psychologically. It had also taken the 
further precaution of degenerating its inmates so that they 
lost the raiments of humanity and became, as Foucault points 
out, something closer to animals. The madman had slid, so to 
speak, irrevocably down the Great Chain of Being: 
The animality that rages in madness dispossesses 
man of what is specifically human in him; not in 
order to deliver him over to other powers, but 
simply to establish him at the zero degree of his 
own nature. For classicalism, madness in its 
ultimate form is man in immediate relation to his 
animality, without other reference, without any 
recourse. ( 7 4) 
For Foucault the interest lies in the delineation of 
madness within classicalism, whereas, for our purposes, it is 
the madman's reaction to the prevalent modus that is of more 
interest. Smart has already made it clear that he supposedly 
belongs to the animal kingdom in his comparison between the 
"White Raven" and himself, "a greater curiosity" (B 25). For 
the 18th century society this distinction was necessary for a 
psychic cleanliness that made secure its own sanity and 
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absolved it from recognizing itself in the other. Rather than 
submitting before this logic, Smart extends it to create a 
bridge, upon which he stands, across these mutually exclusive 
realms. His locus allows him a divine retribution as he 
becomes, in his excess, a. hallucination in the mind of 18th 
century thought. His perception refuses to see the world in 
terms of some fashionable hierarchy of human worth. Smart 
sees an order, true only to the mystery of itself, and one 
that draws no fundamental distinction between the offspring 
of the world. The order is neither Aristotelian nor 
Newtonian, but foolish and in some senses, mystical. His 
celebration of creation discards the techniques and logic of 
a science already absorbed with the myth of the totally known 
and rather speaks of a knowledge of what Meister Ekhardt 
calls istigkeit. Smart as fool joins with the simplicity and 
complexity of the mystic to announce the most obvious and, 
for that reason, the most hidden of truths. Mechtild of 
Magdeburg could be speaking of Smart when she says: 
The truly wise person 
kneels at the feet of all creatures 
and is not afraid to endure 
the mockery of others. (qtd. in Fox; 1983, 69) 
Smart's foolishness has another reason. By poetically 
diffusing himself into nature he partakes in the fool's act 
where each animal becomes, for him, a mask which he tries on 
in participation before returning to the mute asylum. Each 
line, each creature frees him from his confinement into 
animality and what can be called un-existence. Jubilate is, 
in this way, the ultimate poem of participation and absence. 
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The paradoxical union of being and non-being, of 
foolishness and wisdom serve to inform any reading of Smart 
as visionary. As far as he has been rendered absent from 
society he has created for himself a purview from which he 
glimpses a different reality. As far as he is a fool - what 
is a fool but an inarticulate visionary, one who, in 
Willeford's terms 
bear~ the name of a transcendent perfection and is 
the living reminder among us of its 
inaccessibility. The value remains undecipherable 
in the chaotic and insubstantial mirror of the 
fool's show. (138) 
Jubilate's success and failure can be gauged in terms of 
Smart's ability to articulate his glimpse of "transcendent 
perfection". Even in his most obviously prophetic section (C 
57-161 ), however, he makes it clear - "it is the business of 
a man gifted in the word to prophecy good" (C 57) - that his 
vision is ecstatic and addressed to the timeless potential of 
humankind rather than to any specific future time. The 
central metaphor of the horn which infuses the lines that 
follow is on one level a rather pathetic phallic gesture that 
will render women subordinate: 
For I prophecy that [women] will be cooped up and 
kept under due controul. (C 67) 
For I prophecy that men will be much stronger in 
the body. (C 74) 
Beyond his fears of castration, however, the horn is a 
gateway that leads, like Virgil's, to a more opulent world 
(see Liu's remarks, 119) that is realized through a vision of 
hermetic connectedness and Ekhardtian 'Is-ness': 
For it is good to let the rain come upon the naked 
body unto purity and refreshment. (C 113) 
For the horn is of plenty. 
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For this has been the sense of all ages. 
For Man and Earth suffer together. 
For when Man was amerced of his horn, earth lost 
part of her fertility. (C 153-56) 
This potentiality is kept from fruition because humanity (and 
here we can form a partial compromise from the above) has 
lost its spiritual phallus. As sexist as this aspect of his 
vision is, it does reiterate a principae anima that he 
believes has been lost in humanity's preoccupation with self-
glorification. At this point his celebration of a world 
'gathered by obsession' gives way to a critical thrust 
accusing society for the way it makes sense empirically 
rather than spiritually. Historically it is not surprising 
that scientific consciousness would face the brunt of Smart's 
peculiar wrath. 
From his illusory state of mind, his un-existence, Smart 
attacks the great progressive mechanism of science. In 
Bacon's terms, Smart has achieved an "inductive leap"; not 
into the clear pathways of empiricism, but into 'the cloud of 
unknowing'. Jubilate's now notorious anti-Newtonian stance 
has generated much discussion (probably because here, as in 
other areas, he adumbrates Blake); all of which proves that 
for all his diversity of interest he was no scientist. 
Williamson presents the best summation of this position in 
"Smart's Principae": 
Smart's indiscriminate embrace of 'facts' of any 
kind, from any source ... was fundamentally 
unscientific. In so far as scientific evidence 
supported his metaphysical preconceptions he was 
happy to accept it; where the evidence conflicted 
with his preconceptions he dismissed it with 
cavalier disdain. (1979 411) 
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While she is certainly correct in attributing his selective 
usage of facts to an overriding desire to allocate to God the 
original and final cause (419), there is another possibility 
as worthy of consideration. 
Part of the fool's ethos is implicitly critical of the 
human tendency towards self-importance for it entails a 
consequent depreciation of the other until the other becomes 
merely useful or non-existent. The history of madness is a 
history of exactly this process of distinguishing between the 
useful and the otiose. Furthermore, as many prominent 
thinkers have noted, this process was initiated in the 17th 
and 18th centuries and has become our most pervasive legacy. 
Newton, together with Bacon and Descartes, initiated a 
radical reevaluation of nature and our location therein; a 
forsaking of the hermetic world-view for one explainable in 
mechanical terms. Now obviously this is a complex, and 
contentious, issue and one largely beyond this essay's field 
of interest. 6 Suffice it to say that Smart detects in 
science's treatment of nature the same process as that which 
resulted in his confinement. Nature, like the madman, matters 
only in so far as it can be explained and manipulated. With 
unconscious irony Bacon's New Organon posits its fundamental 
premise in terms of madness and panic: 
For even as in the business of life a man's 
disposition and the secret workings of his mind and 
affections are better discovered when he is in 
trouble than at other times; so likewise the 
secrets of nature reveal themselves more readily 
under the vexations of art than when they go their 
own way. (qtd. in Berman 17) 
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Bacon's "art" is nothing more than the mechanisms of science. 
As Morris Berman argues in The Reenchantment of the World, 
Bacon was not only the founder of scientific method but the 
one who initiated a gradual change in consciousness. Perhaps 
somewhat idealistically (although his thesis is provocatively 
argued), Berman sees the movement from alchemy to the 
mechanical sciences as one that brought with it a change from 
participating consciousness to one that, in Bacon's terms, 
stood outside - vexing nature. Thus 
quantifiability, and the deliberate act of viewing 
nature as an abstraction from which one can 
distance oneself - all open the possibility that 
Bacon proclaimed as the true goal of science: 
control. ( 34) 
And if the natural world was fast losing its sense of 
hermetic connectedness it was surely becoming, as Foucault 
reminds us, a menagerie closed in by much the same bars -
those of mechanical and classical reasoning - as those which 
confined the madman. It is unreason that initiates Smart's 
attack on Newton more than any influence of Hutchinson or the 
Cambridge philosophers; "cavalier disdain" arises from his 
rebellion against this reasoning rather than any carelessness 
in philosophical methodology. 
From any reasonable perspective his attack, and 
resolution, is ludicrous: 
For the phenomenon of the horizontal moon is the 
truth - she appears bigger in the horizon because 
she actually is so. (B 426) 
For she has done her day's-work and the blessing of 
God upon her, and she communicates with the earth. 
(B 429) 
For when she rises she has been strength'ned by the 
Sun, who cherishes her by night. (B 430) 
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The naivety of these lines obviously reiterates what Smart, 
elsewhere, calls "the Argument A POSTERIORI [which] is God 
before every man's eyes" (B 360). The argument is conducted 
visually rather than discursively and it is indicative of his 
mad poetry. Jubilate is not Smart 'doing' poetry, but Smart 
as poetry: "For a man speaks HIMSELF from the crown of his 
head to the sole of his feet" (B 228). The process of doing, 
of actively ordering material into a publicly accessible form 
is anathema to Smart because it requires the translation into 
merely rational terms. Smart's translation involves a 
reasoning not only of the mind, but of the body in totum: a 
translation of himself into the natural, the social, and 
finally the spiritual world - "I shall be translated myself 
at the last" (B 11 ). And perhaps this explains the poetic 
clarity of so much of Jubilate. The dialogue between poet and 
the world is conducted from the crown to the sole; and 
thinking, contrary to Descartes assertion, is but a part of 
the body's reasoning. The moon appears bigger because "she 
actually is so": the eye may yet triumph over the mind's 
incessant, congested recall of fashionable facts. Day and 
night and the sun and moon are described as platonic lovers -
an affiliation of macrocosmic dimension that destroys, if 
only for a moment, the inanimation of a more probable 
explanation. 
To detect only a causality of homage fails to note the 
working of a more complex logos present at the heart of the 
matter. For Smart, God is ontology and teleology. It is God 
whose presence embodies truth, but a truth necessarily remote 
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from rationality and empiricism - any attempt to pursue and 
discover this truth is pointless and impossible. Smart's God 
and the fool's chaos once more appear nearly identical. 
Believing that he is visibly immersed in spiritual truth it 
frees him from the tiring search for truth and meaning. It 
frees him into an atemporal amphitheater that requires only 
ecstatic description, not ordering. Here, order does not have 
to be humanly created, but is creation - is itself. Within 
this medium Smart proclaims a world ordered not by equations 
but by poetry. His literal reading is partly the simple-
mindedness of the fool and partly an expression of a truth 
poetic, rather than logical. Even his early verse displays, 
however infrequently, a poetry of child-like innocence. 
Knowledge comes from a purity of action, of being entirely 
involved in the delight of natural action. For humanity this 
action is praise as it is for the migratory bird. The bird 
praises by following its divine instinct: 
Who points her passage thro' the pathless void 
To realms from us remote, to us unknown? 
Her science is the science of her God. 
Not the magnetic index to the North 
E'er ascertains her course, nor buoy, nor beacon, 
She Heav'n-taught voyager, that sails in air, 
Courts nor coy West nor East, but instant knows 
What Newton, or not sought, or sought in vain. 
("On the Omniscience of the Supreme Being"; qtd. in 
Dearnley, 97) 
It is incorrect to assume that Smart was against Newton 
or, for that matter, Bacon and Descartes merely because of 
their ideas. Smart - and time has proved him correct - saw 
the mechanical universe as one de-vitalized. Instead he 
proposes a spiritual and poetic form of physics which 
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understands many of Newton's laws according to the veritas of 
poetry and celebratory spirituality. This is not to hold that 
he saw scientific inquiry as a waste (for it has the 
potential to celebrate the world rather than mankind) but as 
a failure in its desire to value control over participation 
and measurement over blessing. 
In his attempt to reconstitute the world, Newton's 
mechanical explanation situates humankind as the one who 
explains and therefore creates; Newton's error is that he 
denigrates the poetry of the obvious: 
For Newton nevertheless is more of error than of 
the truth, but I am of the WORD of GOD. (B 195) 
Let Silas rejoice with the Cabot - the philosophy 
of the times ev'n now is vain deceit. (B 219) 
Let Barsabas rejoice with Cammarus - Newton is 
ignorant for if a man consult not the WORD how 
should he understand the WORK? (B 220) 
"Newton is ignorant", is a fool, not simply because he fails 
to perceive an obvious extant order but because he fails to 
understand the depth of meaning in "the WORD of GOD". Matthew 
Fox traces this phrase back to the Hebrew for 'word' which is 
dabhar, meaning creative energy (40). For Smart the Word and 
the Work are indistinguishable whereas he feels that Newton 
has dissected them and in so doing has, perhaps unwittingly, 
sought to render the Work understandable with the consequence 
that the Word becomes a useful, but lifeless, appendage - a 
tool of convenience. When Hartman observes, from a 
structuralist framework, that for Smart ''the fault lies with 
language, which has lost yet may regain its representational 
power" (438) he is nearly correct. Smart does not blame 
language but sees it as a victim of a social de-meaning that 
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involves both humanity and its language. But a language 
victimised works, in turn, its own silent revenge and becomes 
a prison for those who would speak. If language has been de-
meaned, it ensures that those who use it are de-humanised, 
are controlled by its proscriptive functionality. The danger 
is that a language without a spiritual dimension, without its 
dabhar, may become, like a humanity without belief, "lost in 
the middest''. Adrift, without any location the individual is 
rendered truly foolish: "For the MAN in VACUO is a flat 
conceit of preposterous folly" (B 264). Like Erasmus' Folly, 
Smart turns his foolishness on its head to point to a folly 
disguised, but one that is "flat" and vacuously hollow. He 
recalls, if only for an instant, Johnson's Rasselas and the 
warnings made against the vacuity of life and the importance 
of a vision directed towards God. With this threat of 
lifeless vacuity, the solution proposed by Smart is to bring 
the 'language of humanity' back to life, to uncover that 
creative energy: 
For by the grace of God I am the Reviver [re-viver] 
of ADOPA'i'LOtl a.,nongst ENGLISH-MEN. 
For being desert-ed is to have desert in the sight 
of God and intitles one to the Lord's merit. 
For things that are not in the sight of men are 
thro' God of infinite concern. (B 332-34) 
Approaching the question of language and representation 
from an entirely different perspective, Smart reaches a 
conclusion remarkably close to contemporary thought. 
Discourse, for Smart, is never a transparent instrument 
through which an impartial world is observed. The moral 
didacticism prevalent in so much 18th century verse 
(including much of his earlier work) gives way to a 'poetics' 
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unfashionably alive to its medium. Smart's madness produces a 
poetry - in Jubilate and Song to David - that exhibits both 
language's potential and the possibility of it bearing fruit 
through the insanity of the poet's logos. Discourse and logic 
unite to form (as they did in Cowper) a unique logos. If, at 
least in this regard, Smart appears strangely modern it is 
because he anticipates much of the work of contemporary 
criticism. And while these affiliations must be left to 
others to explore ( see L .. i. and Hartman' s work) it is 
noteworthy that Smart's 'aesthetic' provides a refreshing 
palliative to the ennui that marks those critics who see only 
failure and silence haunting every utterance. Smart's answer 
is, of course, the fool's. Whether it is the joie de vivre in 
his transformation of isolation ("deserted") into a feast of 
religious reverie or the absurd claim that each language 
contains the spirit of an animal - "For the Mouse (Mus) 
prevails in the Latin./For Edi-mus, bibi-mus, vivi-mus --
ore-mus" (B 636-7) - we are forced to acknowledge the way in 
which language and nature, supposedly as objects to be 
controlled, are liberated in order to illuminate or destroy 
our careful schemes of ordering. If this insight is trivial, 
it is not often so in a poem that rivals Blake's Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell in aphoristic profundity: 
For where Accusation takes the place of 
encouragement a man of Genius is driven to act the 
vices of a fool. (B 365) 
For the phenomenon of dreaming is not of one 
solution, but many. (B 371) 
Whereas Cowper's discourse is bound for catatonic silence, 
Smart's seeks to overflow the world by means of a constant 
126 
evocation of language: as poetry, as joyous plaything and as 
living subject. If "to act" merely implies action then the 
reference could be to the likes of Newton and Bacon for in 
their attempts to manipulate nature they implicitly accuse 
rather than encourage through praise. But if "to act" is 
taken as the fool's show then the line is self-reflexive -
Smart is the "man of Genius" who has been accused and 
expelled by his society. His sensitivity to the paradoxes 
initiated by this ambivalence foreshadows (in B 371) the 
basic premise in the dream analyses of Jung and, to an 
extent, Freud. Smart forsakes any simple causality between a 
dream and its meaning by emphasizing the multiplicity of 
meaning that is so precisely the dream experience. 
Again he is like Blake in his desire to see beyond the 
obvious (as superficial) into the obvious (as thing in 
itself). Their poetry has, in common, this simultaneity of 
the simple and complex. Both these poets manage to animate 
the Word's 'character' in a way that succeeds in narrowing 
the hiatus between signifler and signified. The Word is 
disturbed, it manages to shake off its extant shroud of 
meaning and is momentarily transfigured as it reaches into 
the ineffable. Daniel Stempel speaks of something similar in 
"Blake, Foucault and the Classical Episteme": 
The source of Foucault's 'verticality' is not 
necessarily obscure. If the axis of identity is 
lifted from the surface of the taxonomic grid and 
rotated until it is perpendicular to that surface, 
passing through the grid at the origin, being and 
logic are no longer in the same plane .... 
Discourse, as Foucault points out, becomes detached 
from representation, moving either towards the 
ideal of language as mathesis or towards a rhetoric 
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in which being recedes from representation, 
infinitely regressing into the transcendence of the 
ineffable or the abyss of the unspeakable. (404-
405) 
Stempel's implication is that at this vertical position (a 
verticality close to the vertical poetry of insanity) being 
and representation become, so to speak, poles apart. However 
difficult it is to conceive of one's being "infinitely 
regressing into the transcendence of the ineffable" it is 
possible to detect a contingent movement in the dialectic of 
madness. 
In Smart's exclusion from society he had lost his 
identity; as far as society was concerned madness deprived 
him of the rights of existence, of existence itself. This 
absence is totally in accord with Stempel's "being [that] 
recedes from representation''. Fut that is not the entire 
point. As poet of foolishness he forges, and we recall his 
printer's analogy, a world out of that absence; a world 
literally of "things which are not in the sight of man" - a 
world open, once more, to his unique representation and 
participation. This is the reason that Bishop Lowth's 
antiphonal response becomes, for Smart, seminal to Jubilate. 
Even the most esoteric connections display this dialogue 
between the poet who participates and the one who represents: 
LET PETER rejoice with the MOON FISH who keeps up 
the life in the waters by night. 
FOR I pray the Lord JESUS that cured the LUNATICK 
to be merciful to all my bretheren and sisters in 
these houses. (B 123) 
While there is no logical connection between the "Let" and 
the "For" the two grids of context and meaning coalesce 
imaginatively allowing the "MOON FISH" to represent the hope 
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of health in the dark despair of the asylum, allowing Smart 
to become that same fish, acting as a sentinel for a society 
who struggles to see the vitality of Smart's spiritual world 
immersed, as they are, "in the waters by night". The many 
possible readings must acknowledge the central place occupied 
by Smart both as one who re-presents the world and actively 
participates in its representation. In madness the individual 
bound only by the superficial trappings of logic can 
reconcile being and representation within an insane, and 
unique, logos. But if insanity can achieve this impossibly 
paradoxical union of being and representation it can as 
easily alienate being from any kind of representational 
expression: a condition to which Cowper's silence testifies. 
And in Cowper we see the absolute difference from Smart; the 
difference in the way they resolved, in madness, their 
position on Pope's isthmus. 
Cowper became an empty shadow after "The Castaway", 
became in fact an image of the process by which the madman 
was incorporated - through negation - into society. In Smart, 
the madman as empty cipher finds a champion. Jubilate traces 
a non-discursive progression that is an exact parodic 
reversal of the madman's disinvestment. In fully accepting 
his foolishness, his smallness, he has been able to grow in 
stature - "For tall and stately are against me, but 
humiliation on humiliation is on my side" (B 112) - on the 
other side of the looking-glass until he locates himself in 
the asylum of un-existence where he re-possesses not only the 
medieval wisdom of the fool, but the transcendent vision of 
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the prophet. Thus his madness allows for the reconstitution 
of the world, of language, of self. 
Williamson ends her article on Smart's anti-scientific 
stance in a way that is generally representative of the 
critical attitude towards Jubilate. She draws a comparison to 
Song To David which she describes as 
the greatest monument to the speculations which 
occupied him in his years in the asylum; Jubilate 
Agno became the quarry out of which it was to be 
built. ( 422) 
These are harsh words for one who was to finish editing this 
quarry only a year later. Ironically, for all the insight her 
edition displays, here she misses the point. 
What we have in Jubilate is a battle that takes place on 
the surface between sanity and insanity, between the social 
ethic and its boundary. The triumph of the poem exists 
firstly in its disappointing of poetic expectations: it is 
incomplete, bemusing in its allusions and 'ends' with a 
dreary list (Fragment D) of unknown people coupled randomly 
with obscure herbs. And yet if we have listened to the 
dialogue between self and the universe what else should we 
expect? It is incomplete because it extends into the past and 
future 6 - it presumes continuance. It is only esoteric to 
those who wish for the certainty of sources, for those who 
miss the evocative quality that can result when disparate 
fields meet, momentarily forming new worlds. The 'endless' 
Fragment Dis, if anything, exhibitionist; carried off by one 
who has already won the battle in breaking down the boundary 
that sought to divide him from the social ethic. 
Imaginatively he reinstates himself (as "Smart") into the 
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middest of respectability with that gentle, deprecatory 
humour of allusion, the humour of a very wise fool: 
Let Fig, house of Fig rejoice with Fleawort. The 
Lord magnify the idea of Smart singing hymns on 
this day in the eyes of the whole University of 
Cambridge ... (D 148) 
This brings us to the second point. Jubilate is "the idea 
(aptly described earlier as the "mental image of the object" 
[B 7]) of Smart singing hymns'': it is the constant merging of 
the poet and the experiencing self in the act of creation. 
The poem is, of course, a failure. In Williamson's terms 
it is a quarry that needs to be exploded, arranged and 
brought to a state of completion. But that is to view it from 
the outside, through the eyes of the excavator, the one who 
edits. It fails because it continually escapes, through its 
madness, all attempts to order, to isolate consistent themes, 
to confine it, finally, to the dimensions of the page. This 
kind of excavation c~n, at best, be only half successful: in 
the search for the artist as creator, the artist as creature 
is ignored. And indeed it is tempting to ignore Smart as a 
body - from crown to sole - that writes itself in Jubilate: a 
body, and thus a poem, composed of contradiction and 
fragmentation, but pervaded by joyous obsession. It is to 
Nietzsche that we must turn if we would understand what Smart 
achieved, nothing less than the body as the word, life as 
poetry: 
In man, creature and creator are united: in man 
there is matter, fragment, excess, clay, mud, 
madness, chaos; but in man there is also creator, 
sculptor, the hardness of the hammer, the divine 
spectator and the seventh day. (Beyond Good and 
Evil 225) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
I Murphy: That Harmless Lunacy 
Let Jude bless with the Bream, who is of melancholy 
from his depth and serenity. 
For I have a greater compass both of mirth and 
melancholy than another. (Jubilate B 131) 
For Foucault, ever since the classical exclusion of 
madness, humanity has dwelt under its premises, under its 
influence. Modernity (which, for Foucault begins in the 19th 
century) has sustained this exclusion and in much the same 
way as Cowper and Smart were in the middle of an aesthetic 
reorientation, Nietzsche is a transitional figure L2tween the 
classical and modern 'periods'. It is Nietzsche who stands 
between, and who also signifies a repetition and a difference 
in the focus of madness. Zarathustra stands in the middle of 
a madness that links Nietzsche to Cowper and Smart and to the 
mad protagonists that roam Beckett's world. The terror and 
the elation alternately experienced by Zarathustra relates to 
both Cowper and Smart on one side and becomes synthesised in 
Beckett's work on the other side. In Beckett, opposites do 
not follow as much as they become each other. Bruegel's 
Vienna Babel is transformed into the Rotterdam one and back 
again within the space of a sentence, within the space of a 
word. Here melancholy becomes mirth and sanity, madness. In 
Beckett's world the horizontal plane is forever being 
sundered by these (old and new) monoliths asserting their 
presence. It is little wonder that Beckett's heroes are 
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rarely nonplussed. 
How then does one speak of madness within a world 
consistent only with its author's conception and one in which 
all expectations - if expectations there be - are destroyed 
and fulfilled with the same indifference? It seems ludicrous 
to speak of insanity in the carefully organized chaos 
generated by Beckett. His landscape, in its varying hues of 
bleakness, may present madness as a cranky norm but not in 
terms that we have come to expect in the course of our 
discussion. In general, criticism has blithely accepted 
Beckett's characters as odd, as absurd, and proceeded from 
there. Absurdity however, as it was popularised by Martin 
Esslin, is not a suitable place to begin, but perhaps a place 
to end. Madness, which is always in danger of being 
domesticated itself, must continually interrogate the terms 
to which it contributes: we cleave to the surd rather than 
the absurd. The surd is both an exact number that occupies a 
place in mathematical space and time while also being an 
irrational number - that which defies that which defines. It 
also describes a deafness, an inability on the part of the 
sufferer to hear, to participate fully in the conventions of 
intercourse. Like the "aural circumcision" (3) of which 
Kermode speaks, the surd entails a hearing that is a 
mishearing. Within the various resonances of the word there 
is, perhaps, the glimmer of a single content; that which 
Murphy realises when his labour is refused by a chandler: 
Sometimes it was expressed more urbanely, 
sometimes less. Its forms were as various as the 
grades of the chandler mentality, its content was 
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one: 'Thou surd!'. (47) 
And if our search is for the quintessence of the surd within 
Beckett then it is with Beckett the man we may begin. 
Deirdre Bair's biography on Beckett attempts, in vain, to 
make contio ::,e ... ,.~ the man and the artist. Her failure, the 
.. -
failure of all biography, to traverse the intraversable 
distance between creature and creator is exacerbated by man 
and text: both forever receding from availability in a 
procession of contradictory positions. Even when one comments 
on the other there remains a ,ense of fellow actors passing 
judgment on a production in which neither particularly wished 
to participate. 
Two examples, two words, will suffice to plot (at least 
for the present) the correlation between creator and created. 
Both are found in Bair's tome. In his early twenties Beckett 
presented a paper to the Modern Languages Society 
about a literary movement called 'Le Concentrisme', 
led by one Jean du Chas, which was supposedly 
revolutionizing Parisian intellectual circles with 
its Rabelaisian humour and bawdy writing .... The 
body of the membership, all serious scholars, spent 
the remainder of the meeting diligently discussing 
the possible literary merit of ... 'Le 
Concentrisme', which existed only in Beckett's 
imagination [and] was never heard of again after 
that evening ... (51-2) 
The first is, thus, irreverence: an almost blasphemous 
exposition of the academic project and its insatiable 
appetite for the fashionable. Beckett's 'new school' is 
forwarded with a straight face, indistinguishable from the 
multiple faces of the extant avant garde (as a performance, 
Tzara would have been delighted, the politicised Breton, 
outraged). Beckett's irreverence goes deeper for it collapses 
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a series of distinctions: between importance and trivia, thesis 
and hypothesis. 
The second co-ordinate is one that has assured him a 
place as the great composer in, and out of, decomposition. To 
Roger Blin he writes that "[I am] doomed to spend the rest of my 
days digging up the detritus of my life and vomiting it out over 
and over again" (299). This is reiterated (in aesthetic terms) in 
"Three Dialogues" where he blames Tal Coat and Matisse for doing 
nothing more than disturbing 
a certain order on the plane of the feasible. 
D - What other plane can there be for the maker? 
B - Logically none. Yet I speak of an art turning 
from it in disgust, weary of its puny 
exploits, weary of pretending to be able, of 
being able, of doing a little better the same 
old thing, of going a little further along a 
dreary road. (Disjecta 139) 
This prefaces his famous, and typically impossible, dictum 
where in spite of expression's bankruptcy, one writes out of 
the futile "obligation to express" (139). Expression as 
weariness, as exhaustion; living as the awful desire finally 
to exhaust exhaustion, to weary of weariness. Within 
irreverence and exhaustion the private man and the author 
return each other's weary glance. 
If Beckett is unavailable for comment and if the only 
impression he has left on his work is formulated in such 
negative terms - terms that demarcate absence rather than 
presence - we need to look further. The body gone, or almost 
gone (as an icon Jane Bown's portrait expresses this decay of 
almost skeletal proportions mingled with enigmatic mockery) 
we turn to the labyrinth of his texts. 
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That Beckett's personal liaison with literature takes 
place within modernism is a point on which we can speculate 
more profitably later, but for the present let us consider 
his relation to another tradition: an isolated legacy without 
precursors and with no insights to bequeath to those who 
follow. In Sade/ Fourier/ Loyola Roland Barthes touches on 
many aspects of this tradition. He calls these writers 
"Logothetes, founders of language" (3) and detects in all of 
them a withdrawal from society in order to create a language 
capable of articulating and ordering their worlds according 
to the particular hierarchy they establish. And as founders 
of language they are necessarily found in language: 
Sade is no longer an erotic, Fourier no longer a 
utopian, Loyola no longer a saint: all that is left 
in each of them is a scenographer: he who disperses 
himself across a framework he sets up and arranges 
ad infinitum. (6) 
What is implicit and yet never articulated by Barthes is the 
enormity of the task and its implicit failure. Yet in spite 
of this they pursue this infinite arrangement with a 
vehemence that mocks the finitude and mortality of the self. 
In writing the impossible text each of them withdrew from the 
world into the text that was to become their life. That this 
arrangement cannot reach completion, cannot really begin, 
requires on the part of the author, a sense of irreverence, an 
iconoclasm that makes ridiculous both the self and the 
conventional aims of writing: to represent, to order, to end. 
Like Beckett, these writers are always confronted with the 
inexhaustibility of their assignment - and thus their own 
exhaustion - and yet they write, mocking the exhaustion that 
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haunts them in life and in the text. In Sade's case, confinement 
made writing a reasonable way to pass 26 years - he was obliged 
to write by the legal restraints that denied him action. But for 
Fourier, Loyola and (perhaps the greatest of them all) Thomas 
Aquinas the same obligation, of which Beckett speaks, hurries 
them onward along their untenable course: in exhaustion, 
irreverence and obligation we can append the Thomistic world of 
Summa Theologiae. Closer to our concern, we recall Jubilate 
written in the isolation of an asylum (isolation is one of 
Barthes' prerequisites: "the new language must arise from a 
material vacuum" 4), it, too, manages to order, to mock the 
foolishness of the self and the world, and 'ends' continuing into 
infinity. And we have Beckett, whose writings (his poems, plays, 
novels and his one film) constitute a world of language that can 
correctly be called Beckettian. 
There are two points at which Beckett differs from 
Barthes' pioneers of language. The first difference is a 
desperation in Beckett's work: there is no hierarchy of order 
(no Loyolian God or Sadean libertine overseer) that blesses 
his work and exonerates him from the failure of not 
finishing. Secondly, Sade, Fourier and Loyola begin this 
infinite tract in a state of knowledge (if not grace): 
for them the reconstitution of the whole can be no 
more than a summation of intelligibles: nothing 
indecipherable, no irreducible quality of 
ejaculation, happiness, communication: nothing is 
that is not spoken ... (4) 
In the case of Sade there is no evidence of development as an 
author, no chance that he will finish and begin a different 
task. Once created, the Sadean language is always present -
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requiring only the careful arrangement and rearrangement of 
the syntax of bodies and crimes. Beckett, however, has both 
to learn his language and to unlearn a certain Joycean 
strain: the latter was achieved in More Pricks Than Kicks and 
in his early poetry; the former (and formative) took place in 
Murphy and Watt. These novels display an experimentation, a 
honing and destruction of the possibilities of language to 
arrive at a discourse that has never been discarded; only 
endlessly arranged and repeated. Murphy and Watt, then, are 
transitional works that seek to resolve the position of one 
learning to write and one learning to find habitat in that 
writing. 
What this has to do with madness is simply this: in 
Murphy and Watt Beckett not only conducts his most direct 
exploration of madness but also, as will be argued, 
inculcates madness into the fabric of the texts that follow. 
It is not with these transitional works that we begin 
however. Let us rather begin when his discourse is in full 
bloom and decay, and, in keeping with our preoccupation with 
the in-between, let us start in the middle. 
In 1946 Beckett wrote a novel in French called Mercier 
et Camier. Feeling it to be, in some way, inferior, he 
suppressed its publication for 24 years. Most Beckett critics 
have taken their cue from the author's disavowal and while 
Hugh Kenner and John Fletcher refer to it in some depth, they 
do so with reservation. They prefer to view it as a 
transitional work and are content to limit their comments to 
the way the novel continues concerns begun in Murphy and 
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adumbrates the repartee that Waiting for Godot was to make 
famous together with the quest motif that was to plague his 
later works. 
What happens in the novel is simple in the extreme. 
Mercier and Camier are two old tramps (men of leisure) 
accompanied by a relatively absent narrator through a series 
of aborted attempts to forsake their town of habitation. 
Repeatedly they are waylayed by a series of circumstances 
foreseen (pubs, ennui and the weather) and unforeseen (ennui, 
the weather and pubs) that bring them back to their point of 
departure, somewhat older than before. By Chapter seven the 
narrator calls a halt to the "stink of artifice" (9) and 
while allowing for a touching separation begins to conclude 
the work. Although the two meet again, the unstated link that 
bound each hand and foot to the other has been broken and 
they part once more, presumably not to meet again. With the 
narrator they seem to have grown weary of the companionship 
through chapter and verse. With sublime perseverance the narrator 
not only manages to conclude but, with great precision, inserts a 
summary of the action after every two chapters - perhaps this is 
a kind gesture for those immersed in (as Beckett calls it in 
"Gnome") "the loutishness of learning" (Collected Poems 7). This 
summation of course misses the point. What it does show is the 
inordinate difficulty that we must face if we are to come to 
Beckett with our stock of preconceptions gathered from what we 
now call 'the expressive realist text'. Something, it appears, 
has taken place behind our backs, something that affects not only 
the tone but the architecture of the novel. It is this 
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'something' that requires definition. 
It soon becomes apparent that the all important journey 
is of little importance; it is a quest without a chapel 
perilous and apart from the policeman they kill, without even 
a green knight. Apparently fate and amnesia collaborate to 
thwart any prospect of success. If the quest is undefined and 
impossible then surely some form of friendship will define 
the heart of protagonists and novel alike. This possibility 
is also denied when, by the completion of Chapter seven after 
a stirring bout of farewell salutations they part, bound for 
"the tedium of flight and dreams of deliverance" (89). That 
which binds them together will also be that which separates 
them; the cohesive causality at work is habit, the tortuous 
logic it follows, no more than boredom. 
The final refuge would then seem to encourage the 
importance of the individual character; but here too we are 
bound to be disappointed. Dissimilarity does not exist as an 
index of meaning - "no symbols where none intended" (255) is 
the warning that terminates watt. Camier is no more 
intellectual than Mercier (a hypothesis as applicable to the 
false Cartesian dualities that criticism has used to pursue 
Vladimir and Estragon). Their difference begins only to mean 
within their union. As Laurel requires Hardy and as Arsene 
requires Watt - and we recall the morphic similarity between 
these couples - Mercier needs Camier both as the 'straight 
man' and as a way of assuming that role in turn. 
To enter the novel at all, it must be through the 
dialogue: 
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I too fail to see why, said Camier, exactly why. 
All I know is that yesterday we did see why, 
exactly why. 
When the cause eludes me, said Mercier, I begin 
to feel uneasy. 
Here Camier was alone in wetting his trousers. 
Mercier does not join in Camier's laugh? ~aid Camier. 
Not just this once, said Mercier. (60) 
Without memory, without explanation, Mercier and Camier 
pursue yearnings for objects long since var shed with a 
result that is deadly funny. It is quite possible that 
Camier's laughter has a literal meaning (knowing the 
incontinence of Beckett's heroes) and it is this thought that 
imbalances the narrative. The flow of discourse is disrupted 
by polyreferential signifiers (too much meaning) which 
continually bankrupt the narrative, making it meaningless. 
This, in turn, makes the narrator's task impossible. The 
absence of quotation marks, for example, refuses a 
distinction between the one who utters and what is uttered. 
Who says and what is said is reduced to the same level as if 
it has become a matter entirely unimportant or impossible to 
ascertain. The merger however encourages another in which the 
narrating 'I' - ''The journey of Mercier 2nd Camier is one I 
can tell, if I will, for I was with them all the time" (7) -
joins with the narration, joins Mercier and Camier to form a 
vague 'Cloud of Knowing and Unknowing' covering our heroes: 
Strange impression, said Mercier, strange impression 
sometimes that we are not alone. You not? 
I am not sure I understand, said Camier. 
Now quick, now slow, that is Camier all over. 
Like the presence of a third party, said Mercier. 
Enveloping us. I have felt it from the start. And I am 
anything but psychic. (100) 
The narrator's lack of actual congress at once elevates him 
or her to a position as authorial persona while demeaning 
141 
that supposed control as the narrator is exhausted by the 
weariness, if not futility, of both Mercier and Camier's 
actions and the act of narration. There is no possibility of 
non-participant observation in Beckett's world-weary world. 
It comes as no surprise that by the end of chapter seven this 
persona is in the dark (with Mercier and Camier) and 
disinterested in ascertaining the laborious chain of events 
that occur in the ruins of "this hospitable chaos": "In any 
case nothing is known for sure, henceforth. Here would be the 
place to make an end. After all it is the end" (103).Sickened 
both by the protagonists and the artifice of the novel, the 
narrator calls a halt to both:· "That's it. It takes a little 
time to grasp more or less what happened" (108). As is so 
often the case in Beckett's work (often even his point for 
departure) it is all over bar the shouting. Fortunately, or 
unfortunately, it is the shoutinc that is never over. It 
continues 
ingesting, excreting, undressing up, dossing down, 
and all the other things too tedious to enumerate, 
in the long run too tedious, requiring to be done 
and suffered. No danger of losing interest, under 
these conditions.(108) 
The reversal is sjmple yet horrific in its mundaneness. 
Boredom raised to the power of devastation, the trivial 
becoming an all consuming sign of waste. What Mercier and 
Camier achieves is the meticulous inversion of terms whereby 
life is not deprived (in an existential sense) of meaning, 
but meaning is deprived of its importance. And if boredom 
becomes the inescapable catastrophe we must acknowledge then 
we are treading on very familiar rounds. Beckett has borrowed 
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from madness. The endless mingling of exhaustion and 
irreverence that motivates his work is not only obsessive but 
resembles (if it is not indistinguishable from) the madman's 
logos. His terms may be perverted but they proceed from these 
premises in a coherent and orderly fashion. The logic of this 
argument as formulated in Murphy and watt - and based largely 
upon an irreverent reading of Descartes - is unimpeachable. 
The world in which Mercier and Camier wend their way is a 
world (irrespective of the peculiarity of its ontological 
base) that constantly normalises the principles of its 
creation. 
We are back in Cowper's world of rabbits, endless summer 
walks and chatty letters. And yet in the midst of this 
paradise, his nightmares, his sense of condemnation makes of 
Eden something unobtainable: "Ah happy shades, to me 
unblest". Nothing is abnormal in Cowper's world, but 
normality itself, which mocks unwittingly. And it is through 
(and on) that normality that he inscribes his madness: 
how could I escaps 
Infinite wrath and infinite despair! 
Whom Death, Earth, Heaven, and Hell consigned to 
to ruin, 
Whose friend was God, but God swore not to aid 
me! (428) 
It is fitting that these lines should be written on a window-
shutter, on that which grants visual entry into the world -
the point upon which Cowper's madness is written. Nature 
(here read normality) is transformed by madness into the 
wrath of "Death, Earth, Heaven and Hell". 
This is what is described in the fast decaying universe 
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of Endgame. Hamm speaks of an equally obsessive vision where 
he describes a mad friend of his: one who, like Blake 
was a painter - and engraver. I had a great 
fondness for him. I used to go and see him, in the 
asylum. I'd take him by the hand and drag him to 
the window. Look! There! All that rising corn! And 
there! Look! The sails of the herring fleet! All 
that loveliness! (Pause.) He'd snatch away his hand 
and go back into his corner. Appalled. All he had 
seen was ashes. (Pause.) He alone had been spared. 
(Pause.) Forgotten. (Pause.) (32) 
Ironically, this madman's vision has become that which, in 
reality, lies outside the windows of the play. But if this is 
different from Blake's vision, it has a comprehensiveness 
reminiscent of another painter - Pieter Bruegel. For both 
Beckett and Bruegel the ashes and the corn co-exist. 
Foreground merges with background (in Bruegel's work both are 
always in focus) to produce an endless canvas where Icarus 
falls, a farmer toils, the innocents are slaughtered, village 
fairs are celebrated and skeletons disrupt an idle feast. 
This makes more specific Beckett's inexhaustible text and 
explains Watt's appearance in an attempt to reconcile Mercier 
with Camier, their memories of Murphy's demise and more 
typically Malone's disgruntled assertion: 
Then it will be all over with the Murphys, 
Merciers, Molloys, Morans and Malones, unless it 
goes on beyond the grave ... How many have I killed, 
hitting them on the head or setting fire to 
them? .... There was an old butler too, in London I 
think, there's London again, I cut his throat with 
his razor. (217) 
Malone as the arch-mover in Murphy, solving the mysterious 
'suicide' of the butler 20 years earlier? If there is a 
freedom in Be ~ett's world it is simply the freedom to range 
freely among the ruins of that world while being held captive 
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by it. Like the Beckettian body (which will be treated in my 
discussion of Watt) these characters not only overflow the 
dimensions of their physicality but transgress the boundaries 
of the text, flowing from one to the other but prisoner still 
to the unenviable logic of Beckett's world. And it is that 
logos that first becomes apparent in Murphy and establishes 
the range of pigments available for the 'endless' Beckettian 
canvas. 
II Murphy: Insanity In Sanity 
What is the nature of existence within the Beckettian 
canvas, what is it to exist here? The Latin root of 'to 
exist' is ex - sistere, 'to stand out' and as such is a word 
whose genesis is spatial. This has useful ramifications both 
for the comparison to the collapsed perspective of Bruegel 
and Beckett as well as partially explaining the distortion of 
space in madness. And so it is with the question of space 
that we begin. 
We begin to notice the ubiquitous sameness of geography 
in Mercier and Camier when we look back at his earlier work. 
His short stories in More Pricks Than Kicks are firmly set in 
Dublin and the surrounding countryside; in Murphy the action 
is rigorously set in Dublin and London, between the months of 
June and October. In fact the narrative is extremely finicky 
about these specifics of time and place. Murphy first appears 
"in a mew in West Brampton" (5); his meeting with Celia 
occurs when she 
145 
had turned out of Edith Grove into Cremorne Road, 
intending to refresh herself with a smell of the 
Reach and then return by Lot's Road, when chancing 
to glance to her right she saw, motionless in the 
mouth of Stadium Street, considering alternately 
the sky and a sheet of paper, a man. (11-12) 
Even his proposal to her "the following Sunday" takes place 
"in the Battersea Park sub-tropical garden, immediately 
following the ringing of the bell" (13). It is extremely 
tempting, after this little foray into exactitude, to join 
with Mr Kelly as he pleads for a break from "all these 
demented particulars'' (12). And indeed, there is something 
demented in these particulars - especially in terms of the 
gray landscapes ("Lessness") and primal ooze (How It Is) of 
his later work. But the dementia goes further. This meeting, 
courting and proposal, as recounted by Celia, is as factual 
as the narrative ever becomes. This is where the conventional 
novel ends: from here on (with the exception of the asylum 
sequence) the novel flounders in a more abstract realm. This 
is not to say - as one can say of his work from Watt onwards 
- that the plot recedes, but that the focus is elsewhere. 
That Celia brings Mr Kelly (and the reader) up to date is 
nevertheless something that is incontrovertibly in the past. 
This "striking case of love requited" (13) has reached full 
cadence, as has the conventional world to which each, 
uncomfortably, belongs. Apparently in Murphy the stability of 
the real is always in the past, before the novel began and 
somewhere else. Once started, the world of particulars is 
rendered unstable by the very people that should objectify 
it. With the sole exception of Celia (and we shall have 
recourse to clarification later), the book is full of people 
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in various stages of physical and mental decline: Mr Kelly on 
his death bed, Neary's attempted suicide at the 'hands' of a 
statue, Miss Counihan's anthropoidal form (69), Miss Carridge's 
stink, Miss Dew's Ducks disease, Mr Endon's apnoea, Cooper's 
acathisia (perfectly described as "deep seated and of long 
standing" [69]) and Murphy. Murphy's dress (45) betrays him 
as a mixture between a clown and a beggar with all the 
resultant odour of his pilgrimage locked in. And as for the 
rest of him 
his troubles had begun early .... With what sorrow 
[the obstetrician] recorded that of all the 
millions of little larynges cursing in unison at 
that particular moment, the infant Murphy's alone 
was off the note. To go back no farther than the 
vagitus. (44) 
Finally, even when the particulars are scientific there 
is something demented about the way they are presented, the 
way their status is ridiculed. We recall how in Mercier and 
Camier the thwarted and unknown quest is enclosed by constant 
summaries which succeed in stripping bare the little that 
happens by focusing attention on the process of inactivity. 
Although these summations locate the action in time, they 
also dislocate the action by commenting on its passing. These 
'factual' summaries merely become ghosts that haunt the 
characters, mock the author's failure to get to the point and 
tease the reader. Similarly the physiological description of 
Celia, in its measured precision (10), detaches her from the 
lifelessness of the data that constitutes her body. 
Murphy fares no better. Even placed in his mew in West 
Brampton, his posture - bound, naked in a rocking chair - if not 
147 
quite impossible (the lost seventh scarf) presents one 
desperately trying to escape, through confinement, the space his 
body occupies: 
it gave his body pleasure, it appeased his body. 
Then it set him free in his mind. For it was not 
until his body was appeased that he could come 
alive in his mind, as described in section six. (6) 
Apart from its obvious Cartesian resonances, the oddity of 
this ritual of release demarcates Murphy's search for a space 
that is other than that of West Brampton. By stilling his 
body - in nakedness and a primal rhythm - he can escape (if 
only for a while) its exhausting demands. And the consequence 
of coming alive in his mind is not to give it precedence over 
th~ body, but to obliterate the voice of the body as a step 
towards a greater obliteration that entails both: to silence, 
finally, the dialogue of woe betw. 3n antinomies. The desire 
to still the body is thus not an attempt to take sides with 
either of these warring factions, but merely to declare a 
momentary truce. Bound to a rhythm that is both coital and 
pre-natal, he simulates a time of undifferentiation, a moment 
when he is either lost in the act of coitus, or hidden j_n the 
womb and unaware of the acting to come. Within this rocking, 
there is the dim possibility of negating the chatter of 
Pope's opposites: life and death, subject and object, self 
and world, mind and body. 
As promised by the considerate narrator "section six" 
does indeed clarify Murphy's relation to the mind, body and 
rocking chair. Murphy's body is in a position common to all 
Beckett's protagonists from Belacqua to the persona in 
Company. The body is more or less perennially in a state of 
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exhaustion - exhausted not only by the decrepitude of a body 
forever waning, but by its traffic with the mind. For motion 
to be at all possible it must occur while one is at rest: for 
the rat to move, the man must be asleep (64-5). 
The movement of the mind through "the three zones, 
light, half light, dark" arises from the rest of the body. 
The first zone, an imaginative mockery of the prevalent terms 
of existence, allows Murphy, the victim of the world, to 
become its persecutor. But in the same way as even God must 
tire of avenging himself on the wcrld, this zone gives way to 
the second where "the pleasure was contemplation": 
In both these zones of his private world Murphy 
felt sovereign and free, in the one to requite 
himself, in the other to move as he pleased from 
one unparalleled beatitude to another. (65) 
But each requires effort, a kind of weak participation and 
for one exhausted in body, mental strain, however slight, 
takes its toll. The third degree is infinitely more alluring: 
Here there was nothing but commotion and the pure 
forms of commotion. Here he was not free, but a 
mote in the dark of absolute freedom. He did not 
move, he was a point in the ceaseless unconditioned 
generation and passing away of line. 
Matrix of surds. (66) 
Here the escape is seemingly final; not only from the body, 
but from the mind as well - the final retreat from the 
Cartesian world. If this retreat is important to Murphy, it 
is also pertinent to the study of madness. Morris Berman's 
Reenchantment of the World and Foucault's Madness and 
Civilisation are odd bed-fellows indeed, and yet both locate a 
significant change in social consciousness with the writings 
of Descartes. Descartes is, for them, a metaphor of a change 
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under which we still toil. For Foucault, Descartes excludes 
the madman (108) - both as body and as one who thinks - from 
the terrain of what can be thought. The madman becomes 
unthinkable and - madness having lost the validity of thought -
only good enough to be locked away. Felman summarises the 
position: 
A man can still be mad; but thought cannot. Thought 
is, by definition, the accomplishment of reason, an 
exercise of sovereignty of a subject capable of 
truth. I think, therefore I am not mad; I am not 
mad, therefore I am. (39) 
Implic~c in this, is a division that is indicative of the 
Cartesian thesis, a division that Berman sees as central to 
thinking since the 17th century. In proposing a body and 
mind, Descartes holds 
the assumption that mind and body, subject and 
object, were radically disparate entities. 
Thinking, it would seem, separates me from the 
world I confront. I perceive my body and its 
functions, but 'I' am not my body. (21) 
Thus for Berman, Descartes' method (together with the work of 
Bacon and Newton) created a perception of ourselves as 
divided entities: divided from the world, from others and 
from ourselves. But as divided subjects we retain the desire 
to merge with our otherness. Hence Cartesian sanity is, 
according to Berman, a systematic fragmentation that is 
finally "nothing more than a collective madness" (124). 
Although Berman does not glorify the experience (see Cooper's 
Language of Madness 41-42), madness is conversely a 
reconstitution of the unified self: 
Madness is, in the end, a statement about logical 
categories, and its reversion to the structure of 
premodern thought represents a revolt against the 
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reality principle that it sees as crushing the 
human spirit. (125) 
Phrased by the Cartesian voice, Murphy is, on one hand, a 
picture of sanity: he is one unable to think madness. He is 
excluded, by definition, from anything beyond sanity's realm. 
But on the other hand, Murphy is an example of one on the 
limits of sanity, where the consequence of being sane begins 
to breathe the air of madness. And his inability to reconcile 
the opposites of body and mind, together with his desire to do 
so, draw him towards madness and make of his sanity a kind of 
madness. Madness exists in Murphy as an index of his sanity. His 
scorn of the latter, however, does not guarantee him finding 
succour in the former. Madness does not accept volunteers. He is 
finally caught, for all his attempts at immolation of the double 
headed self, in the frustration of dualism. 
Our study of madness has, once more, shifted its ground. 
From the osmotic flow between madness and sanity that we 
detected in connection with Nietzsche, we arrive at the 
supposed heart of sanity (or the impossibility of madness) 
only to find that we have been followed. The mathematical 
basis upon which Descartes built his system, and which has 
become an unquestioned legacy to contemporary thought is, for 
Foucault, the sign of a withdrawal from madness. For Berman 
it signifies the presence of madness. The consequence for 
Murphy at least, is the perpetual confinement in the "matrix 
of surds": as an irrational number existing within a mathesis 
that typifies its opposite. He is nothing less than an 
irrational number on either side of the mirror which divides 
sanity from insanity. His quest is perfectly reasonable under 
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these impossible conditions: to reach negation, "a mote in 
the dark of absolute freedom". The brief reprieve of coitus, 
being held in the arms of his rocking chair, moments in which 
he is rendered insensible to the world and finally madness 
are, for him, tolerable steps towards ''Christ's parthian 
shaft: It is finished" (44). As Beckett, with great lyricism, 
claims in his translation of Chamfort's maxim: 
Better on your arse than on your feet, 
Flat on your back than either, dead than the lot. 
(Collected Poems 159) 
~ike the darkening hues of refutation that make up the 
spectrum of Murphy's mind, there are degrees of bodily rest; 
brief reprieves from the exhaustion of movement. We have 
examined Murphy on his arse, let us now consider him on his 
back. If the rocking chair grants him a physical exit from 
the Cartesian paradigm, then equally the park is, for Murphy, 
an exit from the labours of the city. The park, within the 
topography of a city that is geared toward a mathesis of 
productivity, functions as a pocket of worthlessness. It is 
no coincidence that Mercier and Camier and Watt begin in a 
park, not by chance that Murphy proposes to Celia in one and 
definitely not serendipity that speeds him to Lincoln's Inn 
Fields with the knowledge that "to sit down was no longer 
enough, he must insist now on lying down" (48). And this 
position achieved, like the meditative tramp he is, 
he slipped away, from the pensums and prizes, from 
Celia, chandlers, public highways, etc, from Celia, 
buses, public gardens, etc, to where there were no 
pensums and no prizes, but only Murphy himself, 
improved out of all knowledge. (62) 
His slipping away is under the guise of indolence. The 
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unemployable scandal that was the madman of the Classical period 
continues to exist in Murphy. In the domestication of madness, in 
the rationalisation of irrationality, madness remains a pathetic 
cipher on the periphery (in the city's parks) but nevertheless 
has not been entirely expunged. Madness exists, barely visible, 
out of the corner of the social eye. Murphy, perched precariously 
between sanity and its otherness, retains a freedom of movement 
(however painful) within the matrix of worth. While he maintains 
that freedom - which is little more than the freedom to starve -
he can carry out his petty blasphemies against the social order. 
Here too he finds refreshment on his lonely journey, for although 
there is no possibility of his being "improved out of all 
knowledge", if he can cheat the waitress out of .83 of a cup of 
tea (51) or Miss Dew out of threepence (60) he achieves, in 
reality, a sovereignty over the order that is akin to the light 
zone of his imagination. To win but a round between those 
"endowed with the ruthless cunning of the sane" and himself "a 
seedy solipsist" (SO) is victory indeed. A victory, in no other 
sense, than that of a child pulJ.'.ng faces as the enemy parades 
its supremacy through the conquered streets. It does however 
introduce Murphy's trivial attempts to subvert the order of 
things: it is a refusal, like Beckett's "Le Concentrisme", to 
belong. 
Seedy solipsist or not, there exists a world, social in 
nature, either to or from which Murphy cannot escape. What of 
the bevy of lesser characters that commute feverishly around 
Dublin and between Dublin and London? Their role as lesser 
entities is a given, for as the narrator tells in one of the 
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numerous asides, ''all the puppets in this book whinge sooner 
or later, except Murphy, who is not a puppet'' (71 ). What 
makes them puppets is partly a narrative ploy whereby they 
assume an almost farcical status at the hands of the 
puppeteer (author, God). As with much farce, they are 
motivated by the stringency of love: physical, romantic, 
ideal. It is over love that Neary - Murphy's prospective 
mentor - and Murphy part: 
'The love that lifts up its eyes,' said Neary, 
'being in torment; that craves for the tip of her 
little finger, dipped in lacquer, to cool its 
tongue - is foreign to you, Murphy, I take it.' 
'Greek,' said Murphy. (7) 
They are puppets not because they are unaware of the 
Cartesian mess, but because they refuse to learn its object 
lessons - Neary's desire for Miss Dwye~, Miss Counihan and 
Celia; Wylie's yearning for Miss Counihan and Celia; Miss 
Counihan's affection for Murphy, Wylie and Neary. And beyond 
this cacophony of voices loving and loved there is another 
strident choir involving Neary, Flight Lieutenant Elliman, 
Miss Farrell, Father Fitt ... (7). Beyond that, no doubt, 
there lies another mathematical constellation of love's 
hopelessness. However far it extends, at its epicentre is 
Murphy. 
Literally, they are bound to him, for it is Murphy whom 
they seek: he is the rational answer to their problems, the 
one who can give credence to their collective waiting, 
travelling, kissing, double-crossing, pursuing and drinking. 
He is the logic that, once gained, will organize their lives 
into syllogistic bliss: 
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- Murphy loves not Miss Counihan 
- Neary/Wylie loves Miss Counihan 
- Miss Counihan loves Neary 
- Miss Counihan loves Wylie. 
If Murphy is the ergo sum of their immediate existences, he 
is also Descartes' "evil demon" (100) who instills doubt 
rather than certainty. This is obvious for one who, in his 
amorous dealings, is still trapped within the old antitheses: 
"[t]he part of him he hated craved for Celia, the part that 
he loved shriveled up at the thought of her" (8). Love for Murphy 
is yet another version of the same dis-ease. This is most 
perceptively realised by Celia and, to a lesser extent, by Neary. 
Neary for all his need for an object to love grows 
weary, in the course of the novel, of the game in which he 
participates. He is like Murphy, but for one major 
difference: "he seems doomed to hope unending" (113). Thus 
betrayed by Miss Counihan q.nd Wylie he begins "yearning for 
Murphy as though he had never yearned for anything or anyone 
before" (113). "As though": the original premise of the game; 
the premise that forces continuance. Murphy is no longer a 
means to an end but an end in himself: the game continues, 
the sides are changed. This is exactly what Murphy desires to 
escape, this infernal closed system where causes become 
effects, means become ends, subjects become objects. As even 
Wylie has the perspicuity to note: 
For every symptom that is eased, another is made 
worse. The horse leech's daughter is a closed 
system. The quantum of her wantum cannot vary. (36) 
Both David Hesla (The Shape of Chaos 43-45) and Hugh Kenner 
(Samuel Beckett 79-115) perceive the immense difficulty of 
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one embroiled in this rational/irrational universe. So Neary, 
although contaminated by Murphy, fails to learn Murphy's 
lesson: if desire is to be found anywhere, it must lie in the 
desire to make of oneself an end and an end to desire. 
The contamination of Neary may be partial, but Murphy's 
need for the cessation of need entirely rubs off on Celia. 
When left to her own devices (while Murphy is out searching 
for unemployment) she assumes his former position in the 
rocking chair. Moreover, she does not merely content herself 
with sitting: 
She could not sit long in the chair without the 
impulse stirring, tremulously, as for an exquisite 
depravity, to be naked and bound ... always the 
moment came when no effort of thought could prevail 
against the sensation of being imbedded in a jelly 
of light, or calm the trembling of her body to be 
made fast. ( 42) 
This sado-masochism within the self has sexual overtones 
simply because the relief gained is of the same ilk. Celia 
has found a place where victim and persecutor meet within the 
oldest of rhythms, or as Yeats would have it, "O body swayed 
to music, 0 brightening glance,/ How can you know the dancer 
from the dance?" ("Among School Children" 130). As a 
consequence, she also shares with Murphy a growing weariness 
in the face of "life and death and other tuppenny aches" 
(Collected Poems 157). With the death of the butler, she 
reaches a realisation not only of the imminence of her death, 
but the deaths of Murphy and Mr Kelly as well. From this 
point on she turns "away from so much dark flesh and word to 
the sky, under which she had nothing to lose" (129). She is 
on her own way to Murphy's end, she who was Murphy's "last 
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exile" (131). 
Having left his last exile Murphy takes shelter in the 
house of madness, a house whose metaphor is played out 
geographically, "on the boundary of two counties" (90). The 
hints as to the solution offered by madness have come not 
only by way of his intimate proximity to oddity, but also 
through the prognostication offered by the dubious shaman Suk 
(22) and by the narrator: "To those in fear of losing it, 
reason stuck like a bur. And to those in hope ... ?" (56). And 
so Murphy's approach to the Magdalen Mental Mercyseat is 
somewhat like Zarathustra's, a sense of coming home: 
Murphy, whose experience as a physical and rational 
being obliged him to call sanctuary what the 
psychiatrists called exile and to think of the 
patients not as banished from a system of benefits 
but as escaped from a colossal fiasco. (101) 
Those words again: "physical and rational being", madness as 
escape and the world as "colossal fiasco". For Murphy there 
is only one solution. The sane world has, at its core, 
unreasonable assumptions, whereas madness, for all its stink 
of "peraldehyde and truant sphincters" (96) should have, at 
its quiet centre, all that Murphy has hitherto been denied: 
companionship (albeit it of a catatonic variety), a role-
model in the hairy guise of Mr Endon (105), a padded cell 
(103) especially built for Murphy's merger with non-Murphy 
and the possibility, in the end, of madness itself. That he 
can 'communicate' with those under his care is extremely 
alluring: 
It meant that they felt in him what they had been 
and he in them what he would be. It meant that 
nothing less than a slap-up psychosis could 
~onsummate his life's strike. (104) 
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As the park is to the city, the asylum to the sane world, his 
chair to the room, Murphy has finally found "the little 
world" (101) to which he can permanently belong. He has made 
of the periphery a centre and after only a short residency 
has the "aspect, even to Ticklepenny's inexpert eye, of a 
real alienation" (109). 
Thus prepared, he begins his night rounds and enters, in 
a manner similar to that of St. John of the Cross, the dark 
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night of the soul. Delivered from the prying eyes of the 
clinically sane, Murphy is alone in the night with his 
madmen. The apotheosis comes when Mr Endon, sensing Murphy's 
eye behind the judas (a sequence ripe for Lacanian analysis: 
the deception of Murphy's eye by Mr Endon's gaze [see 135]) 
sets up the chess game - a game of initiation that is typical 
of all rites of passage. In keeping with the supposedly neat 
inversion of terms, Mr Endon's chess board bears the same 
relation to insanity as Murphy's chair bears to sanity. Chess 
is governed by rigorous rules, implies an outcome and is 
played upon a surface that is the personification of the 
matrix in which the self engages the otherness of the world. 
It is a game that represents - in its very order - logic and 
rationality: in short, all the limbs of the sane construct. 
Within the game of sanity, Murphy is still too good a 
player. He attempts desperately to engage Mr Endon on one 
hand, and to emulate Mr Endon's refusal to be engaged on the 
other. For all his attempts to reach into insanity, he makes 
the mistake of postulating the old antinomy: Mr Endon refuses 
to become his other, either as friend or foe. As Bair points 
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out, Murphy could have achieved a re-cognition of Murphy by 
Mr Endon in one more move (195) but Murphy retreats before 
insanity's gaze: "there was nothing but he, the 
unintelligible gulf and they. That was all, All, ALL" (134). 
Why is Murphy bound to the "ALL" of sanity (its worthlessness 
and its plenitude) and why can he not cross over into the 
"ALL" of madness - its wealth of Nothingness, of Smart's 
unreality? The answer is obvious. 
Murphy is the curator of madmen and, whether he likes it 
or not, upholds the order he despises. To believe that 
insanity can be reached merely by inverting the terms is to 
repeat Neary's mistake. But as we have noted, Murphy is cut 
off from Neary because of the latter's unending hopefulness. 
He is also excluded from Mr Endon's vision as absolute 
negation: 
'the last at last seen of him 
himself unseen by him 
and of himself' 
A rest. 
'The last Mr Murphy saw of Mr Endon was Mr 
Murphy unseen by Mr Endon. This was also the last 
Murphy saw of Murphy.' 
A rest. 
'The relation between Mr Murphy and Mr Endon 
could not have been better summed up by the 
farmer's sorrow at seeing himself in the latter's 
immunity from seeing anything but himself.' 
A long rest. 
'Mr Murphy is a speck in Mr Endon's unseen'. (140) 
This convoluted epiphany sees madness as the Otherness which 
is oblivious of its being other. Murphy cannot cross over 
into madness, but neither can he retreat to sanity. He has 
reached a point where he is excluded from both: to use the 
language of geometry, he becomes a vertex extending out of a 
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linear plane. And this vertical ascendence or descendence 
places him in "the unintelligible gulf". 
As one unintelligible to himself and to others, as one 
lost in the gulf where the madness in sanity meets the sanity 
of madness, Murphy designates the end of one kind of Beckett 
protagcnist (including Belacqua, Celia and Neary) and the 
birth of a new melodious breed: Watt, Molloy, Malone, 
Unnamable ... Although the potentiality of Murphy has not been 
exhausted, Murphy is. His laboured walk back to his quarters, 
his slow shedding of clothes, his blank collapse on his back, 
the fragmentation of his past in 
Scraps of bodies, of landscapes, hands, eyes, 
lines, and colours evoking nothing, rose and 
climbed out of sight before him (141) 
his dim intentions, his final pushing off and his being 
pushed off into the "superfine chaos" (142): like Christ's 
weary toil to Golgotha (after his own glimpse of madness in 
Gethsemene), Murphy must die so that his spirit may rise in 
Watt. In Murphy we have the simultaneous birth and death of 
madness. We glimpse it in Murphy's game with Mr Endon and 
watch as it dies away or, more properly, is suffused into the 
texts that follow. On the level of character, those that 
follow Murphy bear the stigmata of Murphy's epiphany - damned 
to suffer, perennially, from Murphy's wounds. Madness is now 
an unforgettable part of them and an unobtainable dead end. 
They are cursed to move on, in search of other forms of 
congress with "the accidentless One-and-Only, conveniently 
called Nothing" (138). Whereas Beckett will invariably deny 
it to those who follow, he grants Murphy the great Beckettian 
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wish and allows him the final reconciliation with the other, 
the merger of self quite literally with the world: 
By closing time the body, mind and soul of Murphy 
were freely distributed over the floor of the 
saloon; and before another dayspring greyened the 
earth had been swept away with the sand, the beer, 
the butts, the glass, the matches, the spits, the 
vomit . ( 1 5 4 ) 
Beckett writes Murphy off. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Watt: If This Be Reason There's Madness In't 
I Fatal Vision (In)sensible 
I know a poor man named Murphy, said Mercier, who 
had the look of you, only less battered of course. 
But he died ten years ago, in rather mysterious 
circumstances. They never found the body, can you 
imagine. 
My dream, said Watt. (Mercier and Camier 111) 
Lest we forget ourselves in Murphy's remains, consider 
what remains in Murphy, what spirit has not been burnt off or 
distilled out. Beckett may no longer need Murphy's body in 
toto but there are distinguishing marks which remain to be 
passed on (in his passing on} to his scions. The Cartesian 
mathesis as played out in Murphy's mind is one. Physical 
decrepitude and vulgar apparel are others. And finally there 
is Murphy's birthmark on his buttock. 
The motif of the buttocks as the seat of unreason is 
introduced as early as Neary's first appearance. Neary, 
banging his head - as locus of sense - against the marble 
buttocks of Cuchulain is rescued by Wylie only because the 
latter convinces the Civic Guard "as one sane man to another" 
(28) that Neary is an innocuous lunatic. The preference that 
madness has for this part of the anatomy is reiterated when 
Celia (as one who has learnt Murphy's lessons so well} is the 
only one who can recognise Murphy among the charred remains 
that constitutes his body, mind and soul. The "birthmark 
deathmark" (150) on his buttocks, although hidden from those 
not intimately involved with his quest (note Miss Counihan's 
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disappointment), is visible to those who have intuited 
Murphy's vision. The birthmark then, is Murphy's great 
bequest to those who follow. It is, most obviously, imprinted 
on Watt's anatomy where it festers - between Murphy (1938) 
and Watt (1944) - before finally blooming into the narrative: 
he still carried, after five or six years, and 
though he dressed it in the mirror night and 
morning, on his right ischium a running sore of 
traumatic origin. (30) 
If it establishes itself as a physical mark on the 
characters, it also has its impact on the text: a blemish 
that is registered in the footnotes, the addenda and that 
finally discolours the text itself. 
Similarly, it prevails as a deep seated metaphor that 
signals the nature and the extent of the transformation that 
has irrevocably ruptured Murphy's hold not only on life, but 
on his dealings with sanity. Like the game of chess with Mr 
Endon, the apocalypse (as completion of one world and as 
revelation) is registered in trifling terms: nothing really 
happens in the game, the birthmark is not patently obvious, 
both are beneath the surface. But then as Murphy has so 
effectively evinced, so is madness. 
To see the blemish beneath the skin requires a 
transforming vision, it requires in Blake's terms an ability 
To see the World in a Grain of Sand 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower 
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand 
And Eternity in an hour ... ("Auguries of Innocence" 
506) 
With one difference: Beckett's vision is decidedly negative, 
far more inclined to see the world as a grain of sand and 
infinity and eternity as the unbearable weighing on the need 
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to end. The merging of Cowper's pessimism with Smart's co-
opting vision is complete in Beckett. 
Even given the invisible revelation with Mr Endon Murphy 
has, at best, only a dim and rather romanticised apperception 
of living on the verge of the blackout. His sanity repeatedly 
drags him back to "the pensums and prizes, [to] Celia, 
chandlers, public highways, etc, [to] Celia, buses, public 
gardens, etc." (62) Exactly how gradual this movement is -
from the petty fugues of living as drunk to living dementia -
is indicated b~ Arsene in his encapsulation of the change: 
There r was, warm and bright, smoking my tobacco-
pipe, watching the warm bright wall, when suddenly 
somewhere some little thing slipped, some little 
tiny thing. Gliss-iss-iss-STOP! I trust r make 
myself clear .... rt was a slip like that r felt, 
that Tuesday afternoon, millions of little things 
moving all together out of their old place, into a 
new one near by, and furtively, as though it were 
forbidden. ( 41 ) 
Arsene's revelation is noteworthy because it repeats the 
trivial dimensions of which Beckettian revelation is 
composed. rt is not so much that nothing happens ('twice') 
but that comprehension flounders before the vision's 
inconsequence: "Gliss-iss-iss-STOP! r trust r make myself 
clear." 
Consider the wealth of material Arsene gives in order to 
place his change: it occurs on a Tuesday afternoon, he is 
watching (and note the assuring repetition) the warm, bright 
wall and smoking his pipe. Time, place, occupation - the 
three all powerful locating devices on which we unceasingly 
fall back in order to assure ourselves that we are awake, 
sober and sane. Pitched against this is the vision 
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articulated according to the suspicious rhetoric of metaphor 
and one which is riddled with qualifiers that reiterate both 
its inconsequential status and the impossibility of precise 
description - "somewhere some little thing slipped, some 
little tiny thing. 111 Like the birthmark it is both there and 
not there, visible while being hidden beneath the surface. 
The slip places Arsene beyond the pale of the given. He has 
been initiated into a world irrevocably altered and has 
returned, a portly shaman, to convey his experience to Watt. 
But in the crossing over, the materiality of the old world 
(if it is at all possible to speak of old and new when the 
two have existed contemporaneously) does not neatly, or 
necessarily, translate into the terms of the new. The sun on 
the wall has become 
so changed that I felt I had been transported, 
without my having remarked it, to some quite 
different yard, and to some quite different season, 
in an unfamiliar country. At the same time my 
tobacco-pipe [became so alien] that I took it out 
of my mouth to make sure it was not a thermometer, 
or an epileptic's dental wedge. (42) 
A different yard, a 61fferent season, an unfamiliar country 
and smoking a thermometer: thus is the slip registered. 
Because the change is furtive, "as though it were 
forbidden" and because the vocabulary differs depending on 
which side of the fence one resides, clarity cannot be 
achieved according to the prevalent gospel of making sense. 
Arsene is thrown back to a pre-Aristotelean era, to a moment 
when there is only experience without the ability to arrange. 
He cannot begin his tale without feeling the need to begin at 
a position prior to the beginning (see Edward Said's comments 
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on this difficulty in Beginnings, especially "A Meditation on 
Beginnings" 27-78). He cannot pursue even a linear 
organisation of experience towards an end becaus nothing is 
connected either by time or space. Neither can he pursue a 
thread in his argument because that is all he possesses: 
threads without recourse to pattern. If the point is ever to 
be made it is, as always, only thanks to exhaustion. What 
Nietzsche has to say of philosophy is equally true of any 
attempt to make sense: 
Every philosophy is a foreground philosophy - that 
is the hermit's judgment: 'there is something 
arbitrary in the fact that he stopped, looked back, 
looked around here, that he stopped digging and 
laid his spade aside here - there is also something 
suspicious about it'. (Beyond Good and Evil 289) 
Arsene, and for that matter the main characters in Watt and 
The Trilogy, desire nothing more than to lay the spade down, 
to exhaust for the last time the business of being. 
Exhaustion however, is one of those curious words that 
designates the end of a tether and the hopeless distance from 
the end. Exhaustion: the waste product of the machine that 
enables the mechanism, in the most considerate way, to 
continue and thereby refuses it the opportunity to finish. So 
Lucky ends his speech on "unfinished" (Waiting for Godot 45), 
the Unnamable with the infamous "I can't go on, I'll go on" 
(The Trilogy 382). And as with all Beckett texts after Murphy 
exhaustion - as completion - is imposed by ~he narrating 
figure but always with the awareness that this is but a 
pause, the story is not over. This 'waste product' literature 
rests briefly and then begins again to breathe, out: to 
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exhale, to exhaust. 
Arsene's is not alone in his vision. It has been 
painfully contracted from Murphy who has in turn been 
infected by the squirming lobster that bothered Belacqua so 
in More Pricks Than Kicks (19). And now it is Arsene's duty 
to pass on the disease. 
Either as conversion to a new vision of things or as 
infection, Beckett's earlier works are concerned with 
conveying this change from a prior state to that under which 
his later creatures suffer. For Belacqua, Murphy, Arsene and 
Watt a moment occurs when everything comes under review. As 
Arsene has shown this is an epiphany of uncertain dimensions 
and not only because it refuses to be ordered. Take Watt's 
for example: 
The piano is doomed, in my opinion, said the 
younger [Gall]. 
The piano-tuner also, said the elder. 
The pianist also, said the younger. 
This was perhaps the principal incident of Watt's 
early days in Mr.Knott's house. (69) 
This summation is not entirely facetious and neither can its 
impact be attributed solely to the admittedly pessimistic 
purport of the dialogue between father and son. What Watt 
registers is a similarity between his genealogy (his diseas~d 
ancestors) and the spread of decay that begins, innocently, 
with the piano and goes on to contaminate all connected with 
it. Once the 'machine' (that which allows the free flow 
between things and creates, in the process, the familiar) 
fails, all else follows: Belacqua's lobster, Celia's butler, 
Murphy's game of chess, and for Arsene and Watt, Mr Knott's 
house. The object that acts as the catalyst is insignificant 
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in terms of the consequence; the world, it seems, is full of 
ornaments that can become furniture for the insane. 
The object of transference (in a non-Freudian sense) is 
simply that 'thing' which allows or forces one to move 
through onto the other side - it is the hole in the fence 
through which Sam passes on his way to Watt (159). Rather, it 
is the moment of transference that is remarkable. The 
incident with the Galls, for example 
was not ended, when it was past, but continued to 
unfold, in Watt's head, from beginning to end, over 
and over again, the complex connexions of its 
lights and shadows, the passing from silence to 
sound and from sound to silence, the stillness 
before the movement and the stillness after .... it 
developed a purely plastic content, and gradually 
lost, in the nice processes of its light, its 
sound, its impacts and its rhythm, all meaning, 
even the most literal. (69) 
For Watt transference works by the incident's refusal to be 
transferred. As an incident of little import it refuses to 
take its place in the archives of memory but insists, like a 
stuck record, to play itself again and again and with a 
blithe disregard for the chronology of the event. Moving from 
profundity to silliness in the same breath, breaking up and 
rearranging the sound and the silence, the before and after, 
the event is fractured into disjointed fragments. Like Humpty 
Dumpty fallen the vision refuses to be put together again. Or 
to put it more 'exactly', the incident appears to Watt as 
something akin to a Cubist hallucination - the clues that 
should create order and perspective are exactly those which 
are distorted. However the vision is described, and 
eventually it remains hermetically sealed against 
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description, its effect is such that it decimates everything 
that surrounds the event: a deconstruction that ripples its 
way through the body and the mind of characters and text 
alike. 
For Watt this collapse soon spreads to all attempts to 
signify and he finds himself trying uselessly to connect 
potness with the word 'pot'. His revelation has disentangled 
signifier from signified, has destroyed the faith that keeps 
language on its feet and so Watt in a last attempt to restore 
things hopes that perhaps this is notr ,g more than a 
(transitory) illness: 
he was in poor health, owing to the efforts of his 
body to adjust itself to an unfamiliar milieu, and 
that these would be successful, in the end, and his 
health restored, and things appear, and himself 
appear, in their ancient guise, and consent to be 
named, with the time-honoured names, and forgotten. 
( 81 ) 
The body is at fault and once it has adjusted to the demands 
of its new surroundings everything will return to normal. But 
the body, like its partner the mind, refuses to find its 
health, refuses to become adJusted. 
II The Cartesian Corpse 
There has always been a connection between the vision 
and the body that suffers the vision: it pours into the body 
making it different, transforming it. This is as true for the 
madman whose body becomes glass as it is for St. Theresa with 
her body pierced or for the stigmata that St. Francis 
receives as the apotheosis of his faith: the range of 
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response is as diverse as the manifestations of madness. 
However, whereas religion tolerates and venerates the 
physicality of transformation in its saints the same respect, 
is not reserved for the madman. For Arsene the alteration of 
the body does not indicate a 'perfection' (assuming the 
perfection of Christ's tortured body) of the human form, but 
rather like the analogy of insanity as mental illness it 
indicates a different kind of being. Like Smart, Arsene is 
not translated into the animal but into the realm of the 
curiosity, into another body, into a mouth so different that 
it no longer recognises the stem of a pipe between its lips. 
The vision devastates the previous world, it makes final 
and irrevocable the step Murphy could not take in his life 
even if he took it with his life. But what has this to do 
with the body? Arsene's vision is not simply a cognitive 
event but is a mentally and physically transforming 
experience. The body also sees itself as if for the first 
time. 
Beckett's body is engrossed with Cowper's body as 
something "buried above ground" and drawn more to the 
iconography of Zarathustra's dwarf. The vision of collapse is 
rendered in physical terms - the body recognises in the 
vision a correspondence for the vision is also a locus for 
decomposition; a Humpty Dumpty about to hit the ground but 
calling it 'growing up, growing old'. From this point on 
Beckett's body is always held in the palm of disorder, caught 
permanently in the flight from the realisation of the vision 
and the subsequent realisation that any flight will be 
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accompanied by the decaying body (and mind) it seeks to 
escape. It is in these terms that madness affects Beckett's 
bodies and makes them kin with Descartes' madmen: 
how could I deny that these hands and this body 
belong to me, unless perhaps I were to assimilate 
myself to those insane persons whose minds are so 
troubled ... they constantly assert that they are 
kings when they are very poor; that they are 
wearing gold and purple when they are quite 
naked. . . ( 96) 
The body is moved into a realm of otherness that exists at a 
position diametrically opposed to the sane, healthy person. 
As is so often the case with those who would speak of 
madness, the difference is phrased in absolute and dualistic 
terms: kings or paupers, regally dressed or naked. But what 
is most surprising about this extract is the central position 
it occupies in his Meditations - it constitutes the first 
major objection to the common sense perception of existence 
and occurs immediately after he opens himself to doubt. 
Madness features at the inception of his tract on sanity -
sanity, as that based on reason, founded on common-sense and 
supported by the twin pillars of the body and the mind. Thus, 
at this early stage, it is highly suspicious that he uses a 
non-argument to dismiss that doubt: he is sane because his 
hands and his body belong to himself. The fact that the body 
is possessed by the doubter apparently exonerates the doubter 
from doubt. The Cartesian body can only be examined in the 
surgery of the verifiable and under an extremely rational 
scalpel. It is considered 
as having a face, hands, arms and the whole machine 
made up of flesh and bones, as it appears in a 
corpse .... by body, I understand all that can be 
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terminated by some figure; that can be contained in 
some place and fill a space in such a way that any 
other body is excluded from it. (104) 
Descartes' body is the corpse that thinks, is the machine 
confined to the space where it is and defined by the 
impossibility of it being elsewhere. The body is the object 
supreme, an object only to be owned and operated on by the 
thinking subject. Although Descartes goes on to doubt the 
existence of the body (105), once the cogito is acknowledged 
as the primum mobile the body re-surfaces unscathed. In the 
same way that doubt passes over insanity, it passes over the 
body. The body is a machine, is a functional entity fixed 
securely in time and space. There is no space in the world of 
Meditations for either Arsene's vision or its effect on the 
body. 
Beckett's bodies recall Descartes' and interrogate their 
utilitarianism; they seek to open up the machine to the doubt 
that Descartes could not muster. In the "Sixth Meditation" 
Descartes (innocently) considers the divisibility of the body 
in contrast to the indivisibility of the mind by arguing that 
if a foot, or an arm, or any other part, is 
separated from my body, it is certain that, on that 
account, nothing has been taken away from my mind 
(164). 
It remains for Beckett to take this divisible body to its 
logical extreme, to the weeping trunk in The Unnamable. 
Within this investigation the body does not come away 
unscathed. Descartes' body is healthy, working, as his 
favorite metaphor has it, like a machine. Not only does it 
designate a terminal point in space but is also the apogee 
(in a pre-Darwinian sense) of the various forms of life. In 
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this way it is the Renaissance body, a body defined by 
Mikhail Bakhtin as 
a strictly completed, finished product .... All 
signs of its unfinished character, of its growth 
and proliferation were eliminated; its 
protruberances and offshoots were removed, its 
convexities (signs of new sprouts and buds) 
smoothed out, its apertures closed. (29) 
It is, in short, a body without doubt. In contrast, Beckett's 
bodies are in a state of disrepair and decline. The 
assortment of decrepitude that ranged through Murphy 
continues in Watt not only because it indicates an 
environment beyond the pale but because Beckett is obsessed 
with the ideal of the enclosed body and his protagonists' 
distance from that body. Both mind and body can succumb to 
madness. 
When Foucault speaks of the madman who rises from the 
ashes of the leper, he is touching on an essential point 
about the connectedness of disease with madness. Although the 
perception of madness as disease was popularised in Pinel's 
re-evaluation of the lunatic, it is a metaphor that continues 
to exist and inform our present conception of insanity. As 
Jennifer Radden points out: 
The plausibility of this [disease] model relies on 
the central analogy underlying it: that between the 
psychological states and behaviour comprising what 
can be observed of madness ... and the symptoms of a 
physical ailment. (15) 
In order to understand madness one resorts to an analogy 
outside of itself and in so doing creates, unwittingly, an 
orbit that extends from the healthy figure to the psychotic 
wretch. The ill body gravitates towards the latter pole and 
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because of the mystery that still disciplines the subject of 
madness, the seriously diseased, deformed and dying are moved 
to hospices in the same suburbs as the asylum. The sick body 
like the 'sick' mind still stinks of the extrinsic. 
In essence perhaps, but not in morphology, Beckett's 
body is Deleuze and Guattari's "body without organs" (9). In 
Watt the body has most, if not all, its organs but with the 
stipulation that these organs are never closed, are always 
dripping with the fluid of "traumatic origin". 
Follow fj ·-st a simple line of bodily connections: Murphy 
touches on Watt by benefit of a birthmark, Watt reminds Goff 
of Hackett, Hackett recalls Murphy in their fascination with 
twilight and with the rocking motion (in the farmer's case 
because of a need to scratch his hump [22]) that both indulge 
in before the darkness overcomes them. Hackett is bound to 
the same sick family and exists both as another eddy rippling 
out from the centre of Beckettian ailment and as a point of 
origin for the bodies that swarm through Watt. His hunch is a 
direct result of his falling off the ladder - the same ladder 
that features in the futile pilgrimages undertaken by those 
in The Lost Ones, the same ladder of which Arsene speaks when 
he narrates the impact of his vision: "What was changed was 
existence off the ladder. Do not come down the ladder, Ifor, 
I haf taken it away" (42). If this is the ladder that Beckett's 
heroes climb and fall off it is the same object as that over 
which Descartes climbs to certainty; but whereas Descartes may 
fumble, Beckett's characters have long since fallen. 
For Hackett the transformation was played out in a 
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physical locale and is essentially a matter of stature, the 
hunch giving him a decidedly different slant on that which is 
properly called life. From his purview and confronted by the 
sight of Watt, Hackett 'did not know when he had been so 
intrigued" (15). He recognises, in the fading light, one of 
his fallen brothers. Watt identifies himself as such by 
visual utterance: 
Mr Hackett was not sure that it was not a parcel, a 
carpet for example, or a roll of tarpaulin, wrapped 
in a dark paper and tied about the middle with a 
cord. ( 14) 
This indistinct perception of Watt is due, in part, to the 
fast fading light when he together with "the flowers will be 
engulfed" (20). But if this were entirely so then surely 
Hackett's interest would fade in proportion with the 
diminishing light. Twilight encourages one to see uniformity 
as the night sets about the gradual obliteration of 
difference. Even the hunchback Hackett when in the dark is no 
longer identifiable as a hunchback, or as Hackett. watt is 
discernible because he is in his natural element (where both 
body and mind are most at 'home') and because he continues to 
be visible beyond the point where he should cease to be 
visible, he remains tangible "from the waist up faintly 
outlined against the last wisps of day" (16). Like the smile 
of the Cheshire cat Watt exists as a residue even after his 
departure (which is never mentioned), remains hanging in the 
air long after his body has left for other pastures. In his 
wake he leaves Goff, Tetty and Hackett in an aporia of 
unprovable reasons for his behaviour. As this attempt to 
rationalise Watt's getting off the bus continues the three 
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parties grow increasingly irritated by the incident's 
resilience against plausible ("perhaps he is off his head" 
[17]) interpretation. Nothing about his action, his history -
of which Goff knows nothing - or his appearance allows him to 
be fixed or dismissed in the order of things. Neither can he 
be contained by words; indeed his demeanor "does not invite 
mention" (16) as Goff puts it. Nor can he be contained by his 
body. In the same way as Hackett's hunch depicts a body 
crippled by the flesh's need to escape the confines of the 
body, Watt's body loses its distinctive outline and in 
becoming like a roll of tarpaulin parodies the body which 
should give him shape. For both of them the body refuses to 
fit into the one that Descartes assumes is given. The 
Beckettian body is extended and distended into another 
territory and yet within its discomfort it acknowledges the 
obligation that has been placed on its shoulders (perhaps the 
reason for the incredible decrepitude of Beckett's 
characters) by Descartes' metaphor: to act as if it were a 
machine. As Kenner notes: 
The body, if we consider it without prejudice in 
the light of the seventeenth-century 
connoisseurship of the simple machines, is 
distinguished from any machine, however complex, by 
being clumsy, sloppy, and unintelligible ... (121) 
Although Kenner goes on to say that "Cartesian man deprived 
of his bicycle is a mere intelligence fastened to a dying 
animal" (124) he is more concerned with the bicycle, as a 
Beckettian image, than with the "dying animal". But the 
bicycle only gives the illusion of a functioning Cartesian 
entity, an illusion that is routed even before Mercier and 
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Camier reach the plundered machine. Descartes is undone in 
the pseudo-mechanism of the Beckettian figure. 
From the beginning of Beckett's work the collapse of the 
body was a prevalent concern. "Whoroscope" concentrates on 
Descartes' contrary eating habits where ingestion has a 
perversely stringent order (according to Beckett's notes he 
"liked his omelette made of eggs hatched from eight to ten 
days; shorter or longer under the hen and the result, he 
says, is disgusting" [5]) and a system of eating far from 
delectable: 
Are you ripe at last, 
my slim pale double-breasted turd? 
How rich she smells, 
this abortion of a fledgling! 
I will eat it with a fish fork. 
White and yolk and feathers. (4) 
This gives rise to the two nearly distinct forms that are 
reproduced in the personages in Watt. The first is the 
decaying body that accepts its sine qua non and sets about 
trying its utmost to finish, to escape by perseverance. Thus, 
we have the presence of Mary whose appetite extends over four 
pages of nauseating iteration and where intake - eating as 
drawn out suicide - has consequences that are manifested, 
like Hackett's hump, on the exterior: 
her long grey greasy hair framing in its cowl of 
scrofulous mats a face where pallor, langour, 
hunger, acne, recent dirt, immemorial chagrin and 
surplus hair seemed to dispute the mastery. (53) 
The face, like the rest of her body, is in disarray. Not only 
is it falling to pieces but it is oozing all the while. 
The second point is the way in which this self-abuse is 
ordered, the way in which it retains a pristine logic in 
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terms of its gluttony. An onion is followed only by a 
peppermint and it, in turn, by another onion (49-50). And as 
for her hands Arsene does not "hesitate to compare [them] 
with that of piston-rods" which, in a wonderful parody of 
scientific discourse, meet "at a point equidistant from their 
points of departure or arrival" (54). 
Not far from this is Watt walking. Again it is as if the 
legs are desperately involved in a flight not from something 
behind Watt (note his indifference to Lady McCann's stone 
[30]) but from Watt himself, from the tarpaulin trunk. To 
give his legs their due, they embark upon their journey 
adhering to all the niceties of Euclidian geometry: east is a 
direction that results from the negation of the northern bust 
and the southern foot (28). Such, no doubt, is the paradox 
whereby deformity finds a certain grace by operating in 
compliance with strict criteria. Descartes' body is opened up 
to doubt and upon this investigation, collapses; but this 
collapse is played out according to rules that provide a 
burlesque version of Descartes' machine: arms as pistons, 
legs as levers for the bulk above them. If in Murphy we 
discerned the crippling of the Cartesian mathesis, then here 
we discover the mathesis of the Cartesian cripple. 
Criticism is not merely an instrument of blame that 
takes its revenge against other times, other people. 
Descartes is not a tyrant who stands over history wielding 
his sceptre of thought. He exists both as a metaphor who 
appears as an independent voice and as a vocalisation of 
Renaissance thought. Like El Greco painting himself 
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unobtrusively into his work, Descartes emerges quietly 
(musing in his study) in the Renaissance canvas. Thus 
Beckett's work is not to be seen as a conscious indictment of 
Cartesian order but as a literature that naturally rubs 
itself up against the past corpses of thought and against 
Descartes, a ghost who unquestionably haunts the present. 
This caveat is necessary because in closely following 
Beckett's parody of Descartes' bodies it is easy to overlook 
the end product: a deteriorating machine weakly asserting to 
the deus ex machina that it still works even though it has 
lost its legs. This terminally ill organism that mimes a 
healthy prototype is the result of Beckettian physiognomy. 
What Descartes implicitly (and Bakhtin 
explicitly) portrays is a body obsessed, like the mind, with 
sanity. Part of this concern can be attributed, as Foucault 
argues, to a desire to clean up the public travesty of 
madness, to get it off the streets. "The great confinement" 
was not restricted to madmen being placed in asylums but 
extended to other members of the community of the peripheral. 
On the 'objectified' body a growth had appeared and had to be 
lanced: the madman, the physically deformed and, of course, 
the fool. With classicalism the fool (who has much in common 
with the madman) loses his former status and recedes from the 
public eye. Even the court jester is appropriated into an 
order that nullifies the fool's ability to challenge. Anton 
Zijderveld notes that by the 18th century "the 
bourgeoisification of the fool" (126) was complete, the fool 
is made redundant by a growing bureaucracy. 
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Beckett, however, resuscitates the fool from decline, he 
reconstitutes the reified visages of the fool from the 
circus, from vaudeville and from the tramps in the city parks 
in order to arrive at the caricature of the Cartesian machine 
- Frankenstein's monster in a top-hat attempting to master 
the chaos of an uncoordinated anatomy. 
In Watt it is not that the clothes and boots no longer 
fit (this is reserved for the antics of Waiting for Godot) 
but that like Frankenstein the body can no longer be 
accommodated by its outline. The attempts on the part of the 
Lynch family to reach 1000 years is not a request for a 
temporal identity as much as it signifies a need to come 
together in one body, as if all the variegated illnesses that 
perplex the Lynch individuals can be annulled in the creation 
of one, albeit impossible, healthy personage. Out of a 
century of breath, the family argues, surely we can collate a 
sound pair of lungs, connected to a functional torso, 
connected to ... Of course not says Beckett. 
The Lynch family, then, is the metaphor of the physical 
Beckettian being and is reflected on a smaller scale by the 
abortive coupling between Sam and Watt in the latter's 
attempt to tell his story. While unity is allowed under the 
guise of the family name it is denied by the inability of the 
family to partake of the communion of one body (here those 
searching for Christian symbols should begin their 
investigation). And yet they gain a certain charm simply 
because they cannot achieve their unifying century. Like the 
fool's stumble and eventual fall (as Milton implies) there is 
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a certain grace. The death of Joe, Bill and Jim has its 
(tediously enumerated) consequences for the rest of the 
extended family even down to "Rose and Cerise and Pat and 
Larry [who are left] great-grandfatherless" (107). Although 
they will never reach the golden age they achieve a unity of 
sorts merely because of the fervour of their need to do so. 
The impact of death on the entire family - not merely a thing 
of remorse but of mathematics - generates an inter-
connectedness not unlike that of the sympathetic functioning 
of the nerves, muscles and organs of the body. In this sense, 
its bodiness is its decrepitude. For the Lynch family the 
body refuses to coalesce: it avoids formulating itself into 
one organism, and yet, in spite of itself, is an organism 
because it is connect°-d by deformity and a singularity of 
desire. Thus the Lynch family is an arena where the body 
suffers a breakdown and yet pathetically fulfils the 
Cartesian machine. 
For Mr Knott the one, singular form is achieved but it 
too has its problems - it h: l0st, ?~cording to Watt, its 
singularity. Rather than the machine refusing to work, it can 
no longer "fill a space in such a way that any other body is 
excluded from it". Mr Knott lies at the unstable centre of 
the constellation of earthly bodies and like God, of whom he 
is reminiscent, he cannot be located as a tempera-spatial 
entity. With the passing of each day "the figure, stature, 
skin and hair" (211) change and although the permutations 
follow the rules of combanitorics they entirely disrupt the 
notion of the body as fixed. Accepting that Sam was correct 
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and that "Watt had no hand in these transformations" (211) we 
are left with a morphology little different from the Lynch 
consortium. While the Lynch family were sifting through the 
debris of disease in order to resuscitate an enduring body, 
Mr Knott is one body constantly changing the terms that 
constitute it. The former try to create a self from the 
diversity of others; the latter is, as Rimbaud has it, a self 
that is always other. At any one point in time and space both 
are there and not there. For the Lynch family, death defines 
the living body, and for Mr Knott time kills the body that 
was present a moment ago: 
For daily changed, as well as these, in carriage, 
expression, shape and size, the feet, the legs, the 
hands, the arms, the mouth, the nose, the eyes, the 
ears. . . ( 211 ) 
Such is the fate of the body in Watt: in a state of turmoil 
and hence struggling to find a repose outside of the 
parameters of the body. Murphy's need to emulate more and 
more perfectly the oblivious joys of the horizontal -is 
concretised by those characters in Watt who yearn to escape 
the plane of their physical being. 
Because the body not only collapses in an anatomical 
sense (bound, always, for Chamfort's "better dead than the 
lot") it is restless within the bounds of its form. It 
overflows itself, spreading beyond these dimensions. It is a 
body driven mad by the palpable evidence of unceasing decay 
and unceasing sameness within decay. As such it is always 
driven by the need to find an area into which it can escape. 
This area into which the body desires to escape is not 
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specified, it is not Rousseau's noble savagery - for Beckett 
it is the fact of birth that places humanity everywhere in 
chains - nor Schopenhauer's asceticism. Aware of decay not as 
an abstract construct but as an omnipresent condition gnawing 
away from the inside and the outside, the body cannot hope 
for migration to greener pastures but only for completion, 
for cessation. This is a philosophical decision realised at a 
physiological level. Conceived in Cartesian terms we have a 
machine that is not so much running as running down. And in 
its running, its bleeding, its deformity, its gradual and 
expeditious decay it indefatigably remains as the lunatic 
body: like the vision, refusing to pass into the past, like 
the vision, continually fragmenting. In space and in time. 
Thus Arsene not only leaves the space of Mr Knott's 
house but, upon his departure, leaves a residue image of his 
body: "the man standing sideways in the kitchen doorway 
looking at him became two men standing sideways in two 
kitchen doorways looking at him" (62). Either Arsene's vision 
or Arsene as vision remains and prepares Watt for his 
encounter with the Galls. This momentary doubling up of the 
material world is caused by a blurring of focus but in Watt's 
case it is an initiation carried out intuitively by one 
entering the out-of-focus world of Mr Knott's residence. The 
destabilising of the original and singular world is created 
by this repetition, a repetition that makes it impossible to 
distinguish between the real and the copy. Nothing from here 
on can be verified and this is possibly more disconcerting to 
the reader than to Watt for his sight is focused beyond this 
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apparition of duality towards the slow breaking of the new 
day. His vigilance is directed towards time and its passing. 
As Arsene doubles in space watt doubles in time. Upon 
leaving Mr Knott's residence and upon reaching the train that 
will take him to the farther (for the body doomed to continue 
there is no fartherest) end of line, he sees a human figure 
dressed in 
the uninterrupted surfaces of a single garment, 
while on his head there sat, asexual, the likeness 
of a depressed inverted chamber-pot, yellow with 
age, to put it politely. (225) 
Hackett's tarpaulin becomes the "single garment", Watt's 
mustard-pepper block hat (217) becomes an ''inverted chamber-
pot, yellow with age"; even the walk, although differing in 
inclination, is as useful in praxis. Watt having left Mr 
Knott's employ is followed in time by another Watt trying to 
reach the decaying body of the first. 
The Beckettian body is complete. It stands, with some 
difficulty, as the mirror image of Descartes' physique. On 
the surface of the mirror there is an agreement of forms: 
both are machines, both are terminated in a specific space 
and time and both are possessed by the consciousness that 
inhabits the body. At least that is how it appears on the 
surface. But beneath the skin is the vision of the birthmark 
and once it is foregrounded it sets about the dismantling of 
the Cartesian machine, it destroys the presumption of 
tempero-spatial continuity, it vanquishes the mind of the 
'owner'. And it struggles, despite the impediments of breath 
and motion, to achieve that which Descartes innocently 
assumed as given - to be "made up of flesh and bones as it 
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appears in a corpse". 
The physical body - one of the two great pillars of 
dualism - is eaten away from within and although it continues 
to stand becomes an empty support, pure and white and 
meaningless. Precisely like the vision, which is its cause, 
nothing and everything changes. The mad, distended body 
mimics the sane, enclosed one which such tenacity and such a 
desire for verisimilitude that we can only applaud the 
effort. But the consequence of this applause is dire. 
III The Mad(?) Mathematician 
Irrespective of the support this reading finds in 
Beckett's work it is somewhat unfair, if not to the letter 
then to the spirit of Descartes' work. The body escapes doubt 
because it exists under the sovereignty of the mind. Even 
when in a letter to Hyperaspistes he speaks of "the prison of 
the body" (Philosophical Letters 111) it is with the 
awareness that the body is subservient to the control of the 
mind. The mind is that which orders, which posits 
distinctions (including that between itself and the body) and 
that which doubts and discovers certainty therein. Because 
the mind doubts it proves the certainty of its existence. 
Certainty is reached because the mind cannot doubt that it 
doubts (54). This rephrasing is necessary to point out the 
tautological beauty and ab-surdity of the reasoning. In the 
same way that Beckett's body is born out of Descartes' 
185 
healthy being, Beckett begins at the point where Descartes 
reaches his end. Augustine has prepared the way, when after 
floundering through the unfathomable depths of creation he 
wearily exclaims: "I do not know even what I do not know" 
(Confessions 273). What is possibly the only example of 
humour in Augustine's oeuvre gives philosophic precedent to 
Beckett's gloss of Descartes. 'If I cannot doubt that I 
doubt' becomes, in the looking glass where earlier we caught 
sight of the disfigured body, 'I cannot be certain that I am 
certain'. 
The growth that appeared on the classical body has its 
mental continuation in doubt. Doubt is mental retardation 
that sets the mind back and impedes its progress towards 
divine perfection. If Descartes utters its name, he does so 
in order to dismiss it, to banish it from the realm of the 
thinkable. Certainty and doubt are mutually exclusive but co-
extensive. To understand fully the beauty of this logical 
conundrum consider the notorious example of Die Fliegenden 
Blatter (the diagram that appears as a rabbit or a duck). 
Likewise, to use an image closer to our concern, it is 
possible to see the skin - burning with its third degree 
interrogation - or the birthmark under the surface. And to 
see one excludes, if only for a moment, the other. There is 
little difference between Descartes' seeing certainty and 
Beckett seeing doubt. The structure that demarcates the 
reasoned and the reasonable is repeated. It is traced, so to 
speak, both backwards and forwards in an audacious attempt to 
emulate the existing schemata. 
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This urge to re-iterate (in a novel that is a perpetual 
venture at iteration) finds a striking resonance in Steven 
Connor's Samuel Beckett: Repetition, theory and text. Making 
extensive and provocative use of Derrida and Deleuze his 
focus is linguistic rather than philosophic but with the same 
result. For both Derrida and Deleuze repetition fails in its 
attempt to re-affirm the primacy of the original, be it word 
or concept. Failure is implied in repetition's very ability 
to achieve its aim: 
Repetition aspires to the condition of an invisible 
membrane that encloses its original, without 
impeding access to it in any way, or interfering 
with its nature. But even this close self-effacing 
servitude displaces the authority of the original. 
( 4 ) 
Even if, as Deleuze argues, this difference "is invisible 
except in the fact of its pure differentiality" (7) the 
consequence of this is absolute. 
Beckett has traced Descartes' theorising with all the 
love and dedication of Akaky Akakievich, the logophile in 
Gogol's "The Overcoat" (74-5) 2 . For Akaky the result of his 
1~~our is a movement out of the troublesome plane of 
understanding and meaning and into a surface occupied by the 
pure cavorting of signifiers. For Beckett the same end 
attracts him: "more and more my own language appears to me 
like a veil that must be torn apart in order to get at the 
things (or the Nothingness) behind it" (Disjecta 171 ). But 
for Beckett this can only be reached through repetition -
both as that which creates "differentiality" and, as in his 
treatment of Descartes, achieves inversion - and constant 
negation. Negation is, as Connor asserts, a version of 
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repetition in so far as it also "runs together effacement and 
proliferation" (35). Thus like the Beckettian body, the mind 
is a mirror image of Descartes'. It reflects the common sense 
orderings of the latter's ruminations, it adheres to the same 
logical process by which he arrives at certainty, the same 
mathematical character which he incorporated into his 
reasoning but, and this is essential, the former is unable to 
translate itself back into the original. The Beckettian mind 
finds itself a prisoner both of the body and of the mirror -
reflecting, across an intraversable space a rational being 
while being trapped in the plane of the irrational. This is 
the final culmination of Foucault's logic in madness for this 
apparition is indeed founded on "irrefutable logic, perfectly 
organized discourse, faultless connection in the transparency 
of a virtual language" (97). Madness is achieved and 
sustained by the fervour of the desire to emulate sanity. 
So Watt, the unknowing victim and unwitting desecrator, 
attempts in his small way to fulfill the rules of sanity and 
being "a university man" (21) tries to do so according to the 
extant methodology of making sense. On Watt's peregrination 
through the world he is accompanied by a host of useful 
syllogisms and minor sciences. Thus we find him surprised, on 
reaching Mr Knott's house "that his science of the locked 
door, so seldom at fault, had been so on this occasion" (35). 
The science of the locked door has, if Watt would only 
remember, been annulled earlier. When Mr Endon escapes his 
cell, leaving the sane Murphy inside, he enacts a sub-textual 
release of madness into the clinical exactitude of the world 
188 
and this contaminates not only the asylum but the grounds 
(where Sam and Watt walk and talk), Mr Knott's house and the 
very air that the subsequent creatures are forced to breathe. 
Like that smell of "peraldehyde and truant sphincters" 
(Murphy 96) in the MMM, the smell of madness is concentrated 
around these institutions. Watt's trouble with the Galls is 
nothing more than a symptom of an earlier conundrum at the 
entrance of Mr Knott's house. In the same way as the altering 
vision spreads from its nebulous epicentre backwards (into 
Murphy) and forwards (into The Trilogy and beyond) the 
faltering of the mind - in its attempt to fulfill the dream 
of a logical universe - is present from the outset. Once 
madness has begun its debilitating contamination, nothing and 
no-one escapes from breathing its air. For Watt the meeting 
with the Galls is only the most concrete statement of a 
science irrevocably flawed. The clues have been there all 
along: in Arsene's aside, at the entrance of Mr Knott's 
house, in the voices that babble/Babel in his ear, all the 
way back to his first appearance and its effect on those he 
leaves in the wake of his walk. This is due in part (as I 
have argued) to his indistinct morphology and partly because 
his presence does not add up to anything in the minds of 
Goff, Tetty and Mr Hackett. They flounder because their 
collective reasoning cannot accommodate Watt into the 
dialectic of 'Either ... or'; he refuses to be analysed into 
sides. To this extent, at least, the formulation of the 
madman in Anti-Oedipus is apt: 
Whereas the 'either/or' claims to mark decisive 
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choices between immutable terms (the alternative: 
either this or that), the schizophrenic 'either ... 
or ... or' refers to a system of possible 
permutations between differences that always amount 
to the same as they shift and slide about. (12) 
Their attempt to postulate a specific place - bench, park, 
football field - within a specific time, in short to 
stipulate a route for Watt, falters with each 'or' (18, 22). 
What is left in this plotting of Watt is the refrain of "or" 
that begins each sentence and draws phonetic and semantic 
emphasis to the hollowness of these assignations with 
exactitude. 
Or to consider another example. Mr Hackett reverts to 
simple arithmetic in an effort to balance the equation 
between the mind and the living that assails it: 
all that you can tell me is that he has a huge big red 
nose and no fixed address. He paused. He added, And 
that he is an experienced traveller. He paused. He 
added, And that he is considerably younger than 
you, a common condition I must say. He paused. He 
added, And that he is truthful, gentle and 
sometimes a little strange. (20) 
As Gestalt theory knows, nothing (or only nothing) adds up, 
and each repetition, each attempt to complete the circle, to 
add up the parts, fails. Knowledge is not bound for certainty 
but for something that we call certainty - a point when 
Nietzsche's spade is finally laid aside. Each repetition 
covers the same (never exactly the same) ground and if some 
kind of coherence is ever achieved it is by emphasising the 
'And's and 'Or's calling out into exhaustion (and perhaps the 
capital letter is the most we are finally able to do with a 
Reality that forbids to be named). Neither is Sam above 
addition and repetition in the face of Watt's encounter with 
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the Galls (72). But whereas Mr Hackett used arithmetic 
(admittedly with little success) to clear up Watt's 
appearance, Sam uses it to subtract clarity from Watt's 
narrative. Each "add" moves away from sense, moves into a 
realm where the encounter is frayed and buckled into a 
disjunctive synthesis held together by the inexplicable fact 
of it having happened. In a sublime Cartesian joke the end 
point, the mathematical conclusion, is doubtful but 
rigorously so: 
And some idea will perhaps be obtained of the 
difficulties experienced in formulating, not only 
such matters as those here in question, but the 
entire body of Watt's experience, from the moment 
of his entering Mr Knott's establishment to the 
moment of his leaving it. (72) 
However, this rigour is itself made arbitrary by the scope of 
its enquiry. Watt's problems with the outside and inside 
world are not only confined to his stay in Mr Knott's house. 
The imposing of a time span is an inappropriate 
quantification that sets about undermining the veracity of 
this humble conclusion. The conclusion, tentative as it is 
("some idea will perhaps be obtained"), is negated by the 
difficulty of formulation in the world outside Mr Knott's 
house. Logic and mathematics no longer provide points of 
arrival but of departure. Partly because of the nature of 
repetition and partly because of the dim desperation in 
Watt's application of the mechanisms of logic, Watt becomes 
"like that mad(?) mathematician who used a different 
principle of measurement at each step of his calculation" 
(Disjecta 173). Neither the principle of measurement nor the 
calculation is incorrect; they simply do not meet within the 
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same plane and this refusal to have intercourse inserts a 
doubt that separates procedure from solution. 
There is a rancid spreading of uncertainty that eclipses 
Watt's world with the same alacrity that enabled Descartes to 
recreate his world once his cogito was found amidst the 
potential chaos of a world open to scepticism. Beckett's 
repetition of Descartes generates an unexpurgated version of 
Meditations and one that in its search for an end to doubt 
cannot finish until all permutations, whether reasonable or 
implausible, have been explored. Again here is the presence 
of exhaustion together with the repudiation of the spade laid 
down, once and for all. But (that favourite Beckettian word) 
apart from Murphy who was dismissed by his creator and 
managed to reach the once and for all, the end cannot be 
reached. 
Irreverence and the defiance it heralds do not appear as 
morbid deities for nihilists but grow out of a last ditch 
attempt to discover a mental foundation that cannot be eroded 
away by doubt. The Cartesian meditation is played out once 
more but in this repetition, a state of non-scepticism is 
phrased in a minor and barely audible key. At the heart of 
doubt lies a doubting of doubt that will never equal 
Cartesian certainty but that, as Blanchet points out, makes 
it impossible to pursue doubt into itself (how different 
would be the history of thought if Descartes had realised 
that one can never be certain of certainty). rt is the 
impossibility of reaching this inner temple and taking up 
residence within its secrets that turns Beckett's creatures 
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away from completion, with face averted. Irreverence and 
exhaustion are not the cries of a rebel, are not 
revolutionary calls to desecration but are the consequences 
of the fleeting glimpse visited upon Murphy, Celia, Arsene 
and Watt. They are the signs of cowardice and courage - a 
turning away from the vision with the realisation that it is 
everywhere. Such is the obsession of Beckett's characters, 
such is the view seen by the mad painter at his window. 
The exhaustion that urges Watt and company to stop is 
balanced by the impossibility of this course of action. The 
outcome is that things continue to follow the now thoroughly 
discredited vestiges of sanity in an increasingly maddening 
fashion. Addition, subtraction, alternatives and permutations 
continue throughout the novel and with each new application 
elicit a growing sense of vertigo - a dizziness as that which 
is already minimally effective becomes less so. So watt on Mr 
Knott's rearrangement of clothes and furniture, on Erskine 
and the bell, Arthur on the topic of Bando, Mr Louit and the 
committee are all instances that mimic the scientific Jaws 
upon which reasoning is based in such a way as to debunk 
their efficacy while applying these rules with a straight 
face. Each new application, brings new failure and signifies 
a retreat from the sanity guaranteed by these rules. 
So the reading mind casts about for other points, places 
that have escaped Watt's punctilious eye. But neither space 
nor time has been left untroubled. The space that surrounded 
the body is either a reservoir for decay or is filled with 
the trace elements of bodies no longer there; Watt is 
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followed in time by a self that never arrives. If the 
physical Watt experiences difficulty the same can be said of 
the mental version. 
When Watt manages to enter Erskine's room and discovers 
the painting with the broken circle and the point he, in 
essence, unearths a representation of the system under which 
he lives. Deep within the labyrinth of Mr Knott's house he 
finds access to a secret known only to the first floor 
initiate. He discovers a circle with a centre that has 
escaped, a centre that has broken free of the tyranny of the 
line that encloses and defines it. This point's flight from 
the circle - and according to geometry the point has no 
dimension - must destroy the circle which is defined as a 
succession of points equidistant from a central point. The 
artifice contains a 'central' flaw and is rendered 
'pointless' yet it remains because it is an approximation of 
a mental construct, a physical point depicting a mental 
hypothesis. While this realisation is seminal (if this word 
has any meaning) to Beckett's rel?tion to language, it also 
repeats the entire Cartesian mistake - the unreason at the 
centre of reason. Once started, this instability continues 
into a collapse of the mind's ability to perceive space. The 
permutations of the circle's relation to its centre (126-7) 
and to other centres and circles is complicated again by the 
crude means of expression whereby many dimensions (both in 
space and time) are conflated in any act of representation 
upon a two dimensional surface. Thus the painting represents 
a circle and a centre separated from each other "in boundless 
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space, in endless time (Watt knew nothing about physics)" 
(127) and yet all the while, searching - "search" is repeated 
9 times - for each other. Only a mind as obsessed as Watt's 
could perpetuate such a crime upon this simple 
representation, this geometrical hiccup. The revelation 
experienced by Watt and friends is exactly of this depth: 
nothing has changed, the painting in all its innocence 
remains a simple depiction on a geometrical theme. But to 
consider even the most facile of objects and incidents can 
drag the perceiver into psychotic depths - hence Cowper's 
paranoia when he overhears a conversation, Smart's injunction 
to pray unceasingly, Watt's Galls, Watt's painting. 
Furthermore, to see beyond the surface into a depth, however 
inappropriate, is to see a proliferation of 'meanings' alien 
to the surface. But for Watt the loss of confidence in a 
theory, a theory for which no sane alternatives exist, each 
application is a matter of desire, a desperate searching for 
an exception th~: will once more prove the rule. 
The unreason at the heart of Cartesian certainty 
discredits the theory but never threatens to destroy it. The 
case for a continuous and familiar world, as proposed by 
Descartes and for that matter, Bacon and Newton, has 
overwhelming support. Watt finds in the painting a 
representation of the system and of himself. He is also the 
centre that has escaped the circle, a centre, as I have 
suggested, that exists in the dimension of madness and that 
is irrevocably separated from the plane of the 'feasible'. 
But, as his predecessor Arsene notes, all that remains for 
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the madman is the possibility of searching for that which can 
never be reached: 
The glutton cast away, the drunkard in the desert, 
the lecher in prison, they are the happy ones. To 
hunger, thirst, lust every day afresh and every day 
in vain, after the old p~og, the old booze, the old 
whores, that's the nearest we'll ever get to 
felicity, the new porch and the very latest garden. 
( 43) 
The garden of Eden, no doubt. 
Where does this leave the Cartesian mind as re-thought 
by Beckett? Essentially in a position identical to the meagre 
remains of Beckett's bodies - routed by the decay inscribed 
into the architecture of health. The citadel of the mind 
stands above those lesser Aquinian animals (to which the body 
belongs) and yet for watt it increasingly becomes a ruin 
barely hidden beneath the pristine surface of its columns. 
Attention is drawn to the emptiness under each arch until the 
building is nothing more than a silence in space. The mind, 
like the body, reflects its Cartesian counterpart but in the 
repetition (that is its reflection) slips away from the 
original unable to return, incapable of translating itself 
back into a given, assumed and sane cast. The Beckettian mind 
has been driven away by the force of the vision and it stands 
on the periphery of the Cartesian form, shadowing, but 
irrevocably remote from the certain, healthy construct that 
Descartes called the self. Beckett has added a dimension (one 
of decay and doubt) to Descartes' that undermines the latter 
and yet almost escapes detection from humanity's 'two 
dimensional' perspective: the dimensions that constitute the 
dialectic of foreground and background, sel and other, 
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sanity and madness, being and non-being. The merger between 
self and other so attractive to Murphy is achieved in Watt 
simply by reiterating the terms of distinction (body and 
mind, self and other) and making of the self a place where 
the self cannot be. 
Watt's body, for example, is the other of Descartes' 
body. In the same way Watt's mind is not a thing that 
organises and promotes a coherent identity but a thing 
disorganised. The doubting mind without the succour of 
certainty is .iothing more than a plaything of numerous 
plausible (and hence implausible) alternatives - a perpetual 
fragmentation that occurs in tandem with an urge towards 
unified coherence. And if Watt is besieged by a plenitude of 
alternatives he is also harassed by other voices: 
But Watt heard nothing of this, because of other 
voices, singing, crying, stating, murmuring, things 
unintelligible, in his ear. With these, if he was 
not familiar, he was not unfamiliar either. So he 
was not alarmed, unduly. (27) 
For watt (as for Molloy, Marone, Malone, Worm ... ) the self is 
the sum total of the other. 
When I spoke, earlier, of Bruegel's kinship with Beckett 
as a conflation of perspective it was simply this. For both 
the canvas depicts a scene where every gesture of certainty 
and meaning is placed within a context that disrupts and 
negates that meaning. The fall of Icarus, and the sense of 
tragedy it evokes, is destroyed by the farmer's toiling. The 
act of ploughing, as an act of preparation for cultivation, 
is also a preparation for death - the furrows become the 
earthly grave that Icarus never attains. A two-fold movement 
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is enacted. One is the expression of meaning negated and the 
other, deriving from the first, is a meaning, a connectedness 
that surfaces on another level. Beckett's representation of 
Cartesian body and mind is a repetition that finds itself 
unable to repeat the model of assured identity. Descartes' 
certainty, like the 'fact' of Icarus' fall is negated by 
Beckett's attempt to phrase that certainty. And yet meaning, 
admittedly of a different order, is secreted from the folds 
of that negation. 
IV The Logistics of the Word 
Perhaps it is presumptuous to speak of meaning in a 
context so absolutely enfeebled by the emptying out of 
meaning - be it logical, scientific, mathematical or even the 
proclamation of identity. 'I', and all that this enormous 
word suggests, is perhaps the funniest joke known to those 
sedentary forms of life crawling, ambling, dying and thinking 
along Beckett's lanes and ditches. If the notion of a 
continuous and contained self is discredited according to the 
means by which things are made to mean, then language is 
surely the last bastion of sense? 
But by now the fortifications that demarcate certainty 
(body and mind) have systematically been entangled by the 
contaminating vision and thus, language must be considered 
with the same wariness. A certain rhythm can be detected 
below the surface, a dance that like Zarathustra's gains 
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momentum from the confrontation with "the birthmark 
deathmark". The crippling of Descartes' body is subsumed, and 
to an extent cured, by the control of the mind over the dis-
ease of that body. But what can heal the mind after it meets 
with Watt's aphasia, this short-circuiting conveniently 
called thought? Language, surely? 
In order to dismiss any doubt that there exists an 
intimate liaison between the mathematical and the linguistic 
cipher, Mr MacStern (a member of the incapacitated but 
objective committee) suffers a slip of the tongue, more 
metaphysical than Freudian. In an attempt to make sense of a 
conversation which has long since slipped into the 
nonsensical he asks that Mr Nackybal's answers be written as 
words rather than as figures. His reasoning is as follows: 
Why then he would simply write down the words that 
he hears, instead of their ciphered equivalents, 
which requires long practice, especially in the 
case of numbers of five and six letters, I beg your 
pardon, I mean figures. (186) 
Although this apology follows fast on the heels of his slip, 
the damage is done. His is a mistake that is made all the 
more grievous by its insignificance. The proposition 
forwarded by Beckett is simply that there is no essential 
difference between these modes of signification. 
Again Beckett is following Descartes' scheme whereby the 
incorporation of mathematical principles into language was an 
attempt to impose upon language a new rigour. This is not to 
say that Descartes held a naive view of language, as his 
letter to Mersenne (20 November 1629) makes clear. For 
Descartes the notion of a new and universal language based on 
199 
the mathematical equivalence of terms - love= aimer, 
amare, philein ... - "is too much to suggest outside 
fairyland" (Philosophical Letters 6). But for all the 
problems he has with Hardy's plan, his method is attempting 
something very similar. As far as Beckett is concerned this 
opens language to the same kind of internal incoherence as 
that which appeared in the seemingly clear surface of 
Descartes' scientific reasoning. This, more so than maths and 
science, is an accepted observation and one guaranteed ever 
since Platonic Idealism posited its distinction between 
forms. In fact, Watt's encounter with the unnamable pot and 
his frustrated search for potness is surely one of the finest 
fictional accounts of what took place in Saussure's Course in 
General Linguistics. Like Watt's inability to reach a 
convincing solution using the paraphernalia of science and 
logic, language also retires from its obligation to settle, 
once and for all, on that which it names. 
Even worse is that it comes so close, its arbitrariness 
is so exact, that it escapes the notice of those who happily 
and unhappily go about their business. For watt, language is 
another example of the fall off the ladder: 
For the pot remained a pot, Watt felt sure of that, 
for everyone but Watt. For Watt alone it was not a 
pot, any more. (79) 
But he is not the first to have realised this. With Adam's 
fall - from life in fairyland - he also lost absolute 
proximity to that which he named. In order for Adam to call 
out the name of an animal involved a pre-lapsarian 
remembrance, a re-calling of a time when he, content in the 
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twilight, strolled with his creator. A 'cow' after the Fall 
is not the same as the pre-lapsarian cow, the quintessence of 
the former (the archetypal signified) has been milked off, 
leaving a drained facsimile. The difference between the cows 
is for most of us negligible, but for Beckett's characters it 
cannot be forgotten or resolved: "it was just this 
hairbreadth departure from the nature of a true pot that so 
excruciated Watt" (78). 
Thus we arrive at the final fulfillment and refutation 
of Descartes by Beckett. There are moments, as Kenner points 
out, when the narrative "despite Descartes' proclaimed 
certainty, has Molloy's tone" (119). Indeed, there is a sense 
in which Beckett's opus can be seen as an attempt to re-write 
Descartes' Discourse on Method and The Meditations, this 
essay which Descartes self-effacingly calls "an historical 
account, or, if you prefer, a fable" (29). This fable, by the 
arrogance of its brevity and the certainty of its solution is 
an alluring prospect for any writer. But in Beckett's 
repetition something (called respectively the body, mind and 
language) goes terribly awry. 
Like the clown who tries to emulate the audience's walk, 
smile (see Watt's 23) and its rational gestures, each new 
attempt is more catastrophic than the last. The Cartesian 
formula whereby thought translates itself into language to 
arrive at certainty is recast in the Beckettian recipe as a 
language unable to translate itself into lucid thought and 
producing a double confusion: confused thought confused, in 
turn, by language. Central to this confusion is the presence 
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of language which confounds and betrays the smooth passage of 
thought towards certainty. Language manages to ambush thought 
and threatens, always, to throw it and certainty into 
confusion. It is an awareness of this - but mediated by a 
genuine affection for Cartesian mathesis - that prompts Lacan 
to situate the Cartesian I think as something separate from I 
am (See The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis 35-
7, 222-26). For Beckett, language constantly refuses the 
surrender of the period and continues, closing this famous 
dictum in its own arms so to speak - I think therefore I am I 
think ... The result is what cybernetics calls an infinite 
loop, a kind of ping-pong game between assertion and denial 
and one which elicits a dizziness (on the part of the reader) 
powerful enough to eventually destroy the machine. 
Whether the break is between signifier and signified or 
between language and thought it persists, diminutive but 
beyond the resources of translation. Returning to our clown, 
each attempt to traverse that 'hidden' distance not only 
makes it increasingly explicit but increases the distance, 
albeit within a non-spatial realm. The realm crossed over 
with every sane gesture entails a leap of faith that is 
beyond Watt's physical and mental mobility. It comes to 
designate the moment where meaning falls away, where it 
reaches its limit. On the one side there is a reality as 
remote as death and on the other side hollow signification, 
like ~e echo of footsteps in a mausoleum. In the middle 
( '\') is Watt, alone, with the rest of his post-Murphy 
family, and this middle spreads until it is no longer merely 
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an object of obsession, a symptom of something else. The 
obsession engulfs the perceiving Watt and sucks him into a 
vortex from where he indistinctly mumbles sermons that refuse 
to be translated back into the rational or forward into 
death's wise silence. 
His living denies him silence and yet, like Adam, his 
every word is infused with an impossible desire to return to 
the language of Eden where things would "consent to be named, 
with the time-honoured names" (81). For Watt, language is not 
only to be regretted once spoken - as Arsene says, 
"Personally of course I regret everything" (44) - but is, in 
itself, language as regret. 
Regret is retroactive desire. It issues forth a language 
that seeks, as the centre seeks the circle, Descartes' wordy 
confidence. While this confidence is lost on Watt he has a 
translator of sorts in Sam. Sam is the one who can restore 
Watt's failing body, his frail mind and his flailing 
language. In so far as Watt is The Meditations' other - the 
broken text full of ruined protagonists and debilitated words 
- Sam is Watt's other: a Cartesian representative who will 
renovate the body of Watt and the text. They stand across 
from each other, reflecting each other: "I felt as though I 
were standing before a great mirror, in which my garden was 
reflected, and my fence, and I" (157). In fact with Sam's 
first full blown appearance he sets about physically 
restoring the ailing Watt much like Mary Magdalene repairing 
Christ on the road to Calvary: 
with a cloth I had in my pocket [I] wiped his face, 
and his hands, and then taking a little box of 
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ointment I had in my pocket I anointed his face, 
and his hands, and then taking a little hand comb 
from my pocket I straightened his tufts, and his 
whiskers, and then taking a little clothes brush 
from my pocket I brushed his coat, and his 
trousers. ( 161) 
This achieved, he encloses Watt in his arms and the two set 
about walking and talking: at last a unified, coherent 
entity. That this novel exists at all is (seemingly) thanks 
to Sam who transfers Watt's manic inversions back, through the 
looking glass, into sense. It appears as if Beckett, after 
detecting the rot that has set in, retreats behind the 
closure that Sam's narrative provides. 
If this is granted the rest follows. The 'fault' lies 
with Watt. He is simply mad and Sam, in an act of Christian 
charity, is engaged in a faithful transcription of that 
madness. Thus Watt is a case study no different from 
Nijinsky's diary or Schreber's journals. The narrator Sam 
translates it into an accessible, fictional portrayal of 
oddity for the edification of others who like him are 
"desirous above all of information" (163). However, if it is 
infor~ation that sanity desires there are small lacunas that 
first need to be filled in. 
In the process of cleaning Watt, Sam embarks upon a mode 
of expression that is as laborious and iterative as Watt's 
bovine attempts to make sense. It is evident, from this, that 
Sam has huge pockets (the bottomless pockets of the clown?), 
that his actions are carried out with the meticulous care of 
a mime and that his language is not as impartial as it 
pretends to be. It is as if he has to take a run-up, to go 
back to that infernal pocket before he can get to the end. 
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But by now the faintest smell of repetition should create 
suspicion. Sam is having the same difficulty as Watt in 
getting to the point, in finishing. Even the repetition of 
"Then" (six in all) which should move the story on, slips 
into "And then" alternating with "And so" and making of the 
narrative a clumsy, jangling thing. We are watching a 
recital, in language, of Watt walking. Nor is there any way 
to ascertain how much is Watt's story and how much is a 
fictional account offered by Sam. There are parts of the text 
- the opening and closing sections of the book in which Watt 
is not present - that are obviously beyond the scope of 
Watt's telling. Compounded with this are the difficulties 
experienced by Sam in the act of translation where, as he 
frequently admits 
I missed I suppose much I suspect of great interest 
touching I presume the first or initial stage of 
the second or closing period of Watt's stay in Mr 
Knott's house. (163) 
Such is the voice of our Cartesian candidate. Finally there 
is (by now) the small problem of Sam's own mental 
credentials. His friendship with Watt is confined to the 
pavilion (obviously within an asylum) which they once shared 
(149). Sam is but another of Beckett's madmen. 
The discrediting of Sam as a reliable narrator succeeds, 
once more, in unwinding the stable centre - the given in the 
geometry of being - with the result that the reader is caught 
in something akin to Poe's maelstrom. Holes are forever 
opening up in what appears to be a solid surface and these 
whirlpools drag the protagonists and reader alike, down, 
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revolution by deliberate revolution. Connor also remarks on 
the 'impossibility' of reading Watt: 
as she struggles down the page, she is likely to 
lose her place, lose the sense, and to become, like 
the disembodied voice of The Unnamable, adrift in 
the words that speak remorselessly through her. 
( 32) 
Here, on the rapidly descending boat (the mechanisms by which 
sanity builds for itself a sea-worthy edifice) a logos 
begins, quietly, to make itself heard. At the point where all 
is imminent chaos a small, barely audible voice asserts 
itself. It is the voice that must doubt doubt, the body in 
pieces, the body still not still and the language creacing in 
the face of effacement. 
watt and Sam have indeed tossed themselves off from the 
myopic security offered by the plunging ship and pursue, in 
plural, the narrator of "A Descent into the Maelstrom": 
[I] fastened myself to the cask by means of the 
lashings which secured it to the counter, and 
precipitated myself with it to the sea, without 
another moment's hesitation. (217) 
If this maelstrom can be compared to the organised chaos of 
Mr Knott and his re3idence the chaos and the cask can be 
found within the resonances of his name. As virtually every 
critic of wa~t has pointed out, Mr Knott is a double play on 
'knott' and 'not' and, as such, his house and his person are 
loci of complexity (as in a problem being knotty) and of 
negation. Furthermore, and this has an important connection 
to Beckett's preoccupation with symmetry, a knot is a way of 
holding things together, an example of human reasoning at its 
most ingenious. 
A sub-text begins to open up in the analysis. For the 
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body the cask (that which permits endurance) was found in 
folly. Descartes' crumbling body, although operating 
according to a defunct modus operandi still creates, creates 
a poetry not of movement but a poetry as movement - a 
struggle for a symmetry not within health but within decay. 
As for the mind there is the ludicrous attempt to repeat 
the gesticulations of sanity only to create its inverse. 
However, in the process, the mind assumes, if not the 
content, then the shape of rational thought. The more it 
parades the vestiges of rational thought from its distant 
purview the funnier it becomes. The point is reached when, 
according to the dialectic of inversion, the brief appearance 
of sense in this normalised unreason is as shocking as its 
opposite once was. Mr MacStern is another of those 
Beckettian characters (see Mercier and Camier) who find 
inordinate difficulty in sustaining the demands of the 
narrative in which they are trapped. His responses to the 
conversation repeatedly slip beyond the text and call out to 
the reader in an attempt at commiseration. Piecing together 
this fragmentary discourse, this laughable but lucid 
commentary, produces something like the following: 
Ego Autem (181) 
Bless me, what was that (183) 
How long will this go on? (184) 
It means nothing (186) 
I know nothing of that (186) 
Impossible (187) 
There is something fishy here (187). 
For Watt (as translated by Sam, as translated by the 
narrator ... ) language repeats the meagre solutions of his 
earlier physical and mental encounter with life (so called). 
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The mere perpetuation of words, a perpetuation which has 
become increasingly strained for Beckett (in his novels, 
plays and radio productions), is nevertheless a declaration 
of independence from, and a flirtation with, the final silence. 
If only as a material entity it fills the blank pages of his 
texts, it covers the desolation of a silent stage and 
disrupts the stillness of a tuned radio. And indeed it 
suffers from exhaustion: 
From where she lies she sees Venus rise. On. From 
where she lies when the skies are clear she sees 
Venus rise followed by the sun. On. (Ill Seen Ill 
Said 7) 
Each "On" drags the story out of the silence forever closing 
in, a metronome keeping beat with the silence but composing a 
rhythm ex nihilo. As Beckett says in a letter to Alan 
Schneider: "My work is a matter of fundamental sounds (no 
joke intended) made as fully as possible, and I accept 
responsibility for nothing else" (Disjecta 109). To make a 
sound as fully as possible is achieved by means of a language 
that repeats meaning (as signifier connected to signified) 
and in so doing shaves off sense in its pursuit of sense. In 
the above example the rhyme and repetition of "lies ... 
rise ... lies ... skies ... rise" - this break of Saussure's 
syntagmatic chain by the paradigmatic - both weakens the 
difference between these words and creates a rhythm. A place 
where, beneath the surface, words can dance. Here, by his own 
admission, is the true measure of Beckett's indebtedness to 
Joyce. 
Transition, edited by Maria and Eugene Jolas, was the 
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review in which Beckett's vision was first expressed. The 
review was heavily influenced by Joyce's Work in Progress and 
the possibilities that it offered. Partly it was a mouthpiece 
for Joyce and a creation of an audience for the language of 
Finnegan's Wake. As part of this preparation a series of 
essays were commissioned by Joyce on various aspects of the 
forthcoming tome. Beckett's contribution - "Dante ... Bruno. 
Vico .. Joyce'' - for all its usual irreverent commentary 
finally turns its attention to Joyce's language. Language -
and thus the future 0f literature - was alive and well, or 
more precisely, drunk and disorderly: 
Here form is content, content is form. You complain 
that this stuff is not written in English. It is 
not written at all. It is not to be read - or 
rather it is not only to be read. It is to be 
looked at and listened to. His writing is not about 
something; it is that something icself . ... When the 
sense is dancing, the words dance .... The language 
is drunk. The very words are tilted and 
effervescent. (27) 
This response to language presages a moment where Beckett 
meets with and departs from Joyce. For Beckett the problem 
with inebriating language is that inevitably it must waken to 
a sombre and hungover dawn. To keep language tilted requires 
a more drastic remedy, one which is already implicit in the 
terms of his argument. The debate is no longer solely 
concerned with the inherent difficulties of representation 
but, according to Beckett, Joyce manages to represent the 
process of representation. While this may be feasible in 
Joyce's case - with Finnegan's Wake generating an unceasing 
slew of neologisms - how is it possible for one who by his 
own admission has nothing to express? Where there is nothing 
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to express, using Beckett's phraseology, and where there is 
the obligation to express, the only and seemingly impossible 
alternative is.to express expression: to write not in order 
to express 'X' but in order to create a discourse that in 
finding its own rhythm can dance itself, again, into meaning. 
The closest he came to this in Murphy was, of course, in Mr 
Endon's company: 
'the last at last seen of him 
himself unseen by him 
and of himself' (140) 
This language of perpetual motion appears at the nadir of 
Murphy and consists of four terms - last, (un)seen, him, 
himself - that threaten to perpetuate themselves into 
extinction, but at the same time constitute a small bastion 
of words, swaying to their beat and holding off the 
inevitability of "a rest" (140). Joyce's intoxication still 
repeats (albeit it with a slur and a hiccup) the old 
relations with the external world. What Beckett achieves is 
the step beyond, the taking of language beyond the new into 
the oldest of places where the silence is met and broken. His 
logos then drives words into the silence of madness, into its 
emptiness, but also out of madness where language weaves its 
silent dance, like Zarathustra, upon the abyss. This then is 
language as regret, a recalling of a time, before the fall, 
when the creative energy of dabhar still sounded across the 
world. But even regret, for Beckett, is not entirely 
negative. It allows Watt and Sam to make inroads into the 
silence, to generate in language a cadence that lingers long 
after the 'last' ('ha', as Arsene would say) word has been 
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sounded. Irrespective of the subject matter, this regret 
choreographs a dance of lyrical beauty that glides far into 
the unsayable silence: 
To pause, towards the close of one's three-hour 
day, and consider: the darkening ease, the 
brightening trouble; the pleasure pleasure because 
it was, the pain pain because it shall be; the glad 
acts grown proud, the proud acts growing stubborn; 
the panting the trembling towards a being gone, a 
being to come; and the true true no longer, and the 
false true not yet. And to decide not to smile 
after all, sitting in the shade, hearing the 
cicadas, wishing it were night, wishing it were 
morning... ( 201) 
The smile, coming as it does before the "after all", 
constitutes the second aspect of Beckett's logos: it allows 
for a foolish irreverence. While language no longer has the 
rights to the quiddity of che world (pots, cows and love) it 
cannot help but beget a meaningful resonance. This paradox 
creates a space for Watt and Sam's humour, a series of jokes 
both in language and on language. 
The endless combanitorics which contribute to so much of 
the bulk of the novel do, as Connor notes, confuse and 
exasperate the reader. But perhaps more importantly they 
enact a virtuoso performance of logic gone mad, they posit 
the thought that this infinite loop may never stop, they 
produce delight when they do, if only for a moment. During 
these interludes of 'Problem - Solution - Objection' once the 
required terms are established, this lumbering mechanism of 
language can take over, allowing the writer a respite from 
the task at hand and leaving the reader battling down a page, 
growing emptier and emptier. 
Emptiness provoked by combination is also provoked by 
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repetition. The consideration of Watt as a man's man and as a 
woman's man (137-8) sets up a frenzy of repetition that 
hollows out the meaning from these already brittle 
denotations. And yet, again, at the point at which they reach 
minimal presence (empty signification) they continue wryly to 
stand - their material existence a joke, their joke their 
existence. Even when words do vanish they proclaim their 
presence by their absence. Upon the first page, in the first 
paragraph, this conundrum asserts itself: "He knew they were 
not his, but he thought of them as his. He knew[] were not 
his, because they pleased him" (5). Repetition here simply 
ensures that the gap is noticed, the joke taken. 
Absence, in this way, contributes to much of the novel. 
From the"?" (27, 30) which responds to the demands of 
becoming specific, to the Swiftian "(Hiatus in MS)" (238) and 
finally to the Addenda with its brilliant "change all the 
names" (254) the novel both allows an infinity to be inserted 
and repeats that expansion where Watt is no longer Watt but 
another with whom we must become acquainted. This presumes an 
endless novel, endlessly repeated and always different. 
Humour allows Watt and Sam to gain an equilibrium as 
they revolve around the walls of the vortex. But this laugh 
is not unequivocally redemptive, it is always tempered by the 
mangled catastrophe below and the inaccessible but blue skies 
above. It is a laugh touched with lunacy, a laugh that arises 
out of the vision where annihilation and futility are written 
upon every surface. It is Zarathustra's laugh, and Arsene's: 
But the mirthless laugh is the dianoetic laugh, 
down the snout - haw! - so. It is the laugh of 
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laughs, the risus purus, the laugh laughing at the 
laugh, the beholding, the saluting of the highest 
joke, in a word the laugh the laugh that laughs -
silence please - at that which is unhappy. (47) 
This laughter breaks out at the moment when it is silenced 
and signifies another link in this carefully fashioned chain 
of inversion: the momentous in the mundane, depth in the 
surface, madness in sanity, silence in the word, laughter in 
the unhappy. And at the end of our discussion the magnitude 
of simply saying 'And Vice Versa'. 
The effect of this is perhaps the funniest of all 
Beckett's jokes. A subtle shift takes place within the 
reading of the text. The protagonists only serve as the butt 
of a small joke, they suffer from the atrocities (at the 
level of plot) inflicted on them by God/god/fate ''who loves 
us dearly with some exceptions for reasons unknown" (Waiting 
For Godot 43). The real direction of the humour is at the 
reader who suffers in parallel, but who is also forced in the 
act of reading to suffer the further indignity of having to 
repair, to fill in with 'meaning' the continual rupture of 
silence and absence that ascends to the surface of the text. 
The process of reading which, as Lennard Davis observes (3), 
is already a rather bizarre activity is made doubly so in a 
novel where the reader is forced to enact the same lunatic 
reasoning in order to make sense. 
One can only read Watt up to a point - a point where 
reason reaches its limit - or until one is moved by that 
point onto another plane. The plane of the foreign, of the 
familiar. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Ends Of Madness. 
Madmen won't stand for imitation. To them 
the outside world is not a mirror or a soundbox. 
They believe themselves alone in the world, as 
though they were holding that world in the hollow 
of their hand and they are right. They live 
vertically. To drown, one drop of water is enough. 
(Wiesel 20) 
The shadowy form of Babel remains undisturbed, it 
continues to stand between, and over, the tales of life, 
birth and death as if haunting the passing of generations. 
Babel, as Bruegel understood, cannot be fully realised, its 
outlines are vague, its content transparent and its shape 
incomplete. And, representing madness, it bestows upon it the 
same credentials, the same sense of the nebulous. Madness 
whispers. 
Foucault, by the fact that he sets out to write a 
history of madness, describes these whisperings into sounds 
that history can hear, that is, into a silence that follows 
from the classical exclusion of madness. The madman was 
silenced, but this silence is of a different order, a 
different kind from the modulations I have sought to trace. 
Like Bruegel's paintings, madness is both exhibited (in 
Vienna and Rotterdam) and lost (the ivory miniature), present 
and absent. The consequence of this ambiguity is that madness 
has become marginalised both in Foucault's negative sense and 
in so far as it appears at the margins. Its presence has not 
been entirely expunged or reduced to impotence. Madness 
registers itself as a threshold discourse, both on the 
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threshold of becoming fully audible and fading into an 
irretrievable silence. Again as Bruegel points out, madness -
its ethereal outline - needs to be filled out, fleshed out. 
His sensitivity to the subject refuses to conceive a 
definitive version and thus presents the madness of Babel as 
having different forms both to the sane and to the mad. But 
with the confinement initiated by classicalism, madness lost 
this multivalency for it was now linked to the idea of cure 
and, once connected, it became a spatio-temporal possession, 
firmly rooted in history. The madman rigorously subjected to 
the dialectic of cure had to comply with the demands of time 
and space, but even more, madness was cured only when it 
repeated the language of reason. However, cure and the 
mutiplicity of (contradictory) meanings that it signifies, 
remains for each a translation, each a theory, a univocal 
fleshing of Babel's outline. And cure - whether 
psychoanalytic, Laingian or even Janovian - necessarily 
excludes that which is anathema to its premises, a cure works 
by exclusion. 
I have attempted to work in reverse - to include, as far 
as I am able, madness. For this reason I have begun in reason 
and from here sought out a moment of disorientation, a place 
where the earth begins to shift, where time, space and 
language no longer provide the old continuities. Within this 
break a verticality is created, a logos rising out of 
language, feeding off it, but given its final transmuted 
shape by the reason of its madness. 
In these terms Nietzsche was perhaps the great 
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philosopher of inclusion, of thinking all things at once. In 
zarathustra he pursued madness through contradiction, through 
paradox and through a language that could, simultaneously and 
endlessly, assert and deny its ability to represent. 
Zarathustra was a surface philosopher, one who dwelt on the 
precarious surface (of the mirror, of the '\') between the 
vanity of reason and the disfigured madman on the other side. 
Zarathustra made of himself a bridge from Rotterdam to 
Vienna. He attempted to traverse the distance between madness 
as devoid of reason to madness as folly, as intrinsic to the 
human condition. If Zarathustra sought madness it was 
Nietzsche who found it. Such was the impact of the discovery 
that Nietzsche retired from words, from the surface of words· 
into a place full of lost memorabilia and where, no doubt, 
Clovio's tower also lay, discarded. 
The vertical logos that elevated Cowper placed him high 
on Babel, a stark figure terrified by the size of the 
building upon which he stood. Believing himself to be cut off 
from the heavens (where God lay) he could only stare down and 
recognise the aweful distance from the ground, the familiar 
that he celebrated in The Task. The tower was his blasphemy, 
his sin against the Holy Spirit and it clung to him as much 
as he clung to it. But in crossing over the divide he 
manages, almost against his will, to produce poems that 
contort language, impossible poems that falter on the brink 
of signification and yet never quite fall (into moral 
platitude or non-sense). Cowper's madness creates a poetry by 
which he not only projects himself beyond the acceptable 
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strains of Augustan verse but beyond language itself. Between 
the opposites that he cannot reconcile, a tension exists, a 
tension that signals a language trying to say what it cannot 
say. By locating himself within the pull of paradox he 
approaches, that which Beckett so desires, "the literature of the 
Unword" (Disjecta 143). 
But Cowper remains as a physical entity and as a mental 
disturbance upon the desolate walls of the Rotterdam Babel. 
Smart's logos achieves the opposite. In his folly he joins 
with the bustling multitude upon Vienna, not in the regal 
figure of Nimrod - although Nimrod finds mention (A 9) and is 
incorporated into the body of the poem, the body of the poet 
- but in the activity of creation. Jubilate Agna is a play 
upon the ambivalence of this version of Babel. It too is 
incomplete, it emanates from the very earth and most 
importantly the poem and the painting involve a vitality that 
repudiates those who would see only condemnation in this 
Babel. In the process of building this unifying tower, this 
tower that involves the whole of creation, Smart disappears 
into the fabric of the edifice. He reaches un-existence at 
the same 'time' that he rediscovers the cadences of a pre-Babel 
logos. In joining the natural to the human by means of the divine 
he unearths a dabhar, a language that seeks the centre of 
translation. For all the madness of these fragments, Smart 
strives for a language that will act like his fountain - '~scend 
in a stream two thirds of the way and afterwards prank itself 
into ten thousand agreeable forms" (B 210). 
The sense that language is a prank played out on a 
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defenceless humanity is both the blessing and the curse 
visited upon Beckett's work. As a logothete, language is not, 
as Cowper hoped it would be, a place to hide from madness, it 
is the place where madness invidiously asserts itself. 
Beckett is not obsessed with madness, he merely sets out to 
describe a world and yet, after the climax of Murphy, finds 
his attempts to describe unhinged. In part Beckett's problem 
can be attributed to his desire to locate Clovio's tower of 
silence while constantly meeting with the ungainly 
convergence of Rotterdam and Vienna. In the foreignness of 
the former there is the familiar shape of the latter. The 
logos to which Watt and company are subject is the 
simultaneous appearance of opposites, of Rotterdam and 
Vienna, of tragedy and comedy and of self and other. And the 
language this gives birth to, is one that asserts and denies 
itself, is one that is trying to die. In Beckett language is no 
longer a surface along which the subject moves towards a 
completed communication, rather it is a unstable surface that 
carries within it the threat of rupture: any word, any pause can 
cause language to ascend into the verticality of its delusion. 
Through time and space, from the madman to the mad 
prophet and to the world demented, each logos attests to its 
singularity - an individual reasoning fashioning a 
distinctively charged language. From sanity to madness, from 
us to those we describe as On Babel is, at once, a huge and 
an insignificant step. Insignificant because madness drags 
with it reason and language, and can only find expression within 
the very mechanisms by which sanity organises itself. Huge 
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because madness, in appropriating these mechanisms, defiles 
and contaminates these sacred orientations. To return to 
Foucault, it was for this reason that madness was excluded 
(and remains so), confined to asylums on the outskirts of 
society. Even in the force of its exclusion, the building 
remains, its bricks and mortar charged with the power of the 
unknown; a sense of the taboo that casts a shadow over the 
city and over its sense of the normal. In exactly the same 
way the various forms of the logos of madness insert 
themselves back into the prevailing discourse upsetting its 
free flow, its pure surface. If this subterfuge was solely 
restricted to the madman's writing (Cowper and Smart) it 
would remain little more than an oddity - something to be 
placed in anthologies of psychosis - but that it is sustained 
in Nietzsche and Beckett instigates a terrorism against the 
community (of language). For the latter especially, those 
places where language (as the embodiment of reason) seems 
most sure of itself are the places where unreason declares 
its presence. 
At the margins of discourse, in every lacuna, every 
comma, every period, madness appears disfigured and 
disfiguring. The language that should reflect and corroborate 
our living becomes the mirror wherein we see the other side. 
It is the eternal fact of madness that denies our truths, 
laughs at tragedy, weeps at accomplishment and refuses to 
bestow upon the subject a sense of finitude, of having 
arrived. 
In its presence madness is still located On Babel. If 
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sanity depicts the mad logos as that which will Babble On 
then madness has its revenge. Madness forces the sanity of 
language to Babel On, to continue and to continue 
perpetuating the same mistakes. From the margins its absence 
defies language's desire for order and forces it to continue 
- sealing up the holes, repairing the leaks, adding letters, 
impossibly trying to finish the sentence. 
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NOTES 
Clovio's Ivory Tower 
1 I intend to use the term 'madman' in its generic 
sense rather than the awkward 'madperson' or madman/woman. 
However, as Foucault suggests, there are differences in the 
way in which madness is treated within gender (see 136-58). 
For a feminist reading of madness see Marilyn Yalom's 
Maternity, Mortality and the Literature of Madness. 
University Park: Pennsylvania State UP., 1985. 
2 I have used the terms 'source and target' according to 
their conventional use in translation studies: 
What is generally understood as translation involves 
the rendering of a source language (SL) text into the 
target language (TL) so as to ensure that (1) the 
surface meaning of the two will be approximately 
similar and (2) the structures of the SL will be 
preserved as closely as possible but not so closely 
that the TL structures will be seriously distorted. 
(Bassnett-McGuire 2) 
3The various editions of Nietzsche's writings have 
necessitated the use of a different form of documentation. I 
have chosen the more popular method: all quotations are 
notated by a paragraph number. When referencing critics the 
difference will be indicated by the use 'p' denoting 'page'. 
4 R.J. Hollingdale associates the melancholy prophet with 
Schopenhauer (p 157) and while this is, no doubt, a valid 
assumption it must be remembered that it is he who most 
threatens Zarathustra's certainty. The prophet is far more 
than a mere representation of his predecessor. 
1 
Cowper: The Art of Nearly Drowning. 
1cowper's interest in animals is reflected through his 
madness and becomes for Hoosag K. Gregory a matter of suspicion: 
I am a hare myself, Cowper seems to be saying, who 
have always feared being left alone and betrayed by 
those on whom I had believed I could depend ... and 
perhaps by making you [his pets] perfectly safe 
from further dangers, I can somehow ensure my own 
safety. ( 45) 
These Freudian insights say nothing about Cowper's poetry (mad or 
otherwise) that is not equally applicable to the modus vivendi of 
the S.P.C.A. In contrast one of the most interesting attempts at 
integrating Cowper's mental anguish into an understanding of his 
poetry, is that of Vincent Newey in Cowper's Poetry: a critical 
study and reassessment. 
2 The similarity between Milton and Cowper is 
comprehensively covered by Dustin Griffin in "Cowper, Milton 
and the Recovery of Paradise". Concentrating on his position 
as a 'transitional' poet, Kenneth MacLean discusses Cowper's 
affiliation to the work of Wordsworth and Keats. See also 
Patricia Meyer Spacks' The Poetry of Vision (chapters two 
through seven). Newey's entire thesis draws attention to the 
relation between Cowper and the early romantics; especially 
Wordsworth and Coleridge. 
3 In the context of our discussion, the most noteworthy 
explication is offered by Newey in a chapter entitled "'The 
Castaway', Hymns and other Poems''. Approaching the poem from 
his discussion of The Olney Hymns he notes that many similar 
techniques are used in "The Castaway", to explore his 
distance from the devotional paradigm. See also Quinlan's 
assessment of Cowper's poetry in terms of imagaic 
2 
consistency, where the sea becomes an increasingly loaded 
image, depicting the threat of dissolution. 
Smart: The Fool 's Asy 1 um 
1 Jubilate Agna. ed. Karina Williamson. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980). All subsequent references will be to 
this edition. The main difference between her edition and 
Bond's is found in her dispensing with the rather clumsy 
division of Fragment B into B1 and B2 . 
2 Lilian Feder also points this out when she notes that 
"the insane during these centuries [late 17th and 18th] 
were generally treated not as alternate selves of the 
sane, but as their 'Antipodes', whose cure could be 
effected, if at all, only through some form of 
prescribed punishment". (148) 
3 While this is accepted as a matter of course by post-
structuralist criticism, it is inimical to those critics who 
are concerned with verifiable influence and a certainty of 
intention. Thus much of the extensive scholarship that 
Jubilate has initiated, has delved deeply into the period and 
found influences that constitute a daunting collection of 
esoterica. While the influence of Bishop Lowth's Lectures on 
the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews is accepted by most, other 
influences are less evident. Dearnley suggests precedents in 
John Ray, Isaac Watts and Samuel Boyse (82-95). John Block 
Friedman detects the influence of "Henry More, Nathaniel 
Culverwel, Benjamin Whichcote or John Norris" (1967: 255). 
Albert J. Kuhn finds influences as remote as Rev. John Brown, 
William Law and Swedenborg (1963: 123). Finally Williamson 
discovers a major influence in John Hutchinson's Moses 
3 
Principal (416). Perhaps the most astounding aspect of this 
collection is Smart's mad perspecuity in (consciously or 
unconsciously) touching on these ideas in his poem. 
4 See A. Sherbo, "Christopher Smart, Reader of 
Obituaries." Modern Language Notes. 71, 1956. 177-82. 
5 The Kabbalist spirit of atonement has very little in 
common with Geoffrey Hartman's use of the word in his 
analysis of Smart. His otherwise brilliant reading is infused 
with a perception of Smart as guilty neurotic who senses that 
he is disturbing the 'holy Sabbath' of creation by 
his recreation; that he is trespassing on sacred 
property or stealing an image of it or even 
exalting himself as maker ... Smart therefore atones 
the exposed, self-conscious self by at-one-ing it 
with the creature. (own emphasis [432]) 
Ironically, Hartman is guilty of that "trespassing" which he 
suspects in Smart. See Geoffrey H. Hartman, "Christopher 
Smart's 'Magnificat': Toward a Theory of Representation." 
Journal of English Literary History. 41 (1974): 429-54. 
6 The flexibility of Jubilate's form has allowed for 
many contemporary variations. As Bruce Hunsberger has argued, 
in "Kit Smart's Howl", there are various connections between 
Jubilate and its mutated offspring by Allen Ginsberg. Perhaps 
less obvious, but equally rewarding, are the connections that 
exist between Smart's poem and Anne Sexton's "Magnificat". 
1 
full: 
Murphy: that Harmless Lunacy 
The passage from which this comes deserves quoting in 
a feeble idea may be obtained of what awaits him 
too smart not to know better, better than to leave 
his black cell and that harmless lunacy, faint 
4 
flicker every age or so, the consciousness of 
being, of having been. (82) 
2 Mysticism and the mystic quest is the theme of Helene 
Baldwin's Samuel Beckett's Real Silence. In an already 
somewhat contrived reading of Beckett's Trilogy, she 
mysteriously ignores the 'plenitude of mystical reference' in 
Murphy by arguing that his early work cannot be "subsumed 
under the rubric of mysticism and metaphysical quest I am 
attempting to outline ... " (10). This is odd, for surely 
Murphy's quest could be seen as assuming the process 
indicated by St. John of the Cross: 
1 
I remained, lost in oblivion; 
My Face I reclined on my Beloved. 
All ceased and I ab,ndoned myself, 
Leaving my cares 
Forgotten among the lilies. (The Collected works of 
St John of the Cross 348) 
Watt: If this be Reason there's Madness In't. 
Such, it seems, is the problem that has plagued those 
yearning to speak of the essential spirit of things, be they 
mystics or poets: the indefinite vocabulary in The Cloud of 
Unknowing, the harassed tone in Yeats' The Vi.sior1 1 an,1 the 
defeatist centre in Eliot's earlier work: 
I am moved by fancies that are curled 
Around these images, and cling: 
The notion of some infinitely gentle 
Infinitely suffering thing. ("Preludes" 24-5, own 
emphasis). 
2 There exists an evocative connection between Beckett's 
work and the strange productions of, at least, two Russian 
writers of the preceeding century. Both Ivan Goncharov (in 
Oblomov) and Gogol (in "Diary of a Madman" and "The 
Overcoat") muster a prose that is extremely reminiscent of 
5 
Beckett's. Gogol could well be describing Watt when he 
describes Akaky's attempt to express himself: 
Akaky Akakievic spoke mainly in prepositions, 
adverbs, and resorted to parts of speech which had 
no meaning whatsoever. If the subject was 
particularly complicated he would even leave whole 
sentences unfinished, so that very often he would 
begin with: 'That is really exactly what ... ' and 
then forget to say anything more, convinced that he 
had said what he wanted to. (80-81) 
Perhaps even more evocative is the biographical similarity 
that has both authors setting their tales in St. Petersburg (a 
kind of Russian Dublin that was for Gogol "a graveyard of 
dreams" [qtd. in Introduction 11 ]) and has Gogol destroying 
his work and starving himself to death and Goncharov as a 
paranoid recluse living out the last 22 years of his life in 
silence, in St. Petersburg. 
6 
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